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Abstract of Thesis
This thesis provides an examination of the contemporary 
discussion of incarnational language as its receives 
classical expression in the formulations of the Council 
of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. with a view to developing an 
incarnational account based on God’s identification with 
desus of Nazareth. With this in view consideration is 
given to a number of contemporary defences of the logic 
of Chalcedon viewed as a literal statement of
identity. It is argued that such defences fail in that 
they carry over the tensions inherent in Chalcedon 
unresolved into their own positions. From this conclusion 
consideration is given to the criticism that 
incarnational language is not literal but metaphorical. 
This is agreed, but an argument is offered to show that
metaphors can refer and bear cognitive information and 
as such are capable of conceptual articulation. It is 
further argued that there is an important class of
metaphors which are ’theory-constitutive’ such that the
theoretical claims which they embody cannot be expressed 
apart from the metaphor. An attempt is made to show that 
the metaphor of incarnation is one such ’theory- 
constitutive’ metaphor.
The results of this general discussion of incarnational
language are then applied to the christological theories 
of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Donald Baillie. It is 
argued that they are legitimate and proper attempts to
articulate the claims embodied in the metaphor of 
incarnation. An attempt is made to show that they offer a 
genuine middle way between Chalcedon and purely
inspirational accounts of the incarnation. However, it is 
conceded that the traditional question raised against 
these theories, as to whether or not they can
successfully maintain a unity of person, is a legitimate 
one, given their failure to indicate adequately how the 
union operated.
The concept of God’s identification with Jesus of
Nazareth is introduced as one which shares a certain 
’family resemblance' to Baillie’s and Theodore’s
approach. It is argued that the concept of identification 
provides the type of conceptual underpinning that both 
Baillie’s and Theodore’s approach require. The fourth and 
fifth chapters of this thesis are devoted to presenting 
an account of the incarnation from the perspective of 
identification with particular emphasis being given to 
demonstrating that the concept of identification can 
account for the unity of God and man in Christ whilst 
respecting the integrity and individuality of the human 
person .
CHAPTER ONE
TWO INTO ONE WON'T GO!
Contemporary Questions on the Doctrine of the
Incarnation
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1.(1) Contemporary Questions on the Incarnation
Recent treatments of the incarnation have concentrated 
on a number of separate though interrelated problems 
which the traditional formulations of the doctrine are 
believed to raise. There are a number of ways in which 
one can characterise these problems but for convenience 
sake they can be grouped adequately under four broad 
headings. Firstly, there is the question as to whether 
or not the New Testament evidence supports or demands 
the later credal interpretations of the person and 
nature of Christ. Secondly, there is the related but 
distinct question of the historical conditioning of the 
doctrine of the incarnation, particularly as it was 
influenced by Greek Metaphysics. Thirdly, there is the 
problem of the uniqueness and finality of the Christian 
claims concerning Christ. This difficulty has at least 
two foci: initially the problem of the finality of
Christ finds expression when one considers the Christian 
faith in relation to the other great world religions. 
However, there is often a second sense attached to the 
notion of the uniqueness of Christ which is that it is 
just incongruous for those of us who live with a 
developmental and evolutionary world view to attach 
absolute significance to a particular man at a 
particular moment in world history. Finally-, there is
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the charge which will be the particular concern of this 
chapter, namely, that the doctrine of the incarnation is 
incoherent and meaningless in that it maintains a 
logical contradiction.(1)
This final issue is exceedingly important and as such 
has come to the forefront of contemporary theological 
and philosophical discussion. The reasons for this are 
not hard to find as a doctrine which is logically 
incoherent cannot justifiably be maintained by any 
person who wishes to explicate her faith according to 
the accepted canons of rationality. Therefore, if the 
Chalcedonian understanding of the person of Christ can 
be shown to be incoherent it matters little whether or 
not the doctrine can find support in the New Testament, 
or that it can be shown to be a culturally conditioned 
concept, if it is incoherent at the conceptual level 
then it has to be reformulated or abandoned.
The issue of logical incoherence indeed all of the 
issues we have outlined came to the forefront of popular 
debate in the celebrated volume of essays entitled THE 
MYTH OF GOD INCARNATE .(2) Although causing something of 
a furore at the time much of what was contained in these 
essays had been anticipated in earlier works.Indeed it 
could be argued that the debate advanced very little
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 3
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beyond the criticisms offered by Harnack and Troeltsch 
at the beginning of this century and by Strauss in the 
middle of the previous century,(3) Yet, for the 
purposes of this thesis, the volume is of interest in 
that it brings together and crystallises in a concise 
form many of the problems which are felt to pertain to 
the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. With that 
in mind I intend to use the essays presented there as a 
suitable springing off point for entering into the 
incarnational debate.
Broadly speaking the contributors to the volume felt 
that the traditional Chalcedonian model of the 
incarnation was no longer tenable. Their reasons for
believing this can be regarded as falling under the
four headings outlined earlier. The four headings are
useful as interpretative categories but it should be 
noted that they are not always kept separate by critics 
of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation, many of 
whom, like Don Cupitt, seem to be arguing on all or most 
of these points at one and the same time.
For the purposes of this thesis I intend to leave aside, 
for the most part, the question of the New Testament 
evidence. My reasons for so doing are two­
fold.Firstly,there is the necessary limitation of space.
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Any thesis has to give priority to its own particular 
concerns. In this case the focus of attention is upon
the doctrine of the incarnation as it finds its fullest 
expression in the formulations of the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451 A.D. As such the question as to whether 
or not the New Testament supports the full- blown
doctrine is of related but subsidiary interest.
Secondly, there is the widespread disagreement among New 
Testament scholars about what can conscientiously be 
said about the incarnational texts of the New Testament. 
It would require a thesis devoted to this topic alone to 
clarify this situation. Finally, I would wish to argue 
that whatever view is taken on the question of whether 
or not the New Testament envisages an ontological
identity between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth, it 
seems to be clear that the New Testament envisages at 
least a functional identity between God the Son and 
Jesus of Nazareth.(4) That is, despite the evident 
diversity of Christological models that are contained in 
the New Testament, the New Testament writers are 
fundamentally in agreement in holding that Christ 
represents God to man and man to God. In other words the 
message that God was decisively and uniquely present in 
Christ is the underlying conviction of the entire New 
Testament.
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page
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This point is worth making, for many of the problems 
(although not the logical problems) that are felt to 
pertain to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation 
apply just as much to any functional identification of 
Jesus of Nazareth with God the Son which is construed in 
New Testament terms. For example, the problems of the 
uniqueness of Christ in his relationship to God and his 
specific and absolute importance for human salvation are 
raised as much under the functional model of Christ as 
they are under the Chalcedonian model, Frances Young in 
her contribution to the 'Myth' debate recognises as 
much when she writes:
"On the whole the New Testament is totally 
Christocentric. Maybe the content and form of 
the confessions are not all that distinctive, 
yet their combined application as
interpretative categories for the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth is unparalleled; and the force of this is 
to make Jesus the one intermediary through whom 
God is revealed and can be approached with 
confidence."(5)
The debate as to whether or not the New Testament
ascribes an ontological relationship between Jesus of
Nazareth and God the Son is, as I have said, a long and
technical one. Precise agreement is hard to find as to
how the nuances of expression in the New Testament are
to be interpreted. For example Don Cupitt's assessment
of the New Testament evidence is that "... the New
Testament nowhere says that the Son of God is God of
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God. In pre-Nicene days the phrase 'Son of God' could be 
used to emphasise the difference of status between 
Jesus and God..."(6) Graham Stanton in direct response 
to Cupitt argues that although the early Christians were 
slow and cautious to refer to Jesus as God (an 
understandable diffidence given their monotheistic 
background) yet it is at least equally impressive that 
given this background they did in fact on occasion edge 
towards such language.(7)
It would be fair to say that the debate upon what the 
New Testament can be reasonably held to say about Jesus 
of Nazareth and his relationship to God the Son is not 
settled in either the "Myth of God" debate or in the 
subsequent volume Incarnation and Myth: The Debate
Continued.(8) Nor indeed could one reasonably expect 
non-technical and popular volumes such as these to 
settle the issue. It would be helpful if the specialist 
literature could be looked to for a final and 
conclusive answer, but unfortunately none seems to be 
forthcoming despite the valiant attempts of a number of 
scholars.(9)
Generally speaking, although one recognises the 
necessary distortions of generalisations, the view of 
the majority of New Testament scholars would tend
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 7
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towards a functionalist presentation of the person of 
Christ in the New Testament. That is, despite the 
Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, the intimations of pre­
existence in the Pauline writings and in the Letter to 
the Hebrews, and the use of titles such as Son of God 
and Lord, no clear ontological relationship which can 
be held to imply that Jesus is 'very God of very God' in 
the sense intended by the later creeds exists in the 
New Testament documents. Christ's relationship with God 
is best described as one of the embodiment of the Spirit 
and the power of God. A Sonship which is constituted and 
revealed by his perfect obedience to the Father.(10)
The difficulty in establishing what the New Testament 
can be held to say concerning the relationship between 
Jesus of Nazareth and God the Son is exacerbated by 
recent trends in hermeneutical theory. For example, 
David Brown, in his work The Divine Trinity, agrees 
with Frances Young's assessment that the New Testament 
evidence largely points to a functional understanding of 
the person of Christ.(11) Yet he wishes to argue that 
although this may have been the intention of the New 
Testament authors there may yet be implications within 
the texts they created which have ontological import. 
Brown wants to maintain that certain motifs that the 
New Testament writers used concerning Christ have
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implied within them the substance of later ontological 
reflection. Notions such as pre-existence and the 
hypostasis of wisdom, the Logos prologue, the assertions 
that Christ was in the form of God, that the fulness of 
God dwelt within him, etc., carry with them ontological 
ramifications whether or not the New Testament writers 
intended this.
Brown argues that it is necessary to distinguish between 
the historical origin and the theological truth of 
certain ideas.(12) According to Brown, we need not make 
the disciples' intentions our own.It is possible to 
recognise that their monotheistic assumptions prevented 
them from completing the equation that Christ was God 
the Son but to nevertheless see that this is the 
logical outcome of the pre-eminence that they accorded 
Christ in the scheme of salvation and of the fact that 
they addressed worship to him.
Although this may seem in one sense to be forcing a 
reading upon the New Testament beyond the intent of its 
authors, there is something to be said for Brown's 
approach. It is clear that the New Testament pattern, as 
far as it can be detected, seems to begin with an 
assertion of Jesus as one who is closely associated with 
the escha tological reign of God. In this close
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 9
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association he is himself the embodiment of God's 
purpose and message. However, this early witness to 
Jesus demanded the type of conceptual clarification that 
the later New Testament writings and the early fathers 
engaged in. A 'functional' christology demands to be 
interpreted along the lines of showing what would have 
to be the case for it to be true that Jesus was in his 
teaching and ministry the embodiment of God's message 
and purpose. As we know the Church eventually decided 
that Jesus would have to be 'very God of very God' in 
order to inaugurate the Kingdom of God, in order to be 
the manifestation and harbinger of God’s saving grace. 
It is not for us to say that this type of conceptual 
development is a betrayal of an earlier and more 
primitive message although we may say that the 
particular conceptual development that arose is not the 
only, and not necessarily the best, possible 
interpretation.
The purpose of mentioning Brown's treatment of the New 
Testament data was not to enter into the debate 
concerning whether or not the meaning of a text is 
independent of the author's intention, rather it was 
merely to show how difficult it can be to assess the New 
Testament data and its precise implications for 
articulating Jesus of Nazareth's relationship to God
Page 10 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
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the Son. Having established the case that no clear
opinion exists among New Testament scholars on those
texts which seem to imply an ontological linking of 
Jesus to God the Son, I merely wish to note the point 
and pass on.
1.(ii) The issues of identity and coherence.
Of all the difficulties raised against the traditional 
doctrine of Chalcedon it is the accusation of logical 
incoherence that is potentially the most damaging. An
incoherent account of the person of Christ cannot
justifiably be sustained by even the most credulous
believer once the incoherence has been demonstrated. But 
to raise the issue of the demonstration of incoherence 
is perhaps to arrive immediately at the heart of the
issue. For many scholars have asserted forcefully and 1
}volubly that the traditional doctrine is incoherent but 
few have offered a developed argument that conclusively 
demonstrates that fact.
Within the 'Myth of God' symposium it is Don Cupitt and 
John Hick who most emphatically argue that the
Chalcedonian definition of 'two natures in one person' 
is a logical contradiction, but this assumption seems to 
be hovering around in the background in a number of the
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 11
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essays.Cupitt and Hick both developed the claim of 
logical contradiction in earlier works and they add 
nothing substantially new in their work for the 'Myth' 
collection.(13) Cupitt articulates the point most 
clearly when he argues that "the eternal God and a 
historical man are two beings of quite different 
ontological status. It is simply unintelligible to 
declare them identical."(14) Hick in similar fashion 
maintains that the assertion that Jesus is God is as 
devoid of meaning as a statement of the form that a 
'circle is a square',(15)
Both theologians have been roundly criticised for the 
imprecision of their terminology in that the Church has 
never declared that Jesus is identical with God 
simpliciter .(16) The traditional doctrine is that Jesus 
is identical with God the Son, the second person of the 
Trinity. However, since God the Son is held to be very 
God of very God, equal in power, status, substance and 
significant attributes to God the Father then the 
thrust of Cupitt and Hick's suggestion retains its 
original force.
Although Cupitt and Hick never precisely spell out those 
aspects of divinity and humanity which they take to be 
logically incompatible it is not difficult to put flesh
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on the bare bones of their argument. By definition the 
God of classical theism is pure Being or Spirit, 
necessarily existent, incorporeal, infinite, omnipotent, 
omniscient, standardly held to be immutable and 
impassible. Human beings are contingent, finite, 
corporeal, limited in power and knowledge and certainly 
open to change and emotion. Given this rudimentary 
outline of what it means to be divine and human it is 
not difficult to see what generates the charge of 
logical incoherence. How can any one person 
simultaneously exemplify the attributes of necessity and 
contingency, infinity and finitude, incorporeality and 
corporeality, eternity yet having a beginning in time? 
The answer given by Cupitt and Hick is that no being can 
exemplify all of these properties at one and the same 
time for they are logical complements.
It is clear that the underlying philosophical theory 
behind these criticisms is the theory governing strict 
numerical identity. This theory sometimes known as 
Leibniz' Law argues that for 'a' to be identical with 
'b ' then any property which 'a' has must also be 
exemplified by 'b '. This principle is known as the 
'indiscernibility of identicals'. It would be fair, I 
think, to say that this was the standard position on the 
question of identity among philosophers although there
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are a number of notable philosophers who opt for a
thesis of relative identity. This thesis argues that the 
statement 'a' is identical to ' b ' is an incomplete 
expression and must be expanded into the form 'a' is the 
same ' F ' as ' b ' where ' F ' is some sortal concept term 
before it becomes intelligible. According to this theory 
'a' and ' b ' are identical only with respect to ' F ' and 
may therefore differ at some other point.(17)
The thesis of relative identity has been put to great
use in recent philosophical discussions of the Trinity.
It is argued that this thesis saves the Trinitarian
doctrine from falling into logical incoherence by saying 
that God the Son and God the Father can be the same God 
but not the same person.(IB) Despite the obvious 
attractions of this theory for Trinitarian thought it is 
of limited value when applied to the problem of the 
logical coherence of the incarnation. The classical 
theory of the incarnation states that God the Son and 
Jesus of Nazareth are identical in that they are the 
same person. However, it is precisely this issue, the 
issue of whether or not one person can simultaneously 
co-exemplify divine and human attributes that is at 
question here. Therefore, on any theory of identity the 
problem will remain that of showing how any one person 
can, at one and the same time, exemplify mutually
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contradictory attributes. Consequently the theory of 
identity that will be presupposed in the ensuing 
discussion will be that for 'a ' to be identical with 'b ' 
any property which belongs to *a* must also be 
exemplified by ' b ' . As such in order for it to be the 
case that Oesus of Nazareth is identical with God the 
Son then according to the principle of indiscernibility 
any property or attribute which essentially belongs to 
God the Son must belong to Oesus of Nazareth and vice 
versa .
It is clear from the earlier discussion of both Hick 
and Cupitt that this theory of strict numerical
identity has already been presupposed in the theological 
discussion. As they and other contemporary 
theologians have attempted to flesh out the logical 
difficulties of the incarnation it is precisely the
notion of the impossibility of one person co-
Bxemplifying contradictory attributes which has been 
brought out. For example, Maurice Wiles has argued that 
'being created is part of the meaning of man' and that 
'not being created is part of the meaning of God'(19)
Here there is a direct assertion of a logical 
contradiction in the doctrine of the incarnation.
Obviously one and the same person cannot be both
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 15
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'created' and 'not created' .(Even the thesis of relative 
identity would have difficulties at this point). The 
question at issue therefore becomes, is being created 
part of the meaning of man? Being uncreated seems to be 
part of the meaning of God, for God's properties are
usually held to belong to him essentially or 
necessarily, but is that the case for human nature?
I.(iii) The Integrity of the Humanity of Christ
As theologians and philosophers have discussed the
coherence of the incarnation it has emerged that there 
are two separate questions which have to be answered
successfully if the doctrine is to be shown to be
coherent. The first question concerns the possibility of 
human nature incarnating the Word of God without thereby 
losing its status as a truly human nature. The second 
problem is to show that it is possible for the divine
Word to become incarnate without threatening the 
integrity of its divine nature. In this section the
focus of concern will be upon the possibility of a human 
nature manifesting the fulness of the divine nature 
without losing its integrity in the process.
In earlier references to those theologians who had
maintained that the doctrine of the incarnation was
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incoherent it was pointed out that they had asserted 
rather than demonstrated that this was indeed the case. 
The lack of a developed argument demonstrating this 
point was put right by A.D. Smith in an article entitled 
"God's Death".(20) Smith is aware of the type of 
manoeuvres that have been traditionally used to defend 
the doctrine and he develops a subtle argument which is 
designed to negate such tactics. As such, his probing of 
the questions constitutes one of the most sophisticated 
attempts to show the incoherence of the two-nature view 
of Christ.
Smith focuses upon the concept of human death as a means 
of demonstrating that there are properties which God the 
Son would have which a human being cannot possess and 
remain a human being. Smith asks whether we can properly 
speak of God's death on the Cross. It makes sense to say 
that Sesus of Nazareth died on the Cross, but in what 
sense can God be said to die? The classical response to 
this question would be to say that God the Son did not
die as such but that he experienced the death of the
human nature which he had assumed.
Smith attempts to forestall this response and to hoist 
the traditional doctrine by its own petard. According to 
Smith there are certain possibilities which apply to
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human beings after death. There is the possibility of 
annihilation, which is what most people fear, and there 
is the possibility of mere bodily death ('somatic 
termination' in Smith's words). Mere bodily death allows 
for the continued existence of consciousness,soul or 
spirit. This continued existence is said by Smith to be 
conditional in that it is a free and gracious gift of 
God to sustain human beings in existence after death. 
Conditional immortality is contrasted with absolute or 
necessary immortality which Smith argues is not a 
position which could win the support of the theological 
tradition of Christianity.(21)
Smith then applies these notions to Christ's death. It 
seems obvious that we cannot speak of the possibility of 
annihilation in relation to Christ, for he is identical 
with God the Son. If he faced annihilation then there 
would be a time when the Son was not, at least for the 
period of the few days after Good Friday. It seems part 
of the definition of God that he cannot cease to exist 
and on this understanding alone annihilation is not a 
possibility for Jesus of Nazareth.
Consideration must therefore be given to the idea of 
survival after bodily termination. On Smith's 
understanding, this survival, if it is human, must be
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conditional, a survival which is a result of a free and 
gracious act of God. Yet this would mean that, if God 
the Son is truly human then the eternity of the Son is 
not absolute, or necessary, but conditional. It is 
conditional in that there was a time when the Son’s 
existence was maintained by a special act of grace of, 
presumably the Father, or the Father and the Spirit
jointly.(22)
Smith proceeds to argue that this cannot be the case 
as if Christ is God the Son then he is necessarily 
eternal and this precludes any notion of his taking upon 
himself conditional immortality. As a result the only 
possible type of 'death' that God the Son can experience 
is bodily termination, but as that does not include the 
possibility of annihilation it cannot be a genuinely
human death. For it is part of the meaning of human 
death that in it human beings face the possibility of 
annihilation.
Smith suggests that a similar type of argument can be 
put forward for the notion of coming into existence. It
is part of the meaning of man that he is contingent,
that he comes into existence. This is obviously a 
property which the 'eternal' Son of God cannot assume
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 19
Tula Into One Won't Go!
and therefore he cannot have become man in the sense 
that other contingent human beings are men.(23)
The importance of these categories of 'ceasing to exist'
and 'coming into existence' is that they resist the
traditional separation of properties into those which
are held to be approriate to each nature. As Smith
points out, they are notions which apply to the whole
being of an object. A division and attribution to the
two-natures would, according to Smith, "locate an
ontological gulf within the person of Christ" and would
have the effect of dividing the substance of Christ as
unacceptably as any Nestorian, it would make any talk of
the unity of Christ a collection of empty words.(24)
The force of Smith's point must be taken on board here.
He is arguing that,
"One and the same entity cannot cease to 
exist at two different times or at any one 
time have two incompatible ontological statuses; 
no more can one single entity both cease to exist 
and never cease to exist, or have both conditional 
immortality at a certain point in history and yet 
also possess necessary existence eternally. To 
refer such fundamental ontological differences 
to the two natures in Christ is blatantly 
to hypostasise Christ's natures, to treat them 
as entities or substances in their own right, and 
thus to fracture the supposed unity of the one 
individual comprising both natures."(25)
Smith's argument is powerful and persuasive and it 
blocks a variety of moves sometimes put forward to
Page 20 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
■ î
Two Into One Won't Go!
defend the traditional doctrine. It blocks the appeal to 
the two-natures as a means of solving the dilemma by 
arguing that ceasing to exist is the type of property 
that has to apply to Jesus of Nazareth in his concrete 
entirety. It also interestingly blocks any Kenotic moves 
as an attempt to solve the problem. It may or may not be 
plausible to argue that an omnipotent and omniscient 
being can temporarily lay aside these attributes to be 
fully human, but it surely makes no sense to say that an 
eternal being can lay aside its eternal nature and 
cease to exist for a time or for that matter can come 
into existence at a particular time?
Given Smith's lucid development of the logical 
difficulties which he feels pertain to the doctrine of 
the incarnation it is not difficult to sympathise with 
the thrust of the argument. It must be conceded that at 
least a prima facie case of logical incoherence has 
been established. It is disheartening therefore to see 
the haphazard treatment that the question of incoherence 
receives from some defenders of the doctrine. Brian 
Hebblethwaite contents himself with the counter-argument 
that the notions of divinity and humanity are not terms 
which are sufficiently precise to establish the 
logical impossibility of their being co-exemplified 
simultaneously in one person,(26)
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Whilst there may be some truth in this, it is 
nevertheless an appeal to vagueness. It can be agreed 
that the being of God is ultimately mysterious, pure 
being beyond our comprehension, and Hebblethwaite is 
right to say that we do not have a sufficient 
understanding to say that the divine cannot become 
incarnate in the human. Yet, God has been traditionally 
defined according to the categories of omnipotence, 
omniscience, infinity etc. These categories may not 
capture God in his essential being but they do seem to 
say enough about God to at least establish an initial 
plausibility to the claim that a being so defined cannot 
take on the limitations inherent in being human.
Powerful as Smith's challenge is it depends very heavily 
upon certain concepts constituting part of the meaning 
of being human. Is it really part of the meaning of 
being human that we have conditional immortality? Or 
that we have a certain beginning in time? It is true 
that all human beings have possessed these attributes, 
but are they essential to what it is to be a human 
person?
This question is explicitly and forcefully pursued by 
T .V . Morris in his work The Logic of God Incarnate .(27) 
In this work, which is the most thorough treatment yet
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of the logical problems of the doctrine of the 
incarnation, Morris attempts to show that the two-nature 
model of the person of Christ as formulated at the 
Council of Chalcedon can withstand the charge of logical 
incoherence. He is not attempting to show that the 
doctrine is true or probable, merely that it is not ,i;
logically impossible. Minimal as this task may appear it 
is nevertheless an important one when a number of 
scholars are stating that the doctrine is
incoherent.(28)
Morris allows that the statement Jesus of Nazareth is 
God the Son is a literal numerical identity claim which 
must satisfy the principle which governs all identity 
claims, namely, the principle of the indiscernibility of 
identicals. In order for it to be true that Jesus of 
Nazareth is identical with God the Son every property 
which is necessary and essential to being God the Son 
must apply to Jesus of Nazareth and every property 
essential to being Jesus of Nazareth must apply to God 
the Son.
In order to show the logical propriety of the doctrine 
Morris begins by making a number of distinctions. 
Firstly, he draws a distinction between a creature's 
'individual nature' and its 'kind nature'. An
Two Into One Won't Go! I'individual nature' is that set of properties which 
constitutes who and what the individual is. 'Kind ■ ,|
natures' are a larger category denoting a commonality of 
properties held by members of a certain species or 
group. A 'kind nature' would therefore specify the 
particular group of properties individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for membership of that kind.(29)
Morris argues that although no one person can have more 
than one 'individual nature', it is not the case that an 
individual cannot have more than one 'kind nature'. For 
example, I have my own 'individual nature' and no other 
nature, but I have a number of 'kind natures'. I have 
the 'kind natures' of being human, male,mammal etc.(30)
At this point Morris begins to foresee certain 
difficulties with the concept of 'kind natures'. For, 
according to standard accounts, 'kind natures' are 
essential to their members, that is, I exemplify my 
'kind nature' of humanity essentially. I literally could 
not exist as "I" without exemplifying the 'kind-nature' 
of humanity. The reason for this is that if "I" existed 
without exemplifying humanity I would quite literally 
not be myself but some other species or being. Such a 
view seems on the surface level to be intuitively valid 
and unobjectionable. However, it does cause problems
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when applied to the doctrine of the incarnation. For 
it would mean that God the Son did not assume humanity 
at a particular point in time but must always have 
displayed humanity essentially, if he were ever to 
display it at all, for 'kind natures' are not held 
contingently but essentially by their members.
In order to derail this objection Morris has to argue 
that anyone who wishes to maintain the traditional 
doctrine of the incarnation will have to reject the 
theory that 'kind natures' are held essentially by every 
one of their members.(31) Since Christian orthodoxy has 
always maintained that God the Son took on humanity at a 
particular point in time and prior to that did not 
display humanity then the notion that 'kind natures' 
must be displayed essentially by their members has to be 
abandoned as not to do so would leave the doctrine open 
to the charge of logical incoherence.
Morris' position becomes even more complex (and 
difficult to defend) when he allows that any typical 
member of a natural kind will belong to that kind 
essentially. That is, a tiger cannot exist without 
exemplifying its 'tigerishness', and 'I' cannot exist 
without exemplifying humanity essentially. However, 
Morris argues that no orthodox Christian will argue that
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J b s u s  was a typical member of the natural kind of 
humanity.(32) The point that is being made is that an 
individual with only one 'kind nature' must exemplify 
that nature essentially. However, if an indiviudal has 
more than one 'kind nature' he must necessarily 
exemplify one of them but the other 'kind nature' can be 
exemplified contingently. On this theory God the Son 
exemplifies his 'kind nature' of divinity essentially 
but displays the 'kind nature' of humanity contingently 
thus satisfying the traditional belief that God became 
incarnate at a particular point in time and also 
satisfying the philosophical requirement of displaying 
at least one 'kind nature' essentially.
One cannot help but feel that the whole thrust of 
Morris' strategy here separates Christ's humanity from 
every other instance of humanity to such an extent that 
it is no longer recognisable as humanity. At any rate it 
is clear that the "essential" person under consideration 
is God the Son. In so far as he is defending the 
traditional interpretation of Chalcedon this is to 
Morris' credit in that he recognises that this is in 
effect what the tradition has taught. However, he seems 
oblivious to the fact that it is precisely this tendency 
within the tradition, from Alexandria onward, which has 
threatened the true humanity of Oesus.
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Furthermore one cannot help but feel that a more 
satisfactory way of dealing with the problem of 'kind - 
natures' being exemplified essentially by their members 
would be to resort to the Barthian claim that God willed 
to become incarnate before the creation of the world. 
Thus, in a sense, the whole history of the world is 
nothing other than the working out of God's primal 
decision to become one with us. By recourse to this 
notion of a primal decision, and with reference to the 
concept of God's timeless existence, one could perhaps 
have argued that God the Son displayed humanity 
essentially although the incarnation took place at a 
particular point in time. Certainly it could be argued 
that in the realm of possible worlds and transworld 
identities so beloved of philosophers of Morris' ilk 
there is no possible world in which God is not the God 
who has become incarnate. For incarnation has become a 
fact in the life of God himself who therefore exists in 
every possible world as the God who was incarnate in the 
life of Jesus of Nazareth.
The distinction between essential and non- essential 
'kind natures' and between typical and non-typical human 
beings leads to another set of distinctions that 
Morris wishes to make. He wishes to distinguish between 
being 'merely human' and being 'fully human' and between
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having 'essential' human properties and having 'common' 
or universal human properties.(33) More will be said
about these distinctions later but attention is drawn to 
Morris' questionable tactic of utlilising dogmatic
considerations to rule out philosophical positions which 
conflict with the position he wishes to defend.
One must question the use of a dogmatic bar in a work of
this nature. It is of course familiar from the writings 
of Barth that we do not impose an abstract conception of 
divinity or humanity upon the figure of Christ. Rather 
the method is to find out what we can know about God and 
man from what we know of Christ.(34) Whilst this is 
perhaps acceptable within the field of dogmatic theology 
it is not so acceptable in a work which seeks to show
the logical coherence, by strictly rational arguments, 
of the doctrine of the incarnation. The reason why it is 
so objectionable is that Morris is arguing that 
adherence to the very doctrine which is being questioned 
will rule out a philosophical position which seems 
otherwise unobjectionable (a position which he himself 
believes applies to every other member of the human race 
apart from Jesus of Nazareth). The result is that a 
philosophical position is ruled out because it makes the 
notion of incarnation impossible when the very question 
at issue is the possibility of the incarnation.
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Noting Morris' appeal to dogmatic considerations and 
the distinctions he has introduced it is time to 
consider the metaphysical divergences between God and 
man which A.D.Smith raised,i.e. how can one person be 
eternal and yet have a beginning in time? In order to 
accommodate these differences Morris utilises the 
distinctions between 'essential' human properties and 
'common' human properties and being 'fully human' and 
'merely human'. This distinction involves the separation 
of 'common' human properties from 'essential' human 
properties. Such a distinction seems unobjectionable 
until it is realised that Morris intends to include 
within the group of 'common' but not 'essential' human 
properties such properties as 'having a beginning in 
time' and 'the possibility of passing out of
existence'.(35)
Having previously drawn the distinction between being 
'merely human' and 'fully human', Morris argues that 
Christianity has never maintained that Jesus was 'merely 
human' but that he was 'fully human' . A 'mere' human 
being (everyone else who has ever existed apart from 
Jesus of Nazareth) will have had a beginning in time, 
will pass out of existence and will exemplify all the 
other limitations which are part of 'mere' humanity. 
However, these properties although universal
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accompaniments of human nature are not essential to 
human nature. A being is 'merely human' if it has all 
the properties necessary and sufficient for satisfying 
the description of humanity. A 'mere' human being will 
exemplify those properties alongside some limitation 
properties. A 'fully human' being, however, is someone 
who exemplifies all the properties necessary for 
humanity but which also at one and the same time 
exemplifies an ontologically higher kind such as 
divinity.(36)
It is obvious at this point that Morris is trading very 
heavily upon the vagueness of the term 'humanity'. He 
never at any time offers an anthropology which would set 
out the properties which he considers essential for 
constituting humanity. He argues, after the manner of 
Barth, that there is nothing which could force the 
Christian to count as essential any common human 
properties which would rule out a literal divine 
incarnation.(37) In this sense anthropology is not 
divorced from incarnation and the Christian accords, 
within certain bounds, an epistemic priority to the 
notion of incarnation. Whilst there is something in the 
fact that a Christian need not count as essential to 
being human any common property which precludes a 
literal incarnation of God, great care must nevertheless
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be taken, and good grounds must be given, for showing 
that we are not thereby distorting the whole concept of 
what it means to be human to save a particular 
interpretation of Christian doctrine.
It is clear that the concept of human nature has not
been defined exactly enough to rule out the manoeuvre 
that Morris wishes to make. Yet, it does lead to a 
strange view of humanity. For the manner of the
origination of an individual human being can no longer 
count as an essential component of what it means to be 
human. Again this contradicts a recent and influential
philosophical account which maintains that although
origins of individuals can only be known a posteriori , 
they are nevertheless necessary truths. That is to say, 
I could not have sprung from any other source than from 
my natural parents. This can only be known after the 
fact, but once it is known, it constitutes a necessary 
truth about me.(38)
Morris' rebuttal of this charge is a little 
unconvincing. Part of the reason is that he again 
introduces into the logical debate a dogmatic bar. This 
time the principle invoked is that of creatio ex nihilo. 
Morris maintains that any theist who wishes to maintain 
such a position cannot agree that having a certain
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sort of origin is necessary for 'natural kind'
membership. The reason for this is if we hold that 
Adam was created out of nothing along with an entire
universe, then Adam could not count as a member of the 
'natural kind' humanity, since he did not have the same 
type of origin as every other member of the human race.
If Adam did not count as human, then we, his
descendants, do not count as human either.(39)
Morris supports this argument by considering the idea of 
scientists concocting from basic chemicals a being with 
the constitution, organs, appearance and mannerisms of 
a human being. This being acts in every way as a human 
being would act and enters into the social relationships 
that human beings would enter into. Would such a being 
count as human? Morris thinks he would, but allows that 
variations of opinion could occur on this point.(40)
It is important to point out here that Morris is placing 
a great deal of importance on a point which he himself 
allows is debatable.(41 ) It is by no means certain that 
such a being would count as human. Society could be 
forced to create a new category for describing such 
beings, perhaps 'humanoid 2' or some such similar 
terminology.Should such a situation ever occur it is 
more than conceivable that a distinction would be drawn
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between such creatures, no matter how human they may 
appear, and those who descended from human parents in
the normal biological way. The reason for such a
distinction may be that such creatures would not share 
in the same genetic pool in which we all share. This 
does not constitute a knockdown argument but it is no
more speculative than Morris' proposal.
With particular reference to christology and Christ's
human nature John Knox has written these words,
"A true human being could not be freshly 
created.Such a creation might look like 
a man and even speak like a man.He might 
be given flesh like a man's and a man's 
faculties,but he would not be a man.He 
would not be a man because he would not 
belong to the organic human process, to 
the actually existing concrete entity 
in nature and history, which is, and alone 
is,man."(42)
In a similar vein John Robinson argues that,
"... But this is to ignore completely what 
for us is a sine qua non of personal 
existence,namely, the nexus of biological, 
historical and social relationships with 
our fellow-men and with the universe as a 
whole. If that is not there,then Jesus may 
have entered completely into the place where 
we were-but only as a visitor. He was like 
one of us, but he was not one of us."(43)
The argument concerning whether or not the genetic or 
biological origins of a being constitute a strong 
reason for according, or not according, an individual
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the status of being human is not as trivial as it may 
first appear. There is a genuine philosophical 
difficulty in agreeing upon the precise range of 
properties which would be individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for membership of the natural kind 
'humanity'. It should always be realised, however, that 
this difficulty is an abstract difficulty. For there is 
certainly no practical difficulty involved in the 
recognition of other human beings. We do not even have 
to look for certain defining characteristics, we 
recognise one another immediately.
It is important to note that this 'common sense' 
recognition, far from being trivial and unphilosophical, 
has important moral implications. For the fact is that 
this recognition happens even when the person we are 
recognising as human is physically or mentally 
handicapped to such a degree that they no longer look or 
act like other human beings. Despite the grave 
differences in, say, the number of limbs, or the absence 
of various parts of the body, or the fact that they may 
provide us with no evidence that they possess the 
rational capacities that we normally take as typifying 
humanity, despite all these differences we recognise 
such people as fully human and accord them all the legal 
and moral rights which apply to human beings. The
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underlying reason behind this immediate and 
unproblematic 'moral' recognition that such severely 
handicapped people are fully human is surely the 
knowledge that they have the same biological descent as 
ourselves, they share in the same genetic pool from 
which we and our forebears descended.
Returning to Morris, a more serious deficiency in his 
argument is his appeal to the notion of creatio ex 
nihilo . Again it seems strange in a strictly logical 
work to see a direct appeal to a dogmatic concept as a 
means of overruling an otherwise straightforward 
philosophical position. The doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo does not of course rule out the concept of 
humanity (Adam) developing through an evolutionary 
process from the basic building blocks of matter. In 
this sense Morris is wrong to say that the theist who 
wishes to maintain a doctrine of creation out of nothing 
has to rule out the idea that types of origin are 
essential to being a member of a natural kind. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of incarnation can hardly 
seek support from another doctrine which is itself under 
immense pressure from scientific, logical and indeed 
theological qualifications which cast doubt on its 
appropriateness and truth.
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Flexible as the concept of humanity may be it does seem 
that this type of manipulation is stretching it to 
breaking point in order to accommodate the notion of a 
divine incarnation. How far can human nature be 
stretched before one is no longer talking of human 
nature but some other type of being?
John Hick, in a direct response to Morris, raises this 
point specifically. Hick points out that Morris assumes 
that because an ontologically higher being manifests 
many of the properties of a lower ontological being, it 
is therefore possible for a lower order being such as 
humanity to manifest higher ontological categories such 
as divinity. To illustrate his point Hick cites the 
example of a rock and a crocodile.Both share the 
properties of being physical objects, but the crocodile 
has properties which the rock lacks, namely that it is 
animate. Similarly, the crocodile and a human person 
share many common properties, but the human person 
possesses higher order thought processes which the 
crocodile lacks and so on,(44) All of this is 
straightforward and unobjectionable but Hick wants to 
say that the reverse strategy is not permissible. That 
is, a lower order being cannot manifest the properties 
of a higher ontological kind "without invariably 
breaking the mould of the lower kind."(45)
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The idea behind this objection is that just as it is 
impossible to conceive of a human being becoming 
incarnate in a crocodile because a crocodile's bodily 
structure, and particularly its central nervous system, 
is incompatible with the manifestation of human 
intelligence, it is similarly inconceivable to imagine a 
divine incarnation in a human life. Hick asks, "how a 
human brain would process the omniscient knowledge of 
the second person of the Trinity? How could a finite 
human frame exercise omnipotent power?"(46) The 
conclusion drawn is that as it is not possible to 
imagine a crocodile incarnating a human life without 
thereby becoming something altogether different from 
what we usually mean by the term crocodile, it is 
similarly inconceivable that a human being could be 
divine and yet still remain an authentic human being?
Morris' strategy of distinguishing between 'full 
humanity' and 'mere humanity' is designed to overcome 
some of these difficulties. However, the cost of doing 
so is enormous, for Jesus of Nazareth becomes in fact 
the only fully human being that ever existed and the 
rest of the human race are mere human beings. As a 
result the insistence upon his full humanity, upon his 
absolute oneness with us in our human condition, becomes 
a mere shadow of what was originally meant by that term.
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For Jesus' humanity, on this representation, is as 
different from actual humanity as it is possible to be. 
It is pertinent to ask at this point if Morris is being 
faithful to his intention of defending Chalcedon which 
insisted that Jesus of Nazareth was in his 
humanity,"...like us in every respect apart from sin."
In concluding this part of the discussion it has to be 
asked whether or not Morris has successfully 
demonstrated the logical possibility of human nature 
incarnating the divine nature and remaining truly human. 
Intuitions will vary on this point. However, what is 
not questioned is that the defence Morris offers makes 
Jesus' humanity different from every other instance of 
humanity, and one has to ask if this is a direction in 
which incarnational theology wishes to move. Similarly, 
one has to ask, in the light of Morris' invocation at 
certain strategic points of a dogmatic bar against 
certain awkward positions, whether or not his work is 
strictly a logical demonstration of the possibility of 
the incarnation. If, given strong enough motivation, the 
theist can invoke a dogmatic presupposition to defend 
the doctrine of the incarnation, why should he bother to 
demonstrate its rationality at all? Why not just invoke 
the dogmatic presupposition from beginning to end and 
say that the doctrine of the incarnation is true
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irrespective of the logical difficulties which are being 
raised against it?
Whilst genuine doubts may be expressed as to whether 
or not a human life can manifest the entirety of the
divine life without violating its own integrity, this is 
not the end of the problem. For it may be true, as
Morris has argued, that many if not all human properties 
are contingent, and that Jesus of Nazareth may or may
not have exemplified them without diminishing his human 
status. In the case of the divine nature, however, it is
generally acknowledged that a being such as God the Son
does not exemplify his divine properties contingently 
but essentially. As Morris himself asks, does this not
leave us with a Jesus who was omniscient, omnipotent, 
necessarily existent and all the rest, as well as being 
an itinerant Jewish preacher? " And is this not
outlandish to the greatest possible degree?"(47)
The far more difficult task facing Morris is how one 
reconciles the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, 
incorporeality etc, with the limitations inherent in 
human nature. Divine properties, as essential 
properties, are not susceptible to the type of
manipulation to which Morris subjected the human nature 
of Christ. The following section therefore shall be
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 39
Two Into One Won’t Go!
devoted to an examination of the problem as to how 
the divine nature might become incarnate in a human life 
and remain divine.
1. (iv) The Integrity of the Divine Nature in Christ 
Kenosis and Two-Minds
In the patristic theories of the incarnation the 
integrity of the divine nature was maintained by 
carefully distinguishing between what was appropriate to 
the Word as Word and what was appropriate to the Word by 
virtue of the the human nature which he had assumed. 
Contemporary defenders of incarnational theory have 
utilised a somewhat similar strategy involving a two- 
consciousness theory of Christ’s person As such an 
examination and critique of three exponents of a two- 
minds theory of the person of Christ will be the main 
focus of this part of the chapter. However, before 
coming to that some brief consideration must be given to 
an alternative strategy for preserving the integrity of 
the divine nature in Christ : the Kenotic strategy.
1.(iv) a. Kenosis
The concept of Kenosis will be dealt with only briefly 
here as the main focus will be directed toward the
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traditional understanding of the two-nature doctrine of 
Chalcedon. However, as an alternative, and perennially 
popular alternative, to Chalcedon the concept of 
kenosis, or the self-emptying of the Logos in the act 
of incarnation must be dealt with.
The concept of Kenosis derives from the passage in 
Paul’s letter to the Philippians, where he says,
’’For the divine nature was his from the 
first;yet he did not think to snatch at 
equality with God, but made himself 
nothing, assuming the nature of a slave. 
Bearing the human likeness,revealed in 
human shape, he humbled himself, and in 
obedience accepted even death-death on a 
cross." Philippians 2:6-9
Here we have a reference to the humiliation and 
condescension of the divine Son in the act of 
incarnation, the divesting of heavenly glory in order to 
become one with us. This idea of a divine emptying, a 
self -limitation in order to become human is the central 
idea of Kenosis The theory attained a peak of
popularity in Germany in the nineteenth century through 
the writings of Gottfried Thomasius (1802-73). Although 
it received a thorough refutation at that time, it was 
picked up after its demise in Germany by a number of 
British theologians at the turn of the century, notably 
P.T. Forsyth, H.R. Mackintosh and Charles Gore.(48) So
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strong was the theory’s influence in Scotland that 
Keno ticism came to be seen as the besetting sin of 
Scottish Christology, Today, there has been a revival of 
interest in Kenotic theories, particularly in
philosophical circles, and it is proper therefore to 
consider its claims to provide a viable model for the 
incarnation.(49)
In all its forms Kenoticism argues that the second 
person of the Trinity divested himself of certain divine 
attributes in order to become human. The question at 
issue therefore has been to ascertain which divine 
attributes are incompatible with humanity, and 
furthermore, which attributes can the second person of 
the Trinity abandon and remain divine? The theory 
therefore presupposes a distinction between essential 
and relative divine attributes.
The attributes which are normally considered to be 
incompatible with humanity are attributes such as 
omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence etc. The question 
therefore removes to a consideration as to whether 
these are essential or relative divine attributes. 
Obviously, Kenoticism abandons as a matter of course 
the traditional attribute of immutability ( or at least
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defines immutability in terms of God’s constant 
faithfulness to his purpose and character).
The contemporary philosophical discussion tends to focus 
upon the question of omniscience as it does, on the 
surface level at least, seem to be an essential
attribute, or one which is ’modally internal’ to
God.(50) This critique will follow the contemporary 
habit and focus upon the issue of omniscience. It has 
to be asked of those who posit the giving up of an 
omniscient state by God the Son that they provide a 
meaningful model or analogy which would help us to 
understand how an omniscient being could divest itself 
of what it in fact knew. The problem becomes more 
sharply focused when one considers that God’s knowledge 
is intuitive and immediate and is not dependent upon 
experience.
Morris (who rejects Kenoticism ) offers a possible 
analogy of a spy who is given a limited-amnesia-
producing pill to prevent him from revealing secrets
under torture.(51) This is offered as a plausible
analogy of how a Kenosis of God the Son’s knowledge
might take place during the period of incarnation. Yet, 
surely the model applies only to creatures like
ourselves who have a central storage system in the brain
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which can be affected by drugs or injury. It is known 
that the long or short term memory capacities of a 
person can be affected by tampering with certain areas 
of the brain. However, apart from this type of
interference a person cannot ’will’ himself not to 
know that 2 + 2 = 4 ,  nor can he ’will’ himself not to
know past facts about his life.
At this point I would not consider cases of Freudian 
repression as a ’willing’ not to know certain past 
facts. Whether this repression constitutes a real not 
knowing rather than an attempt by the sub-conscious not 
to accept or to ignore certain events is a moot point. 
The fact that such repression often reveals itself in 
neurotic behaviour casts some doubt on whether or not
the events remain totally unknown. In any case the 
notion of sub-conscious repression is not a 
particularly apt model for the incarnation, as it is 
questionable whether the Divine mind could be said to 
have a sub-conscious element which could operate in this 
way.
It is true that one can forget things, but presumably 
this is due to the fact that either (i) the brain has a 
massive but limited capacity and occasionally divests 
itself of certain memories, or (ii) that for some reason
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the person concerned cannot activate the correct neural 
process or path which will release the desired 
information. Again this is a physical storage model 
which cannot be held to apply to a divine being who 
knows what he knows essentially. How can such a being 
divest itself of such knowledge?
One might perhaps envisage a model where God the Father 
and the Spirit exercise, during the period of the 
incarnation, some sort of limitation upon the 
omniscience of the Son. However, this would seem to 
introduce an unwanted hierarchy into the Trinity and 
would probably violate the adage opera Trinitatis ad 
extra sunt indivisa A further question arises, if 
there is a genuine divesting of knowledge, presumably 
Oesus does not know that he is God the Son and therefore 
omniscient. For it would seem to be a strange divestment 
of omniscience for Jesus of Nazareth to be finite in 
knowledge yet to include within his beliefs about 
himself the knowledge that he was once omniscient. 
Certainly the synoptic gospels do not portray Jesus as 
someone who was aware of his own pre-existent omniscient 
state.
If this was the case then one is forced to deal with 
the question how, at a date following the resurrection,
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did Jesus regain his omniscient range of knowledge. If
there had been a true kenosis with respect to
knowledge then Jesus would not have been aware of a
prior state when as God the Son he possessed 
omniscience. If he was not aware of such a prior state 
how could he will himself to regain it? Perhaps the 
answer is that the Father or the Spirit revealed it to
him, but this again seems to place the Son in a
subordinate position to the Father, in that, his 
knowledge that he is omniscient and therefore God the 
Son is not something he knows intuitively and 
essentially, but knows derivatively from the Father.
The question has been raised as to God the Son's 
ability to meaningfully divest himself of his 
omniscience. There are similar arguments that could be 
made for almost all of God's attributes. It would be 
fair to say that the main criticisms which have been 
directed against kenoticism since the time of Thomasius 
revolve around two questions. First, can one separate 
the divine attributes into essential and relative 
attributes, as the theory presupposes ,without losing 
the divine element in the incarnation? Second, does 
the kenotic theory demand an unwanted separation of the 
divine persons so that we are constrained towards a 
social, and perhaps a tritheistic, understanding of the
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Trinity?
To the first of these concerns Donald Baillie suggests 
that,
"For though the Son of God keeps his personal 
identity in becoming the subject of the human 
attributes which He assumes. He has divested 
Himself of the distinctively divine attributes; 
which would imply,if language means anything, 
that in becoming human He ceased to be divine."(52)
To the second Wolfhart Pannenberg points out that,
"An incarnation thus understood as incapacitation 
of the Son necessarily draws the doctrine of the 
Trinity into difficulties as well. Is not the Son, 
who had given up his relative divine attributes in 
the flesh, excluded from the Trinity for this 
period,since during his humiliation he was 
apparently not equally God with the Father and 
the Spirit?"(53)
In conclusion to this brief examination of kenotic
theories it seems that there are good grounds for 
maintaining that the attributes of God are such that 
they will be exemplified essentially by him and that 
consequentally God cannot divest himself of such 
attributes and remain God. That question has by no means 
been settled finally in this discussion, but it would 
seem that at least the logical possibility of a genuine 
kenosis has been brought into question. As such I would
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like to merely note the continuing possibility of a 
redefined kenotic strategy emerging and to move on to 
consider the 'two-minds' theory of the person of Christ.
1 . ( iV ).b . Two-minds or The Black Hole of Chalcedon!
One of the most popular ways of defending the coherence 
of the doctrine of the incarnation in recent years has 
been to offer a 'two-minds', or 'two-consciousness' 
theory of the person of Christ. This type of approach 
has been advocated by such diverse writers as Brian 
Hebblethwaite and Karl Rahner and earlier this century 
by Sanday. (54) In this paper,however, consideration 
shall be given to three contemporary writers who have 
offered the most articulate and philosophicaly rigorous 
theories which have been presented so far. I refer to 
the works of T .V . Morris, Richard Swinburne and David 
Brown and I intend to deal with them in that order.
Each of these authors makes a distinctive contribution 
to the subject, yet the first two , at least,leave the 
essential difficulties of Chalcedon unresolved. Indeed 
they merely translate the traditional dilemmas 
associated with Chalcedon into a new terminology. These 
dilemmas which concern the difficulty in describing the 
true and unique subject of the person of Christ form the
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'black hole' of this part of the chapter. David Brown 
offers a more nuanced theory which does perhaps make a 
genuine advance on the other two positions. However, it 
is part of the ongoing contention of this paper that the 
advance which Brown suggests is actually much more
congenial to the explication of another theory of the 
incarnation, Baillie's famous 'paradox of grace*, which 
Brown himself rejects, than it is to Chalcedon. The 
justification for this assertion is given in chapter 
three of this thesis.
Although there are differences in detail between the 
three theories which are developed, they are all similar 
in that they attempt to preserve the integrity of the
divine nature in the incarnation by attributing the
distinctively divine properties of Christ to his divine 
range of consciousness and the distinctively human 
properties to his human range of consciousness. As such 
they may be regarded as following the classical pattern 
of distinguishing between what is appropriate to the 
Word as Word and what is appropriate to the Word by
virtue of the human nature which he assumed.
To begin with Thomas Morris who has offered by far the 
most complete version of the 'two-minds' theory and as 
such provides the clearest example of what such a theory
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might entail. Firstly, the claim is made that a person 
is not identical with a particular range of 
consciousness, experience or beliefs which he might 
happen to have.(55) This means that we can allow in the 
one person, Jesus of Nazareth, two distinct ranges of 
consciousness, one divine and one human. The divine mind 
which is omniscient contains everything that is 
contained in the human mind but is not itself contained 
by the human mind. The human mind or consciousness came 
into existence at the birth of Jesus and grew and 
developed as the boy Jesus grew. It drew its information 
and knowledge of the external world, including cultural 
and social beliefs in the same way as any other human 
mind. As Morris asserts "the earthly range of 
consciousness, and self-consciousness, was thoroughly 
human, Jewish and first century Palestinian in 
nature."(56)
The relationship between the divine and human minds is 
described as asymmetric. That is the divine mind had 
immediate access to the contents of the human mind but 
the human mind had only that access to the divine mind 
which was allowed by the divine mind and which was 
possible for it to have given its finite cognitive 
abilities. This arrangement accounts for the gospel 
pictures of Jesus which portray a man who underwent real
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moral and spiritual growth, who confessed to ignorance 
and who truly felt forsaken by God on the cross. All 
these experiences are true experiences of Jesus in his 
human range of consciousness. The divine range of 
consciousness knows about these experiences of course 
but it does not itself experience them directly.
How Morris pictures this can be best understood by his 
answer to the question 'could Jesus be tempted to sin?' 
The problem here is that God is necessarily good and 
cannot be tempted to sin, whereas the New Testament 
portrays Jesus as undergoing real experiences of 
temptation to which he did not succumb. According to 
Morris, Jesus could be tempted to sin just in case it 
was epistemically possible for him to sin,(57) That 
is,if in his earthly range of consciousness he did not 
rule out the possibility of his sinning. In order for 
this to be the case the earthly range of consciousness 
would have to lack at least one piece of information 
available to the divine range of consciousness, 
namely,that he was necessarily good and as such that it 
was impossible for him to sin.(58)
The outcome is that Jesus in his earthly range of 
consciousness believed that it was possible for him to 
sin but in fact did not.(This is obviously a claim of
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faith rather than an empirically provable fact) . In 
order to be tempted all that is required is for Jesus to 
believe that he could possibly sin. In fact he could not 
have sinned for the divine mind would have prevented 
such an occurrence. But we have to believe (again by 
faith) that the divine mind did not prevent it in any 
way and that Jesus' choice to resist temptation was a 
truly free choice of his human range of 
consciousness.(59) The role of the divine mind in 
Morris' theory at this point gives clear indication as 
to who he believes to be the true subject of Jesus' 
actions.
At this point a number of alarm bells will be ringing in 
the minds of those with only the faintest acquaintance 
with early Christian heresy. These suspicions can only 
be further heightened by the way in which Morris 
attempts to defend himself from the charge of 
Nestorianism as he is forced to consider the question; 
"if, in the case of God incarnate, we have a human and a 
divine mind, how do we avoid the Nestorian conclusion 
that we have two persons?"(60)
Morris repeats the point that a range of consciousness 
or mind is not to be equated with a person. A person may 
have more than one range of consciousness. Justification
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for this assertion is found in notions of split- 
personality and Freudian theories of the divided 
conscious and subconscious mind in every human person. 
Morris also utilises a theory developed by Aquinas to 
support his position.This theory makes use of the 
concept of a suppositurn which is a whole of a
particular kind, an individual bearer of properties. An 
individual person would normally constitute a 
suppositum. However, although it is conceded that in 
all normal circumstances the conjunction of a rational 
soul and a body would normally constitute a suppositurn 
or individual person, in the case of the incarnate Word 
they do not. The human soul and body of Christ do not 
constitute a suppositum apart from their union with the 
divine person of God the Son in the incarnation,(61)
Morris applies this directly to the 'two minds' 
hypothesis. Normally, minds and persons would be
individuated in a one to one correlation.Indeed outside 
the act of the incarnation it may be impossible for a 
mere human being to exhibit more than one range of
consciousness at a time. But in the case of Jesus a
human body and a soul do not suffice to individuate a
person. Only with the divine mind of God the Son do they 
individuate a person who is both human and divine.(62)
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With this we have almost reached the end of Morris' 
defence of the Chalcedonian definition of the person of 
Christ via a 'two-minds' hypothesis. There is, however, 
one problem still outstanding. What is it exactly that 
makes the two minds arrangement unique in the case of 
Oesus of Nazareth? Presumably, the divine mind, which is 
omniscient, has unlimited access to every human mind. Is 
it the case then, according to the 'two-minds' theory', 
that God is incarnate in each and every one of us?
Morris is aware of this difficulty and answers thus:
"..In Jesus' case, the earthly mind is contained 
in the Divine mind in a distinctive way. Jesus 
was a being who was fully human,but he was not 
a created human being. He was not a being 
endowed with a set of personal cognitive and 
causal powers distinct from the cognitive 
and causal powers of God the Son. For Jesus was 
the same person as God the Son.Thus, the personal 
cognitive and causal powers operative in the 
case of Jesus' earthly mind were just none 
other than the cognitive and causal powers of 
God the Son.The results of their operation 
through the human body, under the constraints 
proper to the conditions of a fully human 
existence, were just such so as to give rise 
to a human mind, an earthly noetic structure 
distinct from the properly divine noetic 
structure involved with the unconstrained 
exercise of divine powers."(63)
Morris is attempting to indicate here the way in which 
the human mind of Jesus is 'metaphysically owned' by the 
divine mind in a way which is unique and distinctive. 
For only if there is a distinct and unique ownership of
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the mind of Jesus by God the Word can he claim a true 
identity of person between them. That is why the notion 
of epistemic access is not sufficient to count as a 
unique incarnation in Christ. For clearly the divine 
mind has such epistemic access to every human mind.
The desire to establish identity has led Morris into
rocky and treacherous waters.There is at least an 
initial charge of an incipient docetism hovering in the 
background when he argues that the 'cognitive and causal 
powers of the earthly mind of Jesus of Nazareth were 
none other than the cognitive and casual powers of God 
the Son.' There is perhaps too the faint aroma of 
Apollinarianism in the attempt to show that the mind of 
God the Son is the mind of Jesus of Nazareth, albeit
operating under the restrictions of a fully human
existence. And what of these restrictions? How do the 
cognitive and causal powers of God the Son being
restricted by the constraints of human existence, 
thereby giving rise to a fully human mind, differ from a 
kenotic restriction or giving up of certain properties? 
It seems that in Morris' mind they must differ as he has 
rejected kenoticism as logically impossible, given his 
Anselmian conception of God as maximal being, yet it is 
hard to see what the difference is.
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 55
Two Into One Won't Go!
The problem of identity and uniqueness of ownership is 
one that Morris has yet to solve. In his most recent 
article on the subject "The Metaphysics of God 
Incarnate" he admits, "that I am no more sure about how 
to spell out what constitutes metaphysical ownership in 
the case of the Incarnation than I am to spell out 
exactly what it is for a range of mentality to be a part 
of my mind, or to belong to me."(64) Again we are led 
to the argument that the complete human mental system of 
Jesus was not intended alone to define a person. Rather,
"It was created to belong to a person with a 
divine mind as well, as the ultimately 
hierarchicaly maximal mental system. At any 
point during the metaphysical event of the 
Incarnation, it is thus possible that the 
human capacities of Christ, or the entirety 
of what we are calling his human mental 
system be subsumed and overridden by the 
divine mind without it being the case that 
any person's freedom is thereby abrogated. 
And this is a crucial difference between 
Jesus and any other human being, indeed, 
between Jesus and any free-willed creature 
of God."(65)
To show how far Morris pursues this approach one 
further example is offered. Morris considers the 
question of whether or not Christ could be said to have 
had erroneous beliefs. The answer, we are told, must 
be given in terms of the 'two-minds' hypothesis and we 
are directed to the earthly range of consciousness in 
which we may say that Jesus possessed certain erroneous
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beliefs concerning, for example, the cosmos. Morris
proceeds to argue in the following fashion;
"However, if the question is pressed, if we must 
be able to say,in principle, what the one person 
Jesus of Nazareth believed about this or that 
issue, we must recognise the priority of the divine 
and represent God the Son's ultimate 'doxastic' 
state as being captured in his divine omniscience.. 
...This feature of hierarchical organisation does 
not leave us in puzzlement concerning the final 
story about the person."(66)
The 'two-minds' view as presented by Morris does seem, 
despite his best intentions, to posit, in Smith's words, 
an ontological gulf in the person of Christ as great as 
any Nestorian.Consider this example. The divine mind is 
omniscient and consequently aware of its necessary 
goodness. The human mind is limited and not aware of its 
own necessary goodness. On this view we may say that 
there are properties which the one person Jesus of 
Nazareth has, which the person Jesus of Nazareth lacks. 
That is being aware of his own necessary goodness
The only solution to this dilemma is to argue, as Morris 
does, that the 'higher' range of consciousness has a 
greater claim to constitute that set of properties which 
instantiate the person. Alternatively, we could imagine 
a Thomistic infusion of knowledge whereby the human mind 
of Jesus is aware of its necessary goodness. But this 
does not solve the problem, for the divine mind is still 
essentially aware of its necessary goodness whilst the
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human mind is only derivatively aware. To argue that 
Jesus in his divine range of consciousness is 
essentially aware of his necessary goodness whilst in 
his human range of consciousness he is only contingently 
aware of it, is only to posit the ontological gulf in a 
different guise. For how can one person know something 
essentially and contingently at the same time.
This follows from the insistence that there is one 
person Jesus of Nazareth/God the Son. Under the 
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals any 
property which applies to Jesus of Nazareth must apply 
to God the Son and vice versa. On the above argument 
then it can be said that God the Son/Jesus of Nazareth 
is both omniscient and limited in knowledge. This can be 
said because he has two ranges of consciousness, one 
divine, one human. But of course one person cannot be
omniscient and limited in knowledge at the same time. If
one is omniscient then one is aware of all the knowledge
that one's limited range of consciousness lacks. Suppose 
that set 'A' is the set of all that can be known and all 
that it is possible to know and that set 'B ' is all that 
Jesus of Nazareth knew. An omniscient being would 
possess set 'A', but of course set 'B ' would already be 
included in set 'A' and would add nothing to set 'A'. 
Therefore to say God the Son had a limited range of
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consciousness through his human incarnation is to add 
nothing to what he in fact already knew.
It is this point that reveals that all the talk of a 
separate and limited human range of conciousness is a
fiction. In Morris' scheme the subject of all experience
is God the Son who embraces any human range of
consciousness in his omniscience. There really cannot be 
one person who is both omniscient and yet limited in 
knowledge, there can only be one person who is
omniscient, or two persons, one omniscient and one 
limited. In other words to speak of an omniscient person 
having a limited range of consciousness is self- 
ref erentially incoherent.(67)
There are two possible ways out of this dilemma. One
which Morris seems to embrace but ultimately holds back
on, is to argue that the human mind of Jesus is the 
mind of God the Son, Morris seems to want to say this 
when he argues that the 'cognitive and causal powers of 
God the Son gave rise to the cognitive and causal powers
of Jesus of Nazareth' but, given his argument that the
mind of Jesus was a product of its time and thoroughly 
Palestinian in nature and capable of holding false 
beliefs, it is hard to know exactly what he means by 
this,
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The danger facing Morris is that any firming up of the
argument that the mind of God the Son produces the mind
of Jesus of Nazareth would seem to threaten the fully
human status of that mind. Part of the problem is that
Morris understands the mind solely in terms of a noetic
structure or a system of beliefs. Yet a living
consciousness, a person, is much more than a system of
beliefs, it is also a centre of volition and will. If it
is argued that the rational and cognitive powers of
Jesus of Nazareth are in fact the rational and cognitive
powers of God the Son, does this mean that the will of
Jesus is also the will of God the Son? Morris' clearly
believes that Jesus had a human will for he asserts that
Jesus always chose aright. But his insistence that if
Jesus had not chosen aright he would in fact have been
prevented from deviating from the divine will by the
intervention of God the Son clearly threatens the
reality of that will. Or it leaves us with a theory
which, as John Hick mischieviously suggests, is not not
a Chalcedonian theory of the incarnation, but is rather
a theory which argues that,
"...Jesus is God incarnate,not in the sense 
that the personal will that was encountered 
by all who met Jesus was the will of God the 
Son operating on earth but in the sense that 
God singled Jesus out for special treatment- 
namely by not allowing him to go wrong."(68)
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It has been necessary to dwell at some length on Morris' 
attempt to defend Chalcedon as he elaborates in rigorous 
detail a defence which is now being utilised by many 
philosophers in relation to the doctrine of the 
incarnation. It is undoubtedly a bold, innovative and 
extremely technical defence of the Chalcedonian 
formulation of the person of Christ. As such it deserves 
to be treated with considerable respect. Its failure, 
perhaps, is that it is too good a translation of the 
two-natures doctrine of Chalcedon into the 'two minds' 
theory of Morris. In other words the problems, 
ambiguities and tensions surrounding the subject of the 
incarnation which haunt Chalcedon are carried over 
unresolved into Morris' scheme.
This is evident from the profound ambiguity at the 
centre of Morris's presentation which mirrors that of 
Chalcedon itself. Viewed from one perspective Morris is 
a defender of the Alexandrian interepretation of 
Chalcedon and comes very close to a modern presentation 
of the classical theory of anhypos tas ia or at best 
enhypostasia. That an Alexandrian christology is his 
preferred option is clear from his citations of 
Athanasius and Cyril and from his constant opposing of 
this interpretation with what he understands a Nestorian 
position to be.
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Morris' 'two-minds' theory suffers too from the 
classical fault of the Alexandrian scheme in that 
although he accords a technical and formal place for the 
full humanity of Christ in his theory, he allows it to 
play no real useful or valid role in his system. This is 
clear when he argues that the divine mind would prevent 
Jesus from freely choosing evil. This implies that the 
choices of Jesus' human consciousness are relevant only 
when they mimic the choices of God the Son. If that is 
the case what was the point of Jesus possessing a truly 
human consciousness?
In the three assertions:(i)that the cognitive and 
causal powers of Jesus of Nazareth were none other than 
the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son,(ii) that 
the ultimate belief state which really matters in the 
incarnation is the belief state of God the Son,(iii) 
that God could override the choices of Jesus without 
violating his personal freedom, there is a complete 
contemporary presentation of the Alexandrian concept of 
the Logos as the subject and centre of the actions of 
Jesus of Nazareth. On this reading, the charge of an 
incipient docetism, a prevailing problem for the 
Alexandrian tradition, certainly remains a problem for 
their modern interpreter. Finally, Morris in his 
admission that he has no clear idea what constituted
Page 62 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Two Into One Won't Go!
'metaphysical ownership* in the case of the incarnation 
seems to be blissfully ignorant of the fact that the 
issue of what constitutes 'metaphysical ownership' is 
precisely the major difficulty that has haunted theology 
in its interpretation of Chalcedon. Thus Morris can
hardly be said to have shown the logical possibility of 
Chalcedon nor advanced significantly the interpretation 
of it, thereby justifying my claim that he has carried 
over into his scheme the central difficulties and 
ambiguities of Chalcedon.
Notwithstanding all that has been said there is an
ambiguity at the heart of Morris' presentation which has 
led to the charge of Nestorianism being made against 
him.(69) This seems an unlikely charge given his
Alexandrian preferences and the foregoing criticisms of 
his position. The ambiguity stems from two separate 
sources. Firstly, Morris is a modern person and cannot 
ultimately separate what it means to be a person from 
the modern conception of a psychological subject of
experience and will. As such he is anxious, however, 
unsuccessfully, to argue for a real and complete 
individual man at the heart of the incarnation. 
Secondly, his strategy for protecting the perfections 
of the divine nature within the incarnate person by 
sharply separating what is appropriate to the ' two-
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minds' is a thoroughly Antiochene and Nestorian 
strategy.
Morris' strategy for defending the logical propriety of 
Chalcedon is one which Nestorius would heartily have 
approved of. The idea that God the Son was impassible, 
perfectly good, omnipotent etc., in his divine range of 
consciousness (for Nestorius,read 'nature') and 
passible, finite, subject to temptation in his earthly 
range of consciousness (human nature) is Nestorian 
through and through. The Alexandrian attribution of 
properties appropriate to the Word as Word and those 
appropriate to the flesh as flesh differs from this by 
refusing to acknowledge a separate and complete 
hypostasis of the human nature of Christ. The
Antiochenes demanded a complete and full hypostasis of 
the human nature precisely because they felt that the 
Alexandrian rejection of a human hypostasis threatened 
the impassibility of the Word.(There was also a strong 
soteriological motive too).
Just as Nestorius' separation of the divine and human 
natures threatened the unity of the person of Christ so 
also does Morris' separation of the divine and human 
ranges of consciousness, Morris' appeal to a special and 
particular use of the term person in relation to Christ
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cannot save him here. For he would have to show how his 
special and particular use of the term person differs 
qualitatively from Nestorius' term prosopon . The normal 
accusation levelled against the prosopic union is that 
it fails to demonstrate the ontological basis of the 
union of God and man in Christ sufficiently, 
Morris,however, must either strengthen the Alexandrian 
nature of his theory, in which case the true reality of 
the man Jesus evaporates, or he stresses the true 
humanity of Christ. In which case his admission of 
ignorance as to what constitutes the 'metaphysical 
ownership' of Jesus by God the Son begins to look very 
Nestorian.
The Antiochene tradition on the whole has received an 
unfavourable press on the question of its inability to 
maintain a true unity of person in the figure of Christ. 
Yet the truth of the matter is that it fares no worse 
than the orthodox tradition. Either the orthodox 
tradition must favour an anhypostatic theory whereby 
God the Son is the person and the full and true humanity 
of Christ is thereby threatened, although maintained in 
a theoretical sense. Or it must embrace the position of 
Aquinas, and favoured by Morris, and argue that there is 
a special and unique sense of the term person which 
applies to the incarnate Christ and no-one else. This is
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a possible and viable position but it appears arbitrary 
on the face of it to assert that the Antiochene
prosopic unity is necessarily less successful in 
maintaining, what was its clear intention, a unity of 
person. This is a point which is simply referred to at 
this point but which shall be given deeper
consideration in chapter three.
If it seems strange that a particular theory can be 
accused of being both Antiochene and Alexandrian then it 
is worthwhile remembering that Morris is attempting to 
defend Chalcedon and that Chalcedon has long been viewed
as a compromise between those two schools. On the one
hand Morris clearly wishes to favour an Alexandrian 
interpretation, but fails to spell it out precisely and 
exactly because to do so would threaten Jesus's 
humanity. On the other hand Morris' recourse to a 'two- 
minds' strategy brings him very close to the Antiochene 
position.
Perhaps the main reason that Morris comes so perilously 
close to the position of Nestorius is that by using the 
category of consciousness to explicate christology he 
imports contemporary psychological notions of the 
person and personality into the metaphysical structures 
of classical doctrine. This importation of modern
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categories of the person may mean that Morris is 
ultimately unable to reflect faithfully and accurately 
either school of thought.Thus Morris hesitates 
perpetually unable to fall decisively on either side of 
the Alexandrian/Antiochene divide which might not be a 
bad description of Chalcedon either.
The second 'two-minds' theory which will be considered 
is that offered by Richard Swinburne in an article 
entitled "Could God become Man?"(70) Swinburne utilises 
a 'two-minds theory' which is in all essential respects 
similar to that of Morris and it is not therefore 
necessary to go to great lengths in outlining it. He 
differs in one vital and crucial respect from Morris in 
that he clearly offers a criterion of identity between 
God and Jesus of Nazareth. God and Jesus of Nazareth 
are the same person because they possess the same 
soul.(71) Swinburne has elsewhere argued that the 
principle of human identity is the soul and he utilises 
that theory to offer a defence of Chalcedon. Swinburne, 
like Morris, maintains a 'modally exalted' view of the 
divine nature and uses the 'two-minds' view of the 
person of Christ to defend it.
To be human, according to Swinburne, is to have a human 
body animated by a human soul.For God to become man on
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this theory he would have to unite his soul to a human 
body. This would be a genuine human being albeit with a 
unique mental system. Yet it would be human because it 
was a human body animated by a soul "..for nothing can 
become a man (while remaining what it is) unless it has 
its principle of identity, the soul which is 
subsequently the human soul."(72)
If the principle of identity in a human person is the
possession of a soul, the problem that Swinburne must
deal with is how the ’soul' of God becomes the soul of
the man Jesus, Swinburne (obviously possessing a deeper
aquaintance with the production of souls than the
present writer) argues that;
" The mechanism which gives rise to souls 
cannot dictate which soul will arise,for in 
general souls do not exist before birth and 
so there can be no law dictating that a 
particular bodily process will give rise to 
this soul as opposed to that one. All the 
mechanism can do is to ensure that it gives 
rise to a__ soul,which will then have a 
certain mental life. That soul,God could 
ensure, without violating that mechanism, 
was his own soul."(73)
And again,
"So if we don't draw the limit of the human 
too strictly,certainly God can become man.He 
would do this by acquiring a human body(joining) 
his soul to an unowned human body),acting 
beliefs,sensations and desires through it.(74)
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It is clear that for Swinburne to be a human being you 
must have a human body which is animated by a soul, but 
that this soul need not be a created soul. Swinburne 
argues that the soul is the subject of experience and 
initiator of action, and is the essential part of any 
human being or person, whose possession makes any future 
individual that individual. Souls, however, are not 
eternal, they do not come into existence before 
birth.(75) On this reading then, Jesus of Nazareth 
differs from every other human being in that the soul 
which he possesses,his principle of identity, is not a 
normal 'human' soul but the soul of God.
Having established a criterion for identity between God 
the Son and Jesus of Nazareth, Swinburne goes on to 
consider the difficulty of one person possessing 
contradictory attributes. It is to this end that he 
utilises the 'two-mind' theory in a manner similar to 
Morris and the criticisms levelled against that theory 
apply to Swinburne's treatment too.
It is hard not to poke a little fun at Swinburne as he 
so confidently describes the normal mechanisms for .the 
production of souls with the certainty of a man who has 
seen them rolling off a production line. But one should 
applaud the attempt to provide a clear and unequivocal
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criterion of identity between God and Jesus of Nazareth.
There are, however, certain problems which confront his 
account. The first, and by no means the easiest to 
refute, is that Swinburne's theory looks remarkably 
like a modern day version of Apollinarianism. 
Apollinarius taught that the Logos was the controlling 
and rational principle in the person of Christ. He was 
condemned by the Cappadocian adage "What has not been 
assumed has not been redeemed" In other words there was 
a clear recognition that a full and undiminished 
humanity, including the possession of a rational soul, 
was required in the person of Christ. Swinburne 
acknowledges that Chalcedon declared Christ to have a 
'reasonable soul', however, he understands this to mean 
a human way of thinking and acting. Swinburne's 
acknowledgment of a human range of consciousness may be 
some defence against the charge of Apollinarianism, but 
his continual use of terminology such as 'the soul of 
God acquired a human body through which he acts' leaves 
some doubt as to the reality of the humanity of Christ.
Swinburne is aware of the difficulty, for he quotes the 
Cappadocian adage in his article, but he does' not 
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem. It^  is 
surely not sufficient to say that a human person is
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someone with a human body animated by a human soul and 
then to say that God could have become man by animating 
a human body with the soul of God, For it would still be 
true that there is an infinite qualitative difference 
between human souls and the divine soul. Swinburne
acknowledges this when he says that normally souls do 
not exist before birth. In other words they are
contingent, created and therefore finite. The soul of 
God is presumably not finite,contingent and created.
The question suggests itself if it is possible to treat 
the human body as what might best be described as some 
form of 'person shell'? Swinburne's original statement 
was that to be human was to have a body animated by a 
'human' soul. However, he went on to say that Jesus 
Christ was human because he had a human body animated by 
the soul of God. This leads to the conclusion that the 
body is a 'person shell' which can be indiscriminately 
animated by a normal human soul, or the soul of God, or
perhaps any old form of soul, yet for it to still form
an authentic human being. This may be being unfair to
Swinburne but he should clarify the distinction between 
the soul of God and human souls and explain why they are 
interchangeable in this way.
Is it the case that a divine soul can take the place of 
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a human soul merely because both are incorporeal? Is it 
correct to say that God possesses a soul in this sense? 
Again Swinburne's imprecision makes interpretation 
difficult. For he refers throughout the article to the 
soul of God. On a superficial reading this would mean 
that his theory was asserting that God simpliciter was 
incarnate in Christ. However, as Swinburne is defending 
Chalcedon, which clearly states that God the Son was 
incarnate in Christ, then perhaps the phrase soul of 
God should be expanded to read the soul of God the Son. 
Although there is a reputable tradition which regards 
the incarnation as a work of the whole Trinity the idea 
that the 'soul' of God simpliciter became incarnate in 
Christ would accord most easily with a modalist theory 
of God rather than a Trinitarian one.
But to expand the phrase to the 'soul of God the Son' 
would bring its own difficulties for it would then seem 
that Swinburne's theory calls for three divine souls 
corresponding to Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yet given 
that Swinburne believes that the soul is the principle 
of identity and individuation, does this not necessarily 
lead to tritheism, three individual Gods corresponding 
to three divine souls? Given this type of difficulty 
more work will have to be done to show that it 
establishes a plausible model for the incarnation. More
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work will have to be done to show how this is a genuine 
human existence rather than the eternal soul of God the 
Son masquerading as a human being through the medium of 
a body.
Swinburne goes some way to attempting to meet this 
charge by using the 'two-minds' hypothesis. It is clear 
that he intends to attribute a real human will and 
consciousness to Christ. Ultimately, however, he faces 
the same difficulties as Morris did if pressed as to
the true subject of the actions of Christ. Either he
must make reference to the divine soul, which on his 
view is the ultimate subject of experience and the 
initiator of action, thereby making the humanity 
illusory. Or he must so stress the separateness of the 
human and divine ranges of consciousness that he loses 
the unity of the person. Swinburne's use of the soul as 
the principle of identity will always mean that his 
theory is pulled towards the Alexandrian pole of the 
dichotomy and, as such, threaten the true humanity of
Christ. Indeed, Swinburne has, as I have tried to
indicate, come as close to an Apollinarian presentation 
of the person of Christ as it is possible for a 
twentieth century person to come. As such a real 
question mark must be placed against his attempt to 
demonstrate the logical coherence of Chalcedon.
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Further work will also have to be done by Swinburne to 
fully establish his dualistic theory that the soul is 
the principle of individuation and identity.Although he 
has argued forcefully for this it is by no means a 
widely accepted position among philosophers or 
theologians. Therefore,its acceptance as an account of 
the philosophical verity of the incarnation is likely to 
be extremely limited.
The third and most theologically sophisticated
presentation of the 'two-minds' theory of the person of
Christ is that offered by David Brown in The Divine
Trinity . He asks,
"What would take us in the direction of 
speaking of one person...it has already been 
noted that a common external presentation is 
insufficient....Clearly what is required to 
justify passing beyond such metaphor is a 
reference to internal psychology, that 
indicates some kind of ontological bond 
between the two centres of consciousness.(76)
Brown develops what he terms a 'flow' account of the 
'two- minds' model. By this he means that there is a 
continuous flow or interchange of experiences and 
information between the two centres of consciousness. 
"The human nature experiences to the maximum extent 
compatible with it remaining a human nature, all the 
internal life of God the Son in his trinitarian 
relations".(77) Of course the human consciousness would
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not know that it was participating in the divine
relationship as there would be no comparable experiences 
which it could compare with this one, it would be 
unable to distinguish what it was experiencing from any 
other case of prophetic inspiration or mystical union 
with God.
However, before it is possible to properly speak of one 
person it has to be asserted that the flow of
information goes the other way too,from human to divine. 
Brown criticises Aquinas' idea of a constant infusing of 
information in the incarnation as it only goes one
way.He argues that if the flow only goes one way the
simplest explanation would be to speak of a divine 
assumption or inspiring of a human personality.(78 ) Of 
course there are limits as to what information the 
divine nature could receive from the human nature 
without transforming it. For example, the divine range 
of consciousness could not receive any erroneous beliefs 
about the world. Similarly, the divine perspective on 
suffering would be such as to transform the human 
experience entirely.
Like Morris and Swinburne, Brown is aware that the 
divine range of consciousness has this total perspective 
and access to every human mind in any case, he is
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therefore left with the problem of showing how this
arrangement in the case of Jesus of Nazareth is unique
and distinctive to Jesus alone. Brown considers the 
possibility that in this case the 'flow' of information 
and knowledge is freely communicated and never against 
or despite the human nature,(79) But this soon proves
to be inadequate as an explanation, for the reason that 
it is hard to see how the omniscient access to our minds
could ever be said to be against our wills. Furthermore,
it is necessary to speak of a unity of experience as 
well as a sharing of information before identity of 
person can be established.
In a passage that will be returned to at a later stage 
Brown argues that, "in this case and in this case alone, 
God allows himself to be directly affected by human 
experience in some sense beyond that of merely knowing 
that certain things are happening."(80) Brown concedes 
that the difficulty has always lain in specifying
precisely what this further sense is, however vital it 
may be.
In order to specify what he means Brown has to make
certain adjustments and modifications to the two nature 
model of Chalcedon. For in order to claim that there is 
a single person present in the union the notion of
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divine impassibility has to be modified. This follows 
from the fact that to speak legitimately of one person 
means that the divine consciousness must truly 
experience the experiences of the human nature of 
Christ. Brown does not completely reject impassibility 
but argues that the concept of incarnation reinterprets 
impassibility to mean the divine consciousness having 
such an omniscient perspective on pain and suffering so 
that those experiences although felt are transformed in 
some way. In the same way the omniscient mind would 
experience the death of Jesus as the personal loss of 
bodily experiences and the cessation of the flow of 
information.
This modification of the term impassibility allows the 
divine consciousness to be the subject of the human 
experiences of Jesus of Nazareth. Such openness to the 
human experience of Jesus has to be stronger than mere 
sympathy if we are to justify talk of one person. 
According to Brown talk of one person is justified 
because of the unique way in which the divine nature is 
affected by this particular human life.(81)
Pursuing this line of thought leads Brown to turn the 
usual 'two- minds' model on its head. It has been shown, 
in the models already considered, that the divine mind
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is the primary subject of the person, making it 
difficult to know if anything other than a formal 
recognition of humanity is being made. Brown doubts 
whether his line of argument makes it possible to 
continue to maintain the priority of the divine 
consciousness in the incarnate life of Christ. He argues 
that in his model the human consciousness has ceased to 
be a mere cipher but has a real role to play. For it is 
the thoughts, experiences,words and deeds of the human 
mind which receive expression in the life of the 
incarnate one rather than the divine mind.(82)
Brown does not wish to deny the divine commitment or 
involvement in the life of the one incarnate person; it 
is just that the usual position is reversed in that the 
divine nature receives things at 'second hand' from the 
human nature.(83) Brown argues that this does nothing 
to undermine the tenability of the model since he argues 
that it need not always be the highest range of 
consciousness that most reaches expression if the entity 
spoken of is to be spoken of as one person.(84) By way 
of reinforcing this point Brown refers to Luther's 
method in Christology which stresses the human nature of 
Christ as the primary subject in the incarnation.
It is clear from what has been said that Brown's thesis
Page 78 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Two Into One Won't Go!
is substantially different from those offered by Morris 
and Swinburne in the real role that it offers the human 
life of Jesus despite sharing a 'two-minds model'. It 
should be said at once that there is much that should be 
valued in Brown's theory, particularly his stress on the 
human life of Jesus as the focus of expression of the 
divine purpose and love. The priority of the human life 
of Jesus in Brown's theory separates his contribution 
from that of Morris and Swinburne and absolves him of 
any taint of docetism that haunts the other 'two-
minds ' models .
Yet one wants to ask in what sense this is a faithful 
representation of Chalcedon. If it is Chalcedonian, then 
it has to be admitted that it is Chalcedon viewed from a 
very Antiochene perspective. No Alexandrian theologian 
could have attributed such an importance to the human 
individual in the act of incarnation that it was the 
words, deeds and thoughts of the human mind that
principally came to expression in the incarnate 
life.(One doubts even if an Antiochene thinker would 
have said this either.)
For what is the ontological connection in Brown's
theory? What constitutes and justifies talk of one
person? It is a divine 'allowing', a divine allowing
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which enables the divine mind to experience the 
thoughts, activities and deeds of Jesus Christ in a 
unique and distinctive way.
But, given Brown's insistence that Jesus could not 
distinguish his human experience of the divine mind from 
any other experience, and given that Jesus's human 
consciousness was unaware that it was participating in 
the divine life, and given that it was the thoughts 
and deeds of the human consciousness which principally 
came to expression in the incarnate life (albeit 
prompted and influenced by the divine consciousness) is 
all this not nearer to the language of inspiration 
rather than incarnation? It has to be conceded that 
Brown's theory, at least as interpreted here, is much 
nearer to the Antiochene approach of an indwelling by 
'good pleasure' rather than an incarnation, an 
embodiment of the Divine Word. In the third chapter of 
this thesis an attempt will be made to show that these 
alternatives are not stark absolutes and that a middle 
way is possible through them and that Brown's theory may 
be of some value in suggesting the direction that middle 
way should take.
It should be stressed that Brown rejects the 
'Antiochene' model of christology (although he values
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its stress upon the complete humanity of Jesus) and 
distinguishes it quite clearly from the Chalcedonian 
model,(85) Therefore the argument that Brown’s thesis 
is best viewed as a continuation of this type of 
approach is controversial. Yet it is possible to argue 
that the position he develops, indeed the very choice of 
a ’two-minds' model which necessarily brings overtones 
of duality,forces Brown towards the 'Antiochene' 
position.
In summing up this consideration of the logical defence 
of the two nature model of Chalcedon via a 'two-minds' 
strategy we may say that there is still an unresolved 
ambiguity at the heart of each system as to the true
subject in the incarnate life of Christ. This inherent 
ambiguity is not an unimportant point of only passing
interest. It does point to the extent to which almost
any modern understanding of the incarnation must
necessarily be removed from the concerns of the early 
Greek fathers, both Alexandrian and Antiochene.
Perhaps of all the models considered here only that 
offered by Richard Swinburne offers a close 
approximation to the thought of the early fathers,The 
reason for Swinburne's proximity, and Morris and Brown's 
distance, is that only Swinburne offers a decidedly
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dualistic understanding of the person of Christ. As 
such, like the early fathers, he is prepared to give a 
clear criterion of identity between God the Son and 
Jesus of Nazareth, namely, that the soul of God the Son 
is embodied in the human frame of Jesus of Nazareth and 
is the ultimate controlling principle of thought and 
action.
Morris’ ’two-minds’ theory is intended to arrive at the 
same position but as has been shown he is ultimately 
unclear as to what constitutes ’metaphysical onwership’ 
of the mind of Jesus of Nazareth by the mind of God the 
Son. Morris' theory hesitates perpetually on either 
side of the dilemma finally unable to decide in which 
way to move forward. The result, as Hick has pointed 
out, is that his theory does not so much give an account 
of the incarnation of God the Son, but instead offers 
the picture of a mind controlling the mind of Jesus 
which prevents him from ever contravening the will of 
God the Son. The result is that the purpose and plan 
of the mind of God the Son come to expression in the 
life of Jesus and that the experiences of Jesus are 
'owned' by God the Son. But is this the traditional idea 
of incarnation? Framed in this way, a reasonable reading 
of the 'two-minds' theory, would conclude that it reads 
much more like an 'inspirational' christology than a
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'metaphysical' christology. This same 'inspirational' 
tendency is found, and indeed is much stronger, in 
Brown's theory despite his strenuous attempts to avoid 
it.
The reason for this is not hard to find for it would 
seem that any attempt to defend Chalcedon by recourse to 
'two-minds' necessarily imports into Chalcedon traces of 
the modern psychological categories of the person 
(intention, relationality, self-consciousness etc.) that 
were not immediately at the heart of the classical 
notion of person. The result is to move the theory away 
from strict ontological categories into contemporary 
psychological categories with all that that entails. The 
move from ontology to psychology mirrors the movement of 
thought which replaces an 'embodied Word' with a 
'controlling consciousness in an asymmetric accessing 
relationship with a human consciousness'. Thus the 
movement from incarnation to inspiration becomes 
inevitable. For what is an 'asymmetric accessing 
relationship' if not a neologism for what theologians 
traditionally meant by inspiration, although with all 
the warmth of a term which draws upon the realm of human 
experience missing when replaced by terminology drawn 
from the language of information technology?
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There is much more that could be said about all these
theories and doubtless the authors could and would
respond to the criticisms offered here. Yet there is 
substance in the assertion that rather than solving and 
defending the difficulties of Chalcedon they merely 
translate them into contemporary terminology. Any 
appearance of a solution is gained by the inevitable 
move away from strictly incarnational language towards 
language which may be characterised as strongly 
inspirational language.
The central problems lying at the heart of Chalcedon 
remain unsolved. Is there a unified person? Is a full 
humanity retained in anything other than a formal sense? 
The extended and accentuated sense given to the term 
person in Morris' theory tends to lead to the conclusion 
that it is not. For either the term means something like 
what we mean when we use the term of another person or 
it does not. If in the incarnation we use the term in a 
way which applies only to Jesus of Nazareth then the
whole purpose of insisting upon a oneness of person
begins to lose its point.
This ambiguity surrounding the term person constitutes 
the 'black hole' at the centre of Chalcedon into which 
the 'two-minds' theorists seem to have stumbled. There
Page 84 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Two Into One Won't Go!
is a real question as to whether or not a non-dualistic 
understanding of the person of Christ can reflect 
Chalcedon accurately. The attempt therefore, to 
demonstrate the possibility of a strictly literal and 
logical identity between God the Son and Jesus of 
Nazareth in Chalcedonian terms must be considered to
have failed. This is not to say that it cannot be done
but merely that the difficulties which have been 
outlined in this treatment of the problem must be
attended to by those who feel that they wish to move 
forward in this direction.
This thesis, however, will move forward in a different 
direction by exploring the concept of what might be 
involved in the concept of the divine 'allowing' of
itself to experience the human life of Jesus of Nazareth 
uniquely and directly. The primary category which 
suggests itself to explicate this 'allowing' is the 
category of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth. 
Whether this type of approach has parallels with other 
theories and whether or not it can justify the term
incarnation will be the concern of the following 
chapters. But only after some consideration has been 
given to the claim that incarnational language is not 
literal and fact asserting but is primarily 
metaphorical and value affirming. It is to a
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consideration of this claim that the next chapter is 
devoted.
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CHAPTER TWO
METAPHOR : THE POETIC OF FAITH
The Conflict of Appropriateness and Dissonance
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2. (i) Introduction
The first chapter may be thought of as having a 
decidedly negative purpose. Its purpose was to examine 
some contemporary defences of Chalcedonian christology 
that understood incarnational statements as literal 
statements of identity. The conclusion to that discussion 
was that none of the defences advanced significantly upon 
Chalcedon itself and that most if not all of the 
difficulties traditionally associated with Chalcedon 
resurfaced in the treatments offered by its contemporary 
advocates .
This is not a new or particularly startling conclusion as 
many critics of Chalcedonian christology have arrived at 
precisely the same position. However, the value of the 
discussion lay in showing precisely why the contemporary 
representations of Chalcedon failed, and more 
particularly why the two-minds positions of Morris and 
Brown had an inevitable tendency to drift towards what 
they characterised as an inspirational or psychological 
christology despite their best intentions. There are many 
possible reasons for their failure to successfully 
defend a Chalcedonian christology, ranging from the 
possibility that the contemporary defences of 
Chalcedonian christology are not themselves particularly
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faithful to the historic credal formulations, to the 
possibility that Chalcedon cannot be coherently defended 
as it contains at its heart a massive contradiction which 
has only been accentuated in modern times due to the 
development of the dynamic relational and psychological 
understanding of the human person.
Certainly one cannot rule out as unreasonable, or unduly 
critical, the opinions of those who have argued that 
there is no way forward for christology through following 
the Chalcedonian pattern. One such critic has argued that 
a possible way forward from this negative position is to 
treat incarnational language not as literal and fact 
asserting but instead as metaphorical and to some extent 
value asserting. The critic in question is John Hick who 
writes ;
" They have not asked what kind of language use 
one is engaging in when one says that Jesus was 
God the Son Incarnate. Is it a factual statement 
(a combined statement, presumably about empirical 
and metaphysical facts, or does it express a 
commitment, or make value judgements, and is its 
meaning literal or metaphorical or symbolic, or 
mythological, or poetic...? (1)
Later, in the same article, after asserting that both the 
councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon intended their 
statements to be literal statements of identity. Hick 
makes his now famous comparison that to say Jesus of 
Nazareth was also God is equivalent to saying that a
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circle is a square. Hick concludes therefore that the 
real point and value of incarnational language is not to 
indicate facts but to express a valuation and to evoke a 
certain attitude.(2)
Hick's view is, of course, exceedingly common and is 
rooted in the widely held distinction between literal 
and figurative language. In this view literal language 
refers directly and unproblematically to states of 
affairs in the real world whilst figurative language, 
especially metaphorical language, is in some sense 
parasitic upon this literal predication. Metaphorical 
language is on this account a deviant usage used solely 
for ornamental effect and conveying no new information.
Such a distinction is not exclusively the domain of
critics of traditional incarnational language. Precisely
the same fact/value distinction as that made by Hick
(although drawing extremely different conclusions) is
made by that staunch defender of theological and
scientific realism T.F. Torrance, who puts it the
following way,
"Thus in spite of the hymnic character of the 
Creed [Nicene] its language cannot be treated 
as if it were merely symbolic....employing 
aesthetic, non-conceptual forms of thought that 
are related to God in a detached, oblique way, 
but that derive their meaning and justification 
mainly through co-ordination with the religious 
imagination and self-understanding of the Church. 
Rather is the language to be regarded as
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essentially significative,employing conceptual 
forms that are intended to refer us to God in a 
direct and cognitive way....If they are merely 
symbolic, then the spatial element in them can be 
interpreted quite easily, in a merely metaphorical 
or tropical sense, yet at the expense of any 
conceptual correlation with the inherent 
intelligibility of God."(3)
It is clear that for both Torrance and Hick, although 
taking very different views on the value and continuing 
relevance of the credal satements of the Church, the 
assertion that christological language is metaphorical or 
figurative is equivalent to saying that it is therefore 
non-referential and non-cognitive and as such is 
incapable of providing conceptual and ontological 
clarification about the nature of God in Christ.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore this widely 
held view in the light of the ongoing and current 
discussion of the nature and value of metaphorical 
predication. For within that discussion we find that it 
is precisely this literal/figurative, fact/value 
distinction which is being questioned. The burning 
question is whether or not metaphorical statements have 
cognitive, referential and ontological significance.The 
focus of this chapter is to consider the assertion that 
incarnational language is primarily metaphorical but not 
thereby to concede that it does not intend to refer or 
factually assert what is indeed the case.
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Nicholas Lash has anticipated something of the flavour of 
the approach that will taken here when he argued, in his 
rejoinder to Hick, that although the Fathers might not 
have had a theoretical and precisely articulated theory 
of the distinction between metaphorical and literal 
language that did not preclude them from using language 
in a sophisticated fashion. Indeed, the Fathers showed 
every sign that they were aware that they were 
stretching language to adequately refer to the mysteries 
of which they wished to speak. Furthermore, Lash doubts 
if contemporary linguistic studies allow such a sharp 
distinction between the literal and metaphorical as that 
posited by Hick.(4)
In this sense an attempt will be made to rebut the 
position advocated by Hick that there is an easy escape 
route out of our christological dilemma by treating 
incarnational language as metaphorical and therefore non- 
significative. If recent treatments of metaphor are even 
close to being right then it would seem that metaphors 
abound in all areas of human intellectual activity and 
that they do refer and provide cognitive information. 
Indeed certain treatments of metaphor argue that it is 
precisely at the limits of our understanding when we are 
struggling to articulate what it is that we only dimly
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perceive that metaphors have their most useful 
application.
In order to justify this assertion I will have to examine 
the current debate on the nature of metaphorical 
predication. This is a field which has generated an 
enormous amount of literature and therefore some 
selection will be necessary but I hope to provide a 
reasonably accurate account of at least the main contours 
of that debate before suggesting its applicability to 
incarnational language. In order to provide an early 
indication of what I seek to establish let me reaffirm my 
intention to show that metaphors are necessary and 
irreplaceable cognitive instruments which provide 
epistemic access to the world. Furthermore given the 
nature of the referent of theological language metaphors 
have a necessary and central place within theological 
discourse. I am not,however, committing myself to the 
thesis that metaphors are completely irreducible, that is 
to say that the cognitive information which they provide 
cannot, in principle, be literally paraphrased at least 
in part.
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2. (ii) The Role of Metaphor
The principle dialogue partner in this discussion of the 
nature of metaphor will be Paul Ricoeur who has written 
extensively on metaphor and whose work THE RULE OF 
METAPHOR provides the most exhaustive account of the 
subject yet attempted.(5) Although Ricoeur will provide 
the principle focus of discussion, as he himself engages 
in a wide ranging debate with virtually every other 
prominent writer on the subject, we shall find ourselves 
engaging in dialogue and discussion with the views of Max 
Black, I.A, Richards, Donald Davidson and many others.
Although the recent history of metaphor, influenced by
the views of Hobbes, Locke and Johnson, has tended to
stress its ornamental and parasitic function,and to see
it as a usage of language that should be discarded when
one is seeking clarity and reference, this has not been
the . sole estimation of its function and value.Alongside
such views of the lowly estate of metaphor there have
been philosophers who have attributed to it a fundamental
role in the ability of humans to conceive of and classify
the world which they inhabit. This view can be traced to
Vico who writes;
"From all this it follows that all tropes... 
which have hitherto been considered ingenious 
inventions of writers, were necessary modes 
of expression of all the first poetic nations, 
and had originally their full native propriety.
But these expressions of the first nations later
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became figurative when, with the further 
developments of the human mind, words were 
invented which signified abstract forms 
or genera.... And here begins the overthrow 
of two common errors of the grammarians: 
that prose speech is proper speech and poetic 
speech improper; and that prose speech came 
first, and afterwards speech in verse."(6)
For Vico man is possessed of an instinctive poetic
wisdom, a sapienza poetica , which gradually evolved
through metaphors, symbols and myths towards modern and
abstract thought. Vico developed the concept that we live
in a world of words, made for us by our language and
wherein our minds are formed by language and not language
by the minds which speak it. This conception of the
priority of metaphor over literal language can be found
in the writings of Vico’s contemporary Herder and more
recently in the works of Nietzsche. Nietzsche writes;
"Idhat then is truth? A mobile army of 
metaphors... which after long usage seem to a 
people fixed,canonical and binding.Truths are 
illusions of which one has forgotten that 
this is what they are- metaphors that have 
become worn out and without sensuous force; 
coins that have lost their face and are 
considered, no longer as coins, but as mere 
metal."(7)
Writing today Gadamer has once again asserted the 
priority of metaphor but gives a different reason for, 
and assigns a different value to, the transition from 
the metaphorical to the literal than did Nietzsche. 
Gadamer maintains the primacy; metaphor precedes and is
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itself the presupposition of ’classificatory logic’ and 
science. For Nietzsche, literal language and the concept 
of truth was a forgetfulness of the fundamentally 
metaphorical nature of language due to accustomed usage. 
Thus for Nietzsche such a forgetfulness which forgot 
the arbitrary nature of the demarcations introduced by 
metaphor led to the debasement of the concept of truth 
itself. In contrast, for Gadamer, the transition from 
metaphorical to literal is not brought about by 
forgetting the metaphorical nature of language but is 
brought about by a transition in the history of mind: 
the determination to classify and define, to regulate 
words and to categorise. Only at this point did it become 
possible to recognise that certain utterances were 
figurative and others literal.(B)
In order to assess how two such different estimations of 
the value and place of metaphor came about it will be 
necessary to give a brief review of the classical 
account of metaphor as it is found in the writings of 
Aristotle. For it would be true to say that both views of 
metaphor, that it is an ornamental and deviant usage and 
that it is a necessary and important part of linguistic 
practice, can find support in Aristotle’s treatment of 
the problem.
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At the outset I should mention that my treatment of 
metaphor is following Aristotle and many contemporary 
accounts of metaphor by including within the compass of 
’metaphor* other tropes which later grammarians separated 
out, namely, synedoche, metonymy, catachresis etc. 
Aristotle had little to say about these individual tropes 
treating them more as different functionings of a more 
basic metaphorical transfer.
Aristotle distinguished three categories of language, 
logic,rhetoric and poetic. For Aristotle metaphor was 
something that primarily happened at the level of word 
meaning rather than sentence meaning. It is something 
that happens to the noun, a process which consists in the 
giving of a name to a thing that belongs to something 
else. This displacement or transference, an epiphora , is 
the characteristic feature of metaphor. The movement of 
transference can take place between genus and species, 
species to genus, from one species to another or on 
grounds of analogy.(9)
Aristotle hinted that metaphor could give a name to that 
which has no name. He anticipates here the catachretic 
role of metaphor, the filling of a semantic void by the 
use of a familiar word in a new way. For example, in the 
metaphorical phrase ’sowing around a God created flame'
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the action of the sun is to light what sowing is to 
grain. However, properly speaking, there is no name here 
for the original item. We have filled a semantic lacuna 
by metaphorical predication. Yet it would have to be 
conceded that for Aristotle metaphor,properly 
considered,is really a decorative addition to language. 
Its use in relation to rhetoric is to add charm and 
distinction to an argument. Its function is to affect the 
hearer by the aptness and power of its unusual 
attribution and to therefore cause the hearer to be 
sympathetically disposed towards the argument being 
proffered. Clarity of understanding by contrast was 
thought to reside in ordinary or literal language.(10)
Paul Ricoeur argues that Aristotle's treatment had the 
following implications for the development of metaphor. 
Firstly, it located meaning at the level of the noun or 
word meaning. Secondly, the idea of transfer of one word 
to another realm led to the notion that the borrowed word 
was somehow a deviant usage and was to be contrasted with 
the proper literal meaning of the word,This reinforced 
the conception that language and the objective world to 
which it refers were quite separate entities and that the 
manner in which something is said does not significantly 
alter what is said.
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In Aristotle's treatment metaphor occurs in a game
whose rules are already given, a game already 
constituted. Metaphor is therefore a violation of the 
order of this game. Metaphor's role according to 
Aristotle is to instruct rapidly. It adds charm to our 
arguments and affects the hearer by predisposing him to 
listen to what we have to say. However, despite the 
preference given to the clarity achieved by literal 
language, Aristotle acknowledged that the ability to form 
apt metaphors is a work of genius. It is the perception 
of similarities within the dissimilar.
Ricoeur links his discussion of metaphor with Aristotle's 
by utilising what Aristotle had to say concerning the 
mimetic function of metaphor. As mimesis metaphor mimics 
and redescribes reality. It represents the referent in 
terms of another subject. Metaphor's figurative nature 
has the power to set things before the eye, to depict the 
abstract in concrete terms. Ultimately, it has the 
capacity to signify active reality. This Aristotelian 
category of mimesis is central to Ricoeur's theory of 
the cognitive and referential value of metaphor.
In the final analysis mimesis reminds us that no
discourse ever suspends reality entirely. All mimesis , 
especially creative mimesis , takes place within the
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horizons of our being in the world. And the truth of 
poetic expression is to make contact with our being in 
the world. According to Ricoeur, mimesis does not only
embody the referential function of poetic discourse, it 
connects this referential function to the revelation of
the 'Real as act'. He argues that, " To present men as 
acting and all things as in act-such could well be the 
ontological function of metaphorical discourse....Lively 
expression is that which expresses existence as 
alive ."(11 )
Ricoeur finally rejects the Aristotelian word-
centred/deviant usage account of metaphor. He does so 
because he favours a theory of meaning that is semantic 
rather than syntactic. That is, for Ricoeur, meaning is 
properly attributed to sentences and not words. The
sentence is the individual unit of discourse, words find 
their meaning only in the context of the sentence. He
traces this contextual theory of the meaning of words
back to I.A.Richards who spoke of the interanimation of
words in any given sentence. The process by which we
understand the meaning of a sentence is not one of adding 
up the different word meanings to achieve a total
meaning.Rather each word receives its meaning from its
use and context in the sentence,(12)
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In this account all words are polysémie. That is, they 
have a wide range of possible meanings and uses and it is 
only the context within which the word is used which 
suggests one meaning rather than another. As such the 
distinction between literal and metaphorical words, 
between proper and deviant usage, vanishes. For all 
words gain meaning from their context.Metaphor, 
therefore, cannot be regarded as a deviant secondary 
usage, it is as valid and meaningful as the literal.
As well as following Richards in the contextual theory of 
meaning where words receive their meaning through a 
process of interanimation, Ricoeur follows Richards in 
ascribing a basic duality in the structure of the 
metaphorical process. Richards' terminology for this 
duality was 'tenor' and 'vehicle'.(13) The 'vehicle' is
usually the word which we recognise as being used 
metaphorically. The 'tenor' can be more difficult to pin 
down. Strictly speaking it need not appear in the 
metaphorical statement at all. It is the underlying 
subject matter of the metaphor rather than the non-
metaphorical element of the statement.
This basic duality has been recognised by all major
writers on the theme of metaphor. Max Black, who
introduced the study of models and metaphors to the
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philosophy of science and who was himself heavily 
influenced by Richards,coined the terms 'focus ' and 
'frame' to represent Richards 'tenor' and 'vehicle'. By 
'focus' he meant the word that is being used
metaphorically and by 'frame' he meant the literal words 
which surrounded it in the statement.(14)
Some contemporary commentators on metaphor have accused 
Black of misunderstanding what Richards meant by 'tenor' 
and 'vehicle'.(15) Related to this criticism is the
objection to Black's assertion that each metaphor has 
two subjects, a 'principal' and 'subsidiary' subject.(16) 
In this account of the metaphorical statement the 
'principal' subject is acted upon by the 'subsidiary' 
subject and certain features of the 'subsidiary' subject 
sort and affect our viewing of the 'principal' subject. 
Thus in the metaphor 'Man is a Wolf', the 'principal' 
subject man is viewed in terms of certain properties 
which are normally associated with being a wolf. Whilst 
agreeing that many metaphors do not have two explicit 
subjects, a 'writhing script' being a suitable example, 
and acknowledging that Black may have been careless in 
his terminology, I nevertheless feel that the basic idea 
that there are at least two poles in every metaphor and 
that one is in some way disrupted by the other seems to 
be indisputable.
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Ricoeur's theory utilises this idea of metaphor
disrupting a whole semantic network by an unusual 
attribution. As such metaphor is a deliberate category 
mistake which always involves at least two ideas and is 
the deliberate taking of one thing for another. This 
deliberate rule-violation is a discursive phenomenon and 
in order to affect one word the metaphor has to disturb a 
whole network of associations by means of a strange and 
new predication.(17) Following Black, he argues that 
metaphor bears information due to its ability to re­
describe reality. Metaphor accomplishes this re­
description on the basis of its ability to de-construct 
our literal world. The inability of metaphor to be 
understood literally is the key to a new understanding 
which is brought about by the strange use of the 
metaphor.
Metaphor has the power to do this due to its ability 
suddenly to combine elements that have not been put 
together before. Metaphor has an unparalleled power to 
set a scene before our eyes. It is more concentrated and 
powerful than simile.On the one hand it shocks us as we 
perceive the absurdity and destruction of the literal 
meaning of the statement; on the other hand it has a 
certain 'hidden' quality that instructs us rapidly. In 
the midst of the shattered literal interpretation we
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suddenly perceive the aptness of the metaphor and our 
understanding of the subject which is metaphorically 
described and re-described is enhanced,(18)
Ricoeur's theory that metaphor has the power to 
redescribe reality due to its ability to force the hearer 
of the metaphor into considering the subject in the light 
of new and previously undreamed of networks of 
associations would in itself be unproblematic to most 
scholars. It is his insistence that metaphor is in some 
sense irreducible, that it has a reference distinct and 
different from the literal reference and that it bears 
cognitive information which cannot be paraphrased 
literally that is questioned. Ricoeur's justification for 
these claims lies in his account of the referential 
nature of metaphor which is a specific instance of the 
referential nature of a narrative text,
2.(iii) Metaphor, Text and Reference
As previously noted Ricoeur rejected the word centred 
theory of meaning, which he attributed to Aristotle, as 
this led to a substitutionary or at best comparison view 
of metaphor whereby one could replace the metaphorical 
word by another proper and more literal word. Following 
Richards (but also Frege and the later Wittgenstein)
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Ricoeur emphasised the contextual nature of word meaning. 
Words find their meaning in the context of the basic unit 
of discourse which is the sentence. This is important to 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor as it is only at the level 
of the sentence that language has the ability to pass 
outside itself and to refer to the world. At the sentence 
or semantic level language exhibits its ability to 
transcend itself and to relate to the world,(19)
Ricoeur argues that the word belongs to the structure of 
this lower and higher level. It is made up of 
signs (letters) but it is also itself a unity of higher 
meaning as it combines with other words to form a 
sentence. The sentence is not reducible to the sum of its 
parts. In context it says more than the individual words 
analysed separately can say. This higher unit of meaning 
(the sentence) provides the key to Ricoeur's account of 
sense and reference. In the sentence language displays 
its intentional character. The sentence aims beyond 
itself and refers and points to something else.
If the objection should be raised that there is a 
constancy of meaning to our words and this is what makes 
intelligible discourse possible, Ricoeur would argue 
that constancy of meaning is never anything but constancy 
of contexts. The stability and constancy of our discourse
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is not self-evident but is something which itself 
requires to be explained. Words can and do signify more 
than one thing and it is only the work of good authors 
which encourages the ascription of fixed values of usage 
to them, but this should not lead us into assuming that 
words have, or possess, fixed meanings.(20)
From this perspective the sharp separation between poetic 
and technical(literal) language is overcome. They 
constitute two poles of a single scale. One end is 
occupied by univocal meanings anchored in definitions 
whilst at the other end no movement stabilises outside 
the movement among meanings. The aim of Ricoeur's 
discussion here is to abolish the sharp distinction 
between literal and metaphorical language. Metaphor and 
poetic language is as valid as technical and literal 
language for all share in the polysemy of word meaning 
and it is only common usage that fixes certain word 
meanings at the expense of others. Similarly, all 
language at the semantic level refers. It is not only 
literal language that refers but all language shares in 
the self-transcending nature of language to point beyond 
itself. In order to understand this more fully some 
consideration will have to be given to Ricoeur's
treatment of the referential possibilities of metaphor 
in relation to the larger context of the literary work.
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In order to make this transition Ricoeur utilises the 
Fregean distinction between sense and reference. Frege 
argued that sense (Sinn) is what the proposition states 
whilst reference (Bedeutung) is that about which the 
sense is stated.Hence the famous example, 'Morning Star' 
and 'Evening Star', both these terms have the same 
referent but very different senses,(21) For Frege this 
distinction applied only to proper names and not 
propositions but Ricoeur wants to expand Frege's 
distinction to the level of propositions. He argues that 
the reference is communicated from the proper name to the 
entire proposition. The proper name identifies and refers 
to something whilst the predicate says something about 
that which is identified.(22)
Ricoeur then extrapolates this distinction between sense 
and reference from the realm of the sentence to the realm 
of the text. Here the question of reference becomes a 
question of hermeneutics rather than semantics. The text 
is more extensive than the sentence. It is a complex 
entity of discourse which is not reducible to the more
basic units of the sentence. As such in the case of a 
text the distinction between sense and reference which 
was found to be operating at the level of the sentence
becomes a distinction between the structure of a textual
work and the world of the textual work.(23) When Ricoeur
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uses the term 'world of the work' he seems to mean a
structured domain of meaning presented by a text, a 
possible mode of being in the world, rather than an 
objective external reality.
Hermeneutics is vital to this scheme as it provides the 
key that enables the reader to regulate the transition 
from the structure of the work to the world of the work.
In order to interpret a work "we must display the world
to which it refers by virtue of its arrangement, genre 
and style."(24) In this move Ricoeur rejects the
Schleiermachean and Romantic hermeneutical method of 
searching after a world beyond the work and instead seeks 
to address the world which is displayed in front of the 
work. This addressing of the world in front of the work 
involves passing from the structure of of the work (its 
sense) to the world of the work(its reference).
Of course Frege and many philosophers since have denied 
that poetic works and fictive works have a reference. 
They may be said to have a sense but not a reference. 
Frege allowed reference only to scientific statements and 
not to poetic statements, for him the proper name 
'Ulysses' has no reference. Ricoeur wishes to challenge 
this distinction head on. His reason for doing so is that 
he wishes to draw a parallel between the indirect
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reference of the aesthetic work and that of metaphor. In 
the case of the literary work it is not that the work has 
no reference but that the reference is indirect and
ambiguous. He argues that"the literary work through the 
structure proper to it displays a world only under the 
condition that the reference of descriptive discourse is 
suspended."(25)
However, reference is only suspended at the first level 
of discourse in order to refer at a second level of
discourse. This nation of split-reference is fundamental 
to Ricoeur*s theory of hermeneutics and metaphor. The
process of interpreting a metaphor is parallel to the 
process of interpreting a text.The text creates a virtual 
or fictive world which is itself a redescription of 
reality and which refers indirectly back to the familiar 
world. This ability of the poetic or artistic work to 
redescribe reality and to offer a fresh way of viewing 
the familiar world is at the heart of the concept of 
poetic truth. For Ricoeur, to raise the question of the 
referential quality of poetic language is to try to show 
how symbolic systems reorganise the world in terms of
works and works in terms of the world.(26) Therefore one 
aspect of the nature of the literary work is its ability 
to provide an insight into the world outside the text.
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In the same way that the reference of a text is altered
through ambiguity so too is the reference of a metaphor.
The literal meaning of the metaphor is shattered by our
inability to interpret the words as they stand and we
search for a metaphorical meaning. In the same way the
literal reference of the statement is suspended but only
to make way for a metaphorical reference. He writes,
"..it was and it was not contains in nuce all that 
can be said about metaphorical reference. Poetic 
language is no less about reality than any other 
use of language... but refers to it by means of 
a complex strategy which implies as an essential 
component- a suspension and seemingly, an 
abolition of the ordinary reference attached 
to descriptive language. This suspension is only 
the negative condition of a second order 
reference, of an indirect reference built on 
the ruins of the direct reference. This 
secondary reference is so called only because 
of the primacy of the reference of ordinary 
language. For in another respect it constitutes 
the primordial reference to the extent that it 
suggests, reveals, unconceals the deep structures 
of reality to which we are related as mortals 
who are born into this world and who dwell 
in it for a while.(27)
Ricoeur makes explicit the link between this exalted 
view of the power of metaphor and the philosophy of 
Heidegger when he says that the emergence of the more 
radical way of looking at things that comes through 
metaphor is the unconcealing of that layer of reality 
which phenomenology calls pre-objective and which 
constitutes the horizon of all our modes of dwelling in 
the world. It is important to realise at this point that 
when Ricoeur therefore speaks of metaphorical truth he is
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not primarily speaking of the truth of certain 
propositions generated by metaphor but rather a 
disclosure of a newly made possible way of being in the 
world itself as we apprehend the world in a new way 
through the redescription offered by the metaphor or 
text.
Realising this it becomes easier to understand why 
Ricoeur finds a place for feeling and imagination in his 
account of metaphor,Feeling should not be understood as 
mere emotion (it seems to be akin to Schleiermacher ' s 
conception of feeling). Feelings, according to Ricoeur, 
have intentionality and the new congruence produced by 
metaphor is felt as well as seen. Feelings are a way of 
orienting ourselves in the world and they connect us to 
other beings and Being itself. With this notion Ricoeur 
addresses himself to the affectus element of metaphor 
that was a feature of the rhetorical tradition. The role 
of feeling it is to make our own what has been put at a 
distance by thought in its objectifying phase. Feelings 
as such abolish the distance between the knower and what 
is known. Feeling, is not, therefore, to be regarded as 
contrary to thought, rather it is thought made ours(2B),
Similarly, imagination's role is to contribute to the 
epochs or suspension which is proper to the split-
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reference of metaphor. Imagination helps to schematise 
the assimilation between terms by its insight into
similarities, it also helps to picture the sense of the
metaphor due to its grasp of the images which are |
aroused, yet it does more than just this: it contributes 
to the projection of the new possibilities of 
redescribing the world which are opened up by the
metaphor.(29)
Ricoeur*s somewhat holistic and complex account of 
metaphor has gone some way to addressing many of the
reservations and caveats usually raised against the
notions of metaphorical reference and truth. Metaphor 
accomplishes its redescription of reality on the basis of 
a blockage in the literal interpretation of the 
statement. In this blockage the primary reference 
founders but this is merely the negative condition of
another referential possibility. Metaphor is a 
transference whereby an entire semantic realm is 
transposed into an unusual setting. It is not the mere 
moving around of an isolated predicate.
Indeed in the adopted semantic region the metaphor acts 
in a manner analogous to a model,(Ricoeur argues that 
metaphor is to poetic expression what model is to
scientific expression), as such it reorganises our
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viewpoint of the subject in relation to the transposed 
network. This modelling function of metaphor is related 
to its mimetic function for we see the subject in 
terms of the metaphorical predication.
Metaphorical predication is seen against a larger 
conception of poetic discourse, which faces reality by 
inventing heuristic fictions(Mythos ) which construct a 
fictive world, and thereby redescribes reality. 
Metaphorical predication is as valid as literal 
predication. Poetic language is as referential as literal 
language though by a more circuitous route. Poetic 
language and metaphorical predication have ontological 
implications. Yet within the verb 'to be' in any metaphor 
we must always detect an 'is not' which is implied in the 
impossibility of the literal interpretation of the 
metaphor.Ricoeur writes, "there is no other way to do 
justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to 
include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' 
within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 
'is'.(30)
Ricoeur's monumental theory of metaphor may be thought of 
as providing a way of addressing the 'something more' 
nature of human existence in the world. Human existence 
is not only actuality but possibility, not only what is
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but what could be. Metaphor’s role, indeed the role of 
all poetic description, is to make available for us a new 
way of being in the world. The ontological function of 
metaphorical discourse is to reveal what is real not 
simply as given and actual but as potential and becoming. 
Parallel, therefore to the polysemy of language is a 
polysemy of being and as such the "reference of 
metaphorical utterance brings being as actuality into 
play."(31)
2.(iv) Metaphor and Conceptual Clarification
At this point it is possible to see the possibilities 
that Ricoeur's theory of metaphor offers to a 
consideration of incarnational language. If much of the 
language that describes Jesus Christ is undoubtedly 
metaphorical then this does not mean that it is simply a 
picturesque way of describing a unique man whom we have 
come to admire. Rather the text of the New Testament and 
its central metaphors for Christ such as ’son’(Jhn 17:1), 
'son of Cod' (Mk 1:1), 'Lord' (Lk 11:1) , 'Uord'(Jhn
1:14), 'Messiah' (Mth 16:17) pick out and refer to Jesus 
Christ and God's activity and presence in him. This world 
and our existence in it are given a new description. For 
to say that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us ' is 
to redescribe our world and to present to us a new way
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of looking at the world as a world in which God is 
uniquely involved in the life and activity of Jesus 
Christ. For the Christian community the world is a world 
of God's presence and not God's absence. From the texts 
of the New Testament gospels a new possibility of self- 
understanding is opened up to the Christian community 
that they are the objects of God's Fatherly love and that 
he has brought about their salvation in Christ. The 
possibility is laid before them of a new way of being in 
the world through following the way of the incarnate one 
and living and being in a world which is of ultimate 
value and significance because it is an incarnational 
world. To say all this is to say more than is present to 
the world of actuality. It is to give expression to what 
is more than actual and to give voice to the possibility 
that God is with us in Christ. To say this something 
more, to bring a new field of reference to speech, to 
reveal the pre-objective reality that our horizon of 
being takes place within an incarnational world requires 
the metaphor 'The Word became flesh and dwelt among us 
full of grace and truth'.(Jhn 1:14)
Before considering these possibilities, however, some 
residual problems remain. For it has to be admitted that 
there is an inherent ambiguity in Ricoeur's treatment of 
metaphorical reference. Ricoeur would not seem to be
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suggesting that metaphors correspond to the way the 
world actually is- for that would be metaphysics- but 
rather they correspond to what the world potentially 
could be for us. This raises the question of 
verification. How do we distinguish between the genuine 
and false possibilities that are opened up for us by 
metaphor? Or is it the case that metaphor's chief 
function is solely to alter the way we look at the 
world?(32)
If this latter option was the position that Ricoeur was 
advocating then his position would seem to reduce to that 
of those writers, like Hick, who argue that metaphorical 
language primarily expresses an emotive response, or 
reflects a subjective attitude, towards the referent. But 
this cannot be the case for much of Ricoeur's polemic is 
designed specifically to counter this approach, despite 
the role he finds for feeling in metaphorical reference.
Yet much of what Ricoeur has had to say in his account of 
metaphorical predication offers a view of language which 
resembles a surrealistic impression of a lunar landscape. 
New interpretations and discoveries are there around 
every corner. One can leap off into the stellar void or 
fall into a gaping abyss that opens up before one's feet. 
All is chaotic and unstructured.(33) Everything is
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possible and possibly expressed in language, but yet one 
cannot gain hold of any one aspect in order to understand 
more fully, for ultimately the full meaning of the 
metaphor eludes our attempts at articulation.
Ricoeur is fully aware of metaphor's need for an 
interpretative structure and devotes a significant part 
of the concluding chapter of his work to providing such a 
structure. He begins by rejecting any notion of an 
ontological naivete which may be said to apply to his \
account of metaphorical reference. By this he means to 
reject the notion that the metaphorical utterance 
contains ready made an immediate ontology that philosophy 
only has to spell out.(34) He also wishes to avoid the 
Wittgensteinian notion that language games are radically 
heterogeneous. According to Ricoeur the metaphorical 
utterance contains within itself a demand for 
elucidation.
This demand for elucidation can only be met by utilising 
a different means of discourse than metaphorical 
discourse. The type of discourse which Ricoeur has in 
mind is a speculative or interpretative discourse. 
Speculative discourse finds both its possibility and 
demand within the dynamism of the metaphorical statement.
The semantic richness of the metaphorical predication
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initiates a desire for conceptual clarification. The need 
for this clarification is due to the fact that the gain 
in meaning that is established by the metaphorical 
predication is not yet at that point a conceptual gain. 
It is not yet a conceptual gain as the semantic gain is 
not yet separable from the tensive interaction between 
the literal and metaphorical readings of the
statement.(35)
The metaphorical statement only provides a semantic
sketch without a complete conceptual determination. It 
goes beyond the familiar referential field by means of a 
new and unusual attribution and as such it brings a new 
referential field towards language. As such the metaphor 
hints at an ontological reality, but at this stage it is 
only a hint without rigorous conceptual clarification. A 
meaning is hinted at but not yet determined. An
experience, a way of being in the world is suggested but 
not yet totally expressed.
It is due to the sketchy nature of metaphorical 
predication that there arises a need for a speculative 
discourse. Speculative discourse is to be thought of as 
a type of meta-language. It establishes the primary 
notions from which we will draw our concepts, Ricoeur’s 
account of speculative discourse is that it provides the
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genera of philosophy, it is the overarching framework 
within which everything is interpreted. Examples of such 
meta-languages, such frameworks, can be found in the role 
of the categories of Being in Aristotelian and Thomist 
philosophies. Understanding in Kantian philosophy and the 
axioms of logic in analytic philosophy.(36)
Metaphorical discourse is driven by its own tensive
nature towards conceptual clarification. For it is only 
the conceptual clarification of meaning, which is the 
product of speculative discourse, that enables 
metaphorical discourse to free itself from the play of 
double meaning which is a feature of its own
dynamism.Yet great care must be taken not to imply that 
speculative discourse destroys or supersedes metaphorical 
discourse. The universe of discourse must instead be 
viewed as set in motion between this interplay between 
the domains of metaphorical and conceptual language.
Interpretation takes place at this point of intersection 
between the two spheres of discourse. As it is the work 
of conceptual language it cannot help but to strive after 
univocity and rationalisation of the terms of involved in 
the metaphorical predication. However, it is only an 
improper reductive interpretation that rationalises the 
metaphorical and symbolic base of discourse. A proper
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hermeneutical interpretation would seek to strive after 
the clarity of the concept whilst preserving the dynamism 
of the metaphorical meaning that the concept attempts to 
pin down. Metaphor and the whole arena of creative 
imagination's role in relation to conceptual language is 
to provoke it into a "thinking more".
"This struggle to think more, guided by the
vivifying principle is the soul of interpretation..
Creative imagination is nothing other than
this demand put to conceptual thought."(37)
Speculative discourse bases its work upon the dynamism of 
metaphor.As such it can never be that metaphorical 
discourse becomes superfluous to a later and more 
superior conceptual discourse.Interpretation and
conceptual clarification can only take place as an 
examination of the experience of belonging that is 
revealed by poetic discourse. As such a proper
hermeneutics will return us to 'that experience of 
belonging as a whole which is revealed by the tensive 
nature of metaphorical discourse whilst preserving the 
distanciation which creates the space and possibility of 
speculative discourse.'(38)
This need for conceptual clarification is important if 
metaphor is to have a vital role in incarnational 
discourse. For theology is nothing if it is not the 
result of the conceptual demand put to our thinking by
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the chaotic and shocking metaphors of the New Testament 
that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. 
The entire history of christological and Trinitarian 
discourse is the product of christological metaphors and 
the need to understand and to articulate their ’shocking' 
attribution. The stereoscopic tension of the true 
metaphor is found in the claim that Jesus ’is and is not' 
God, Trinitarian terms such as ’the Son is homoousios
with the Father’ and 'One God yet three persons’ are the 
conceptual outworkings of the way in which it is true to 
say that Jesus Christ ’is and is not' God in the sense 
that there is more to be said about God than the fact 
that Jesus Christ is God.
Contrary to what many critics have suggested such 
conceptual clarification is not an illegitimate debasing 
of the primary language of faith. This study of metaphor 
suggests that metaphorical language demands that it be 
interpreted if its novel attribution is to become a 
genuine cognitive gain. As such the early development of 
doctrine was not an improper 'hellénisation of dogma’. 
The Church had to explore the implications of 
christological metaphors and to develop these in terms of 
the philosophical and conceptual categories of the day. 
However, the attempt to canonise one particular 
interpretation and to refuse to allow it to be constantly
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challenged by the New Testament metaphors as to the 
adequacy of its interpretation was to cut the 
hermeneutical circle from returning to the experience of 
being in the world suggested by the metaphors. This 
meant that the doctrinal figure of the incarnate Christ 
lost contact with the lively christological metaphors 
which were its precondition and presupposition.
2.(v) Metaphor ; Caveats and Considerations
Having examined what is easily the most massive and 
influential study of metaphor amongst contemporary 
philosophers, and lest we be carried away by its powerful 
rhetoric, it is perhaps time to consider a few demurrals 
from the type of theory advocated by Ricoeur. The most 
prominent philosophical criticism is that offered by 
Donald Davidson in his article "What Metaphors Mean", 
Davidson's position on metaphor is a subtle one and it is 
easy on a first reading to misunderstand him. His thesis 
is that metaphors mean what their words in their most 
literal interpretation mean.(39) Since many metaphors,by 
common acknowledgement, mean nothing literally this would 
seem to be equivalent to saying that metaphors are 
meaningless. However it is clear that many metaphors are 
meaningful. For example, to speak of a 'gnawing pain' is 
metaphorical, for pains do not gnaw our bodies. Yet at
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the same time it would be a foolish man who said that 
there was no meaning to the term 'gnawing pain'.
Davidson is not a foolish man and, like Ricoeur, he sets 
his views on metaphor within a larger theory of meaning. 
Davidson agrees with advocates of metaphor that a 
metaphor cannot be paraphrased, not because it says 
something too novel or too rich to be paraphrased but 
because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Davidson's 
views on metaphor belong to his wider views of speech act 
theory.His account of metaphor depends upon the 
distinction between what metaphors mean and what they are 
used to do. For Davidson metaphors belong exclusively to 
the domain of use.
Yet this is not to deny that metaphors are useful. 
Davidson concedes that metaphors are useful devices in 
literature, science and law.(40) Yet, he argues, that 
metaphors have no distinctive meaning and bear no 
cognitive information that can not be gleaned apart from 
the metaphor.Metaphors according to Davidson are useful 
in that they 'nudge* us into noting certain things. 
However, he argues that although it is possible to 
decide whether or not the visions, thoughts, feelings and 
emotions which a particular metaphor inspires are true or
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false, it nevertheless makes no sense to speak of a
special metaphorical truth inhering in the sentence.(41)
Davidson has a further argument directed against the
idea that metaphor carries a unique and irreplaceable 
cognitive content which is summed up in the following
phrase,",,if metaphor has a special cognitive content why 
should it be so difficult to spell it out..Why can’t we, 
if we are clever enough, come as close as we please?"(42) 
The general response to this type of criticism by those 
writers who argue that metaphors do have a genuinely
cognitive role is to argue that the implications that the 
metaphor evokes are more varied than any literal 
paraphrase.(43)Janet Soskice , for instance, has argued 
that to call a camel ’the ship of the desert’ evokes 
potentially limitless suggestions. The word ’camel’ in 
and of itself would not convey all the possible 
implications and to replace the metaphor with ’proper 
words’ would not do justice to the metaphor, for the 
implication complex which it invokes cannot be carried by 
a single atomistic predicate.(44)
Interesting as that suggestion is, it lacks telling force 
against Davidson’s suggestion. For Davidson’s point 
argues that it is in principle possible to spell out 
literally all that a metaphor invokes. He may allow that
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this would be a difficult and somewhat tedious process 
but, in principle, it should be passible. David Cooper in 
his book Metaphor makes a similar point to Davidson when 
he argues thus, "if the cognitive content or truth of a 
metaphor involves grasping something that transcends the 
literal truths prompted by the metaphor-namely, the 
weights and balances to be given to these truths 
according to their richness and importance- why can't the 
literal truths(the paraphrase) to which we are led by the 
metaphor not include second order truths about the rest 
of them, why can't we spell out the implication complex 
of the metaphor and the relative degrees of importance as 
part of the paraphrase?"(45)
Davidson and Cooper both seem to allow a certain scope to 
our use of metaphor but to deny the larger claims made 
for it such that it has a special cognitive content that 
literal language does not possess and that it is in some i
way irreducible and unparaphraseable. Although Davidson's 
crtique is a powerful one I think that ultimately 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor eludes it. For if we "take at 
face value Davidson’s admission that metaphor can 'nudge' 
us into noticing things for the first time or to make new 
connections then this sounds something like Ricoeur's 
claim that metaphor has the ability to make new 
connections, to reveal things in a new way, although
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Davdison’s terminology is somewhat less inflated than 
Ricoeur's .
Similarly the demand that if metaphors have a genuine 
cognitive content then it should in principle be possible 
to state this in some non-metaphor ical way is met by 
Ricoeur's admission of the need for speculative discourse 
in order to conceptually articulate the possibilities 
suggested by the metaphor. Ricoeur's concern at this 
point is to argue that the later paraphrase is not 
superior to the metaphor which is its necessary base and 
condition. and that the conceptual articulation is 
constantly challenged as to it applicability and aptness 
by the plethora of possible interpretations of any 
sufficiently lively metaphor.
The question of whether or not metaphors are, at least in 
part, irreducible is not related to the possibility of 
their conceptual clarification. If this were the case 
then there would be no sense to Ricoeur's complex 
discussion of the need for speculative discourse. Indeed 
certain metaphors do seem to be completely reducible as 
is evidenced by 'dead' metaphors such as the 'arm of the 
chair' or the 'foot of the mountain' which are so reduced 
to a single possibility of meaning and interpretation 
that they are no longer recognised as metaphors. However,
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Ricoeur does argue that metaphors are irreplaceable in 
that they perform a function for us in revealing things 
as they are which is indispensable to the projection of 
human possibility in the world. The irreplaceable aspect 
of metaphor then is found in this disclosing, revealing, 
nudging us into seeing things in a new way for the first 
time. As such literal interpretation or conceptual 
clarification can never truly replace or exhaust any 
sufficiently lively metaphor, for the metaphor will 
always challenge the interpretation as to the adequacy of 
articulation of the possibility which the metaphor has 
revealed.
Ricoeur would no doubt also refer us back to his argument 
that maintains that poetic language is as valid as 
literal language and that the demand therefore, for a 
literal paraphrase, is unnecessary. Alternatively, he may 
suggest that literal language does not have the
deconstructive power of metaphor which is a necessary
pre-requisite of beginning to look at the world in a new 
way. This looking at the world in a new way is the 
contribution of 'poetic language' rather than technical
or literal language.lt is an accomplishment of 
texts,metaphors and models and it is a revealing and a 
disclosure which takes place in the particular human
medium for such disclosures which is language. These
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disclosures are necessary for the expansion of our 
'being' in the world as we actualise the 'more' that is 
possible for us as human beings in the world. This 
expansion of 'being',this actualisation of human 
possibility, could not be accomplished without the
creative moment of language typified in metaphorical 
predication ,
It is interesting that David Cooper, who argues against 
much of what Ricoeur would have to say concerning 
metaphor, suggests a very similar understanding of 
metaphorical truth by utilising the Heideggerean 
conception of disclosure. In this discussion truth is not 
primarily related to the truths of propositions, but is 
rather a revealing of what things really are to us as
objects present themselves to us through our interests
and concerns. A clock, for instance, would not present 
itself to a group of primitive tribesmen as a clock. It 
can only be a clock to those people whose interests and
concerns are such that the clock has disclosed itself to
them as a clock. Cooper argues that metaphors may help us 
by participating in such a disclosure.(46)
In Davidson's scheme there is no such thing as 
metaphorical truth. We may decide that the propositions 
which the metaphor gives rise true are true or false but
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there is no such thing as a true metaphor. For Ricoeur 
and Cooper the question of truth is not primarily related 
to secondary propositions but to the way of being in the 
world which the metaphor reveals to us. The metaphor may 
be said to be true in that it discloses a possible mode 
of existence to us, it expands our being and offers to us 
a new understanding of reality. The question as to 
whether this 'existential' account of truth is to be
preferred to Davidson's more 'prepositional' 
understanding cannot be settled here. It is sufficient to 
understand that two very different conceptions of truth 
are involved.
To summarise the discussion so far: I hope that it has
been shown that metaphors are not decorative additions to 
language whose primary purpose is to evoke a response or 
to express a certain attitude. Metaphors can and do refer 
and they do possess a genuine cognitive content. However, 
it is both possible and necessary to specify, in some 
non-metaphorical way, the ontological suggestions of
metaphor before they can become a conceptual gain.
However, those authors who argue that incarnational 
language is metaphorical may respond that although it may 
be the case that certain metaphors refer and have 
cognitive content that need not mean that all metaphors 
do so. Furthermore, they may ask, if all metaphors are
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permissible and, if not, how does one distinguish a good 
metaphor from a bad one?
It is certainly true that some of the difficulties 
surrounding an adequate theory of metaphorical 
predication have arisen from precisely this fact that 
certain scholars have been proposing theories of metaphor 
without recognising that not all metaphors are used in 
the same way or for precisely the same purpose. There are 
trivial metaphors and there are vital metaphors, there 
are metaphors which are poetic conceits and there are 
metaphors which are being used to articulate some only 
dimly understood possibility at the limits of our 
understanding. Obviously if incarnational language is 
metaphorical then it will have to be of the second 
variety if it is to have any genuine cognitive content. 
In order to assess that possibility it will be necessary 
to consider the claim that metaphors can in important 
respects resemble models.
2.(vi) Theory Constitutive Metaphors
The theory that metaphors in some way resemble models is 
neither new nor startling. In the examination of Paul 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor it was found that he felt 
that metaphors are to poetic expression what models are
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to scientific expression. Ricoeur is following here a 
suggestion first made by Max Black which in turn heavily 
influenced Ian Ramsey’s treatment of religious 
language.(47)Black’s account of metaphorical predication 
is fairly straightforward and similar to that outlined by 
Ricoeur.
According to Black metaphors work by projecting upon 
the primary subject a set of associated implications that 
belong to the secondary subject. The maker of the 
metaphorical statement selects,sorts,emphasises,
organises and suppresses features of the primary subject 
by applying to it features of the secondary subjects 
implicative complexes.(48) The terms that Black used for 
this sorting process were themselves metaphorical, the 
metaphorical word acting as a filter or a screen upon the 
primary subject.
Metaphors for Black act in a similar manner to 
m o d e l s E v e r y  metaphor is the tip of a submerged
model’.(49) Every suitable metaphor then, in a manner 
similar to a model, suggests an analogy or a structural 
correspondence between the subject under description and 
the metaphor which acts upon it. In changing the 
description the metaphor alters our understanding and 
relationship towards the subject which has been newly
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described. Following contemporary philosophy, Black 
argues that the world is essentially a world under a 
certain description. Metaphor’s cognitive ability derives 
from its power to change that description. Metaphor has 
the power to make connections that once they are 
perceived are then truly present for everybody. Metaphors 
enable us to see aspects of reality which previously were 
hidden to us by revealing a new description of the world 
in which we live.(50)
Metaphors consist of the "..interactions between two 
subjects, grounded in analogies of structure(partly 
created, partly discovered)...The imputed isomorphisms 
can be rendered explicit and are the proper subjects for 
the determination of appropriateness, faithfulness, 
partiality... and the like. Metaphors that survive such 
critical examination can properly be held to convey, in 
indispensable fashion, insights into the systems to which 
they refer."(51))
Black's account of metaphors and models was to prove 
influential in the study of religious language.(52) 
However, at this point I would like to briefly outline a 
recent contribution to the subject which builds on the 
work of Black and which is proving to be extremely 
influential on contemporary theologians.(53) The article
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to which I refer is Richard Boyd's "Metaphor and Theory 
Change; What is "Metaphor" a Metaphor for?" (54) It is to 
Boyd that I owe the term 'theory constitutive metaphors',
Boyd argues that there is an important class of metaphors 
which play an indispensable role in the development and 
articulation of theories in mature sciences. Part of the 
function of these metaphors is to introduce terminology 
where none previously existed thereby mapping a vaguely 
understood referent and picking it out so that it can be 
subsequently identified and meaningfully talked 
about .(55)
It is important to realise that the success of such 
metaphors is not dependent on our being able to specify 
precisely and exactly what the relevant similarities and 
analogies between metaphor and referent are. Indeed it is 
this ambiguous 'open ended' quality which makes them 
useful flexible tools in developing research 
programmes.(56) Nevertheless a successful research 
programme will succeed in explicating, at least in part, 
certain of the relevant similarities and analogies 
suggested by the metaphor.(57)
Central to Boyd's theory is a non~definitional account of 
reference which builds on the work of Putnam and Kripke.
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Briefly put these theories argue for a 'causal theory of 
reference' which separates the ability to successfully 
refer from the ability to provide a complete and 
unrevisable and exhaustive description of the referent. 
Indeed one can successfully refer even when when the 
identifying descriptions that are associated with a name 
or natural kind prove to be false. For example, a 
speaker who knows that Columbus discovered both America 
and that the world was round truly refers to Columbus 
when he uses the term even though Columbus did neither of 
these things. Reference is successful because it does not 
depend upon exact knowledge of the referent but rather 
depends upon the speaker being a member of a relevant 
linguistic community which has passed that description of 
Columbus from link to link.(58) Reference on this theory 
is a linguistically mediated 'epistemic access' to the 
world as communities pass on terms which have received 
an original 'dubbing' ceremony. In this sense I can 
successfully refer to a beech tree even though I am not 
capable of offering a definite description of the natural 
kind beech trees which would distinguish them from elm 
trees. I can successfully refer because I exist in a 
community where experts have 'dubbed' certain types of 
tree 'beech' trees and I have learned the appropriate 
situations in which to identify and refer to them.
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Boyd argues that theory-constitutive metaphors serve 
exceptionally well as 'non-definitional' modes of 
reference fixing which are especially well suited to the 
introduction of terms referring to kinds whose real 
essences consist of complex relational properties, rather 
than features of internal constitution.'(59) This theory 
is 'realist' (though not naively so) in that one of 
metaphor's task is to accomplish the task of the 
'accommodation of language to the causal structure of the 
world.'(60) By this Boyd means that metaphors introduce 
terminology and modify current terminology so that 'our 
linguistic categories cut the world at its joints.'(61)
As an example of one such theory-constitutive metaphor 
Boyd offers the current psychological model of 
understanding the brain as a computer and thought as a 
form of information processing. This metaphor is theory- 
constitutive in that generally speaking psychologists do 
not know how to offer literal paraphrases which express 
the same theoretical claims,(62) This metaphor then is an 
irreplaceable part of this scientific theory for it 
constitutes the theory that it expresses. It gives rise 
to terminology such as 'neural programming', 'thought is 
an algorithmic computation, memory is encoded or indexed 
by labelling etc.(63) Boyd's argument is that the 
centrality and prevalence of computer metaphors in
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theoretical psychology, and the exploration of analogies 
and similarities between minds and computers, play an 
indispensable and irreplaceable role in the vocabulalry 
of contemporary psychology as the same cognitive claims 
could not be made apart from them.(64)
Boyd's account of metaphor is substantially in accordance 
with that offered by Ricoeur. Both agree that metaphors 
are not only allowable but indeed in certain cases are
vital and necessary in the development and acquisition of 
new information about the world. Both agree that the
vague or open-ended quality of metaphors, far from being 
a problem, is instead part of their contribution to the 
gain in information which is achieved through their use. 
For it is the the potentially limitless interpretations 
offered by a metaphor when it transposes a known semantic 
field or relational structure onto a new referent, which 
generates new terminologies and insights, that enables a 
competent community of receivers of the metaphor to both
fix the referent and gain access to it through the
terminology provided. Similarly, both agree that there is 
a conceptual development required and demanded by the 
vital suggestiveness of metaphorical predication before a 
genuine cognitive gain is established.
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The relevance to this theory of metaphor to incarnational 
language is at once obvious and indeed in some cases 
necessary. For if we follow Eberhard Juengel in arguing 
that all talk of God is necessarily metaphorical because 
there is an absolute difference between God and the 
world, and talk of God therefore involves the
transference of words drawn from the world and human 
experience to God, then one must develop a complete 
account of metaphorical predication.(65)
Furthermore it is clear that many of the terms used for 
Christ in the New Testament are metaphorical. The term 
'son of God' (Mk 1: 1) for example, has a history of use 
in the Q.T. where it is quite clearly used to pick out 
and refer to someone or something who was specially 
favoured and who had a particular role to play in the 
purposes of God. Therefore angels are 'sons of God' (Deut
32:8), Israel is the 'son of God' (Ex 4:22) and the King
of Israel is the 'son of God' (2 Sam 7:14),
Jesus Christ is described as the 'image of the invisible
God' (Col 1:15), a metaphor which is literally impossible 
but which nevertheless evokes a powerful constellation of 
possibilities as to precisely which way Jesus could be 
the image of the invisible God. Similarly, Jesus is 
portrayed as the 'Son of Man', 'the second Adam', 'the
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Wisdom of God that created the world', 'the Word of God 
become flesh'. Merely to list these images shows the way 
in which the earliest Christian communities searched 
around for ever more powerful metaphors to adequately 
describe the reality of Christ.
Within this kaleidoscope of images certain metaphors 
achieved a certain dominance so that they became root- 
metaphors or models. That is they suppressed, organised 
and controlled the suggestions of other less primary 
models. Obviously the category of 'sonship' and the whole 
Father - Son relationship which portrayed Jesus as the 
'son of God' came to dominate and control the suggestions 
offered by other less successful metaphors. For example, 
the image of Jesus as the 'Son of man' so prominent in 
the synoptic gospels is excluded in the fourth gospel by 
the powerful combination of the metaphors of Jesus as the 
Word become flesh and Jesus as the unique 'Son' of the 
'Father'. In the same gospel the root-metaphor of Jesus 
as the incarnation of the pre-existent Logos seems to 
have suppressed the idea of Jesus' adoption by the 
Spirit of God at his baptism which many feel was the 
earliest form of christology.
Sally McFague has suggested that the root-metaphor of the 
parables is the 'Kingdom of God' which suggests a way of
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being in the world as the free gift of God.(66) This 
dominant model is a personal and relational one and our 
metaphors and models and the conceptual clarification of 
them should therefore stress the personal and relational 
nature of God. As such McFague accepts the powerful 
metaphors of Fatherhood and Sonship because they richly 
express relational insights concerning the nature of God, 
although she rejects the absolutisation of these 
metaphors which has taken place within theology,
David Tracy has also argued that the 'Kingdom of God' is 
a root-metaphor of the New Testament. However, he argues 
for the necessity of the type of conceptual explication 
which I have outlined for this type of root- metaphor. 
For Tracy the metaphor 'God is Love' as it is found in 
the Johannine letters is part of the process of 
conceptual clarification of the root-metaphor the 
'Kingdom of God'.(67)
Whilst agreeing with much of what McFague and Tracy have 
to say and having no strong objection to the idea that 
the 'Kingdom of God' or 'God is Love' are root-metaphors 
of the New Testament, I would, however, suggest that a 
more basic root- metaphor is God's presence and activity 
in Jesus Christ. McFague has argued that a metaphorical 
theology cannot identify any single individual including
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Jesus of Nazareth with God. (58) In one sense this is* 
acceptable and one could say that Christian theology has 
never simply identified Jesus of Nazareth with God, the 
whole doctrine of the Trinity bears witness to that.
Yet the question has to be asked if McFague has taken 
the parables and texts of the New Testament seriously 
enough. The ’Kingdom of God’ is surely a basic notion but 
is it separable from the person of Jesus of Nazareth in 
the way that McFague supposes. That Jesus preached the 
’kingdom of God’ and the Church preached Jesus is a 
truism which has become a cliche. Yet from the beginning 
Jesus was intensely associated by the earliest 
proclamation with the rule and activity of God. The very 
early use of the ascription ’Lord” testifies to that. And 
this association was not accidental, for even the most 
’nan-metaphysical’ of contemporary biblical scholars 
argues that Jesus strongly associated his person and 
activity with the inauguration of the Kingdom.(69)
This is true too in the case of Tracy’s root-metaphor 
"God is Love". For if we read the first letter of John 
from which it is drawn we find that it says " For God is 
Love; and his love was disclosed to us in this, that He 
sent his only Son into the world to bring us life. " ( 1
Jhn 4:7) Throughout the New Testament we find that
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metaphor is heaped upon metaphor, image upon image, all 
reinforcing the central idea that God was in Christ, "But 
in this final age he had spoken to us in the Son whom he 
has made heir to the whole universe, and through whom he 
created all orders of existence: the Son who is the
effulgence of God’s splendour and the stamp of God’s very 
being ,"( Heb 1:2-3) " He is the image of the invisible 
God.."( Col 1 :15)
The most basic idea throughout the New Testament is
that God was uniquely present and active in the life
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, As Juengel puts
it the root-metaphor of the New Testament, of the whole 
story of salvation, is the identification of the risen 
one with the crucified man Jesus of Nazareth.(70) This 
metaphor has to be interpreted through other 
Christological metaphors such as ’Son of God’ which 
refers us to the origin of God’s activity in Christ and 
Kyrios which refers us to the present and future 
activity of God’s presence in Christ.(71)
Kenneth Surin in a paper devoted to the ’grammar’ of the 
incarnation makes a similar point,(72) Surin argues that 
’incarnational propositions’ are propositions whose truth 
must be presupposed in order that truth may be assigned 
to other more abstract theological propositions. The
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example he gives, is the proposition, 'In Christ God
reconciled all things to himself’. This presupposes the 
’incarnational proposition’’Jesus Christ is of the same 
substance as the Father.(73) Surin argues that 
’incarnational propositions’ are ’pragmatic’ propositions 
which must be true in order that christological discourse 
can be appropriately transacted.(74)
Surin makes the point that the ’incarnational’ theologian 
is compelled to endorse a number of axioms. These are
soteriological axioms which include the claims: (i) that
God redeems all things by breaking into history;(ii) that 
our salvation can only be accomplished if God allows our 
sin to ’interrupt’ his own life through Jesus of
Nazareth; and(iii) that this ’interruption’ is possible 
only if the very being of God engages and identifies with 
the human condition in and through Jesus of Nazareth.(75)
The justification for these axioms is drawn from 
Scripture and its central and controlling metaphor of 
’incarnation’. The Church is the community which consents 
to be interrogated by the Scriptures and to learn what it 
means to live the way of Jesus in the world. Surin argues 
that "Incarnational propositions are thus the
indispensable underpinning of the ecclesial community’s 
’pedagogy of discipleship’, a ’pedagogy’ which is
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inaugurated when the believer enters the Church’s Gospel­
shaped narrative space. "(76)
Here we have the type of hermeneutical circle described 
by Riceour in operation. The Scriptures, the narrative 
text of the New Testament open up a ’Gospel shaped 
narrative space’ for the believer and invite him to enter 
it. Yet in order to inhabit this space the believer must 
pragmatically presuppose a number of incarnational 
claims about Jesus Christ because the text demands that 
we speak of him in this way.Yet we only make sense of 
Scripture by speaking of Jesus in this ’incarnational’ 
way.(77) As such theolgoical talk about Christ is 
appropriate when ’incarnational’ propositions are 
pragmatically presupposed and the justification for the 
use of such propositions is the root ’incarnational’ -,,
metaphor of Scripture.
Surin’s treatment anticipates much of what I want to say 
about the root-metaphor of incarnation. For although it 
may be disputed that there is a clear incarnational claim 
in the New Testament - indeed perhaps only in the phrase 
’The Word became flesh and dwelt among us ’(Jhn1:14) do 
we have an unequivocal statement of incarnation (78)- yet 
there is no doubt that once stated the metaphor of
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incarnation shaped and structured the interpretation of 
all other christological metaphors.
As such I want to suggest that the metaphor of the 
incarnation became for the Christian community a 'theory- 
constitutive ' metaphor. That is, it was used to fix a 
reference and to enable the community to articulate what 
they wanted to say about God's presence and activity in 
Jesus of Nazareth. Like all genuine theory-constitutive 
metaphors it provides a way of speaking about a 
phenomenon which is only dimly understood. Yet in 
providing a way of speaking it provides a terminology for 
the community,and modifies existing terminology, so that 
the community can meaningfully articulate what they 
believe.
In common with many theory - constitutive metaphors the 
theory cannot be expressed apart from the metaphor for it 
constitutes the essential claims of the theory. Therefore 
the Christian community cannot express what it believes 
about God and God's presence in Jesus Christ apart from 
the metaphor of incarnation. To abandon the metaphor of 
incarnation would necessarily involve the community in 
saying something else, in developing another theory, 
about God and Jesus Christ, To illustrate this point let 
us consider the theory that the metaphor generates as a
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scientific research programme. According to one 
influential account of such research programmes they are 
made up of a number of hard-core hypotheses and a set of 
auxiliary hypotheses. (79) The hard-core hypotheses 
define the shape and nature of the programme. They define 
its identity and suggest the way in which the programme 
is to be pursued. The auxiliary hypotheses perform the 
task of accommodating the programme to the world. That 
is, they are the presuppositions and implications 
generated by the hard-core of the programme. They are
theories which state what must be the case if the hard­
core hypotheses are true.
In this scheme the auxiliary hypotheses defend the hard­
core of the programme by allowing themselves to be 
modified or discarded in the face of any contrary
evidence to the programme. The programme remains intact
for as long as one is only modifying or reshaping the 
auxiliary hypotheses. As soon as one has altered the 
hard-core hypotheses the programme has failed and in 
effect a new programme has been initiated.
The incarnation understood as the theory-constitutive 
metaphor of the Christian community occupying a'Gospel
shaped narrative space' is the hard-core hypothesis of 
the Christian programme. It provides the identity and the
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direction and the goal of the programme and cannot be 
abandoned or changed without in effect ending the 
programme. However, like all rich metaphors it demands 
articulation and conceptual clarification so that 'it 
cuts the world at its joints', to use Boyd's phrase. This 
articulation and conceptual clarification may be thought 
as corresponding to the auxiliary hypotheses of the 
programme. That is to say that one can always modify and 
change the articulation or conceptual clarification of 
the metaphor without ending the programme but one cannot 
change the metaphor.
The generation and modification of terms by the early 
Christian community suggests that the concept of 
incarnation did fulfil the function of a theory- 
constitutive metaphor. As the theory-constitutive 
metaphor of the mind as a computer generated terms such 
as 'neural programming', 'memory labelling', 'the 
encoding of thoughts' etc., so the metaphor of 
incarnation suggested and adapted terminology to express 
its own insights. The metaphor demanded explication and 
suggested important similarities and analogies which 
would be helpful in understanding the metaphor. Therefore 
the concept of Jesus as the 'son of God' which need not 
have carried any metaphysical overtones was developed and 
expanded until Jesus' unique relation to the Father was
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captured in the title 'God the Son'. The Sonship motif 
generated its own cluster of related metaphors such as 
'only begotten'and 'Eternally generated'. Indeed the 
whole doctrine of the Trinity is the result of the
attempt to develop a terminology which accommodated the 
language of the Christian community to the 'causal 
structures of the world', or in this case to their 
experience of the divine reality.
Similarly, the terms ousia and hypostasis were modified 
and adapted so that they could carry the conceptual 
implications of the metaphor of incarnation. This was not 
an easy task and shows that the 'accommodation of our 
language to the causal structures of the world' is 
fraught with difficulty and misunderstanding. To say that 
the Son was homoousios with the Father was to transfer a 
word which applied to everyday substantial and material 
things to God who was not himself material or 
substantial. Lonergan has argued that the original use 
of homoousios was undoubtedly metaphorical.(80)
Certainly the shock and misunderstanding generated by 
this novel attribution would seem to bear him out.
The important point to realise is that this conceptual 
clarification is not an illegitimate reduction of the 
liveliness of the incarnational metaphor. The metaphor
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demands this type of clarification but is not exahausted 
by it. As such there is no point at which one can say 
that one particular interpretation has exhausted the 
meaning of the metaphor. This is obviously true as the 
categories which we use to interpret any given metaphor 
will themselves change as our primary philosophical 
categories from which they are drawn develop and expand.
Therefore the problem with the classical theory of 
Chalcedon and its presentation of the incarnation of God 
in Christ is not that it is a conceptual determination of 
the language of faith but that it has assumed the place 
of the sole determination of that language. Consideration 
has already been given in the first chapter as to doubts 
concerning its continuing adequacy and its possible 
repr istination today. But this is what might have been 
expected, for the categories of conceptual articulation 
today have a different shape from those of the Fathers. 
Substance has given way to action, ontology to psychology 
and a static view of the person to a relational and 
social view of the person.
In addition to this it was understood that one of the 
features of a theory-constitutive metaphor was that often 
it was extremely difficult to specify precisely and 
exactly what the relevant similarities and analogies
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suggested by the metaphor were. This difficulty is due 
to the conceptual open-endedness of metaphorical f
predication. It is the work of articulation to explore 
what these might be and to measure them against the 
original metaphor and the way in which they open up a way 
of being in the world, the way in which they advance the 
programme suggested by the metaphor. As such the work of 
conceptual clarification can never come to an end for 
continually the suggestiveness of any sufficiently lively 
metaphor will constantly challenge the conceptual 
articulation of its insight into a thinking more.
In summing up what has been achieved in this lengthy 
discussion of metaphor I hope to have demonstrated a 
number of things.
(1 ) To have offered a general theory of metaphorical 
predication which demonstrates that metaphors do refer 
and provide genuine cognitive information.
(2) To thereby reject the theory that 'Incarnational' 
metaphors are merely statements of subjective feeling or 
belief towards Jesus Christ and to suggest .that they do 
genuinely refer and bear cognitive information about 
God's presence in Christ.
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 149
- - — Lit -
Metaphor : The Poetic of Faith
( 3 ) To have shown that the conceptual articulation of 
metaphors is both necessary and legitimate as it is the 
attempt to clarify the cognitive claims of sufficiently 
lively metaphors
(4) To have shown that there is important class of 
metaphors which are theory-constitutive in that the 
theory they help to espouse cannot be said apart from the 
root-metaphor
(5) To have argued that the metaphor of the incarnation 
is one such theory -constitutive metaphor that unites, 
integrates and suggests the lines of development for 
other less central metaphors of the New Testament.And 
that the same claims cannot be made apart from the 
metaphor of incarnation for the metaphor constitutes the 
theory it suggests.
(6) To have suggested that the conceptual articulation of 
this root-metaphor is the work of the Christian community 
which has as its basis and presupposition the metaphor of 
incarnation.
(7) To have shown that the conceptual open-endedness of 
the metaphor and the difficulty in specifying precisely 
the exact similarities and analogies involved in the
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theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation means 
that the work of conceptual clarification must continue 
for as long as there is a community shaped and defined 
by the programme that the theory suggests.
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'GOOD PLEASURE', 'GRACE' AND THE PERSON OF GOD INCARNATE
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3.(1) Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to move from the more 
general discussion of the logic and language of the 
incarnation offered in the opening two chapters, to a 
more specific consideration of an alternative approach to 
the incarnation. This seeking out of an alternative 
christological matrice of interpretation is required by 
the fact that the discussion of the opening chapter 
concluded that the contemporary defences of Chalcedon had 
implicitly moved from 'ontological' to 'psychological' 
categories, from 'incarnational' to 'inspirational' 
christologies. This move was necessitated by the
contemporary understanding of the person as a relational 
subject of consciousness,will and activity.
Similarly, the discussion of incarnational language as 
metaphorical suggested that the primary metaphor 
of 'incarnation', like all sufficiently lively metaphors, 
contained within its own inherent dynamism the demand for 
conceptual explication. Yet the analysis of the classical 
explication of the metaphor of incarnation, as found in 
the credal statements of the Council of Chalcedon, 
suggested that that conceptual articulation was no longer 
adequate today.Successful as the philosophical categories 
may have been for their own time(and there is some doubt
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about that) there is no doubt that the static figure of 
Christ offered therein no longer speaks to the community 
of faith as a credible, nor a satisfying, account of 
God's presence in Christ. The conceptual explication of 
the early Greek Fathers is increasingly being challenged 
by the metaphors of the New Testament into a 'thinking 
more', to provide a new articulation of the divine 
reality of the person of Christ, so that we are returned 
to the experience of being a disciple in the 
'incarnational' world that is opened up to, us by the 
root-metaphors of Scripture.
The focus of this chapter will therefore be devoted to 
an analysis of two theories of the incarnation which have 
attempted to take the full and individual personhood of 
Jesus of Nazareth seriously and which have also attempted 
to offer an account of God's presence in Christ in 
language which is not drawn from the categories of 
Chalcedon. As such they present themselves to. us as 
responses to the metaphor of 'incarnation' which offer an 
alternative matrice of interpretation to that of 
Chalcedon.
The primary account that I have in mind is that offered 
by Donald Baillie in GOD WAS IN CHRIST . (1) The second 
account that will be considered is much more ancient and
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is that offered by Theodore of Mopsuestia. ( 2) The reason 
for linking the two is that the categories which they 
developed to articulate the metaphor of incarnation 
'grace' and 'good-pleasure' are very similar. The 
similarity is confirmed when a contemporary writer 
accuses both of the same christological fault, namely, 
that, they fail to maintain a unity of person in the 
incarnate figure of Christ.(3)
The reason for focusing upon Baillie's theory is that the 
ongoing concern of this thesis is to develop, out of his 
account of the incarnation, a theory of God's presence in 
Christ which shares the same basic structure of Baillie's 
theory,so that one might speak of them sharing a family 
resemblance, yet which legitimates talk of one
'incarnate' person. The development of that theory is the 
work of the following two chapters. The linking of 
Theodore's theory with Baillie is to explore any insights 
that Theodore's somewhat similar account might offer to 
an analysis of Baillie's position.
The idea that a clarification of Baillie's relationship 
to the Antiochene school, of which Theodore is the 
greatest representative, might be helpful, is suggested 
by a profound ambiguity which surrounds some contemporary 
treatments of Baillie's position. In a recent work
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devoted to christology a number of differing estimations 
as to the character and value of Baillie's work were 
offered.(4) John Hick, for example, suggests that in the 
type of Christology offered by Baillie there is the 
basis for a theocentric development which is compatible 
with religious pluralism.(5) That is, although Baillie 
believed Jesus to be unique this is not logically
necessary to his position and that the possibility is 
open for other founders of faiths to have the same degree 
of infilling of grace as Jesus had.(6) Hick concludes 
that Baillie had discarded the traditonal language of 
Chalcedon in order to make the idea of the incarnation 
more intelligible to modern men.(7)
In the same volume S.T.Davis, a conservative analytic 
philosopher, defends the traditional Chalcedonian 
presentation of the person of Christ. To do this Davis 
distinguishes between what he terms 'minimal'
christologies and 'full' christologies. He rejects all 
'minimal' christologies as insufficient and he clearly 
regards Hick's christology as minimalist. Interestingly 
though, Davis draws a distinction between those who try 
to reinterpret Chalcedon, whilst remaining essentially 
faithful to it, and those who simply reject it. Baillie, 
he argues, belongs to the group of faithful
interpreters rather than rejectors.(8)
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In another recent work by David Brown, Baillie is taken 
to task for offering an essentially non-interventionist 
account of the incarnation and for representing the 
Nestorian/Antiochene position in modern guise.(9) From 
this it is clear that Baillie's account of the
incarnation is still important as is evidenced by its 
continuing appearance, even if only to disagree with it, 
in all these contemporary works.
Consequently it might prove worthwhile to explore the 
ambiguity surrounding Baillie's position and to ask in 
what sense Hick is right to cast Baillie's theory as 
'inspirational'. The thesis of this chapter is that Hick 
is wrong in this assessment and that there is no
possibility of arriving at a theocentric position which 
is separable from the God who Christ revealed and who is 
incarnate in Christ from Baillie's position.(This is what 
might be expected if the incarnation functions as a
theory-constitutive metaphor so that the same claims 
cannot be made apart from the metaphor of incarnation).
Furthermore, it will be suggested that Davis may be 
right to say that Baillie belongs to the faithful
interpreters of Chalcedon. Although the justification for 
this may mean that an expansion of what Chalcedon allows 
is called for. Support for that idea will be drawn from a
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critique of David Brown's rejection of Baillie's 
position. It will be argued that Brown may be right to 
state that Baillie's position ultimately has profound 
difficulty in maintaining a unity of person in Christ, 
but that he is wrong to reject it. It will be suggested 
that Brown's theory of two-minds, as discussed in the 
first chapter, is in itself totally compatible with 
Baillie's famous 'paradox of grace' christology. It 
follows then, that if, as Brown contends, his theory is 
faithful to the two-nature model of Chalcedon then 
Baillie's theory is similarly faithful. In order to 
demonstrate this it will be necessary to take a detour 
through what is normally termed Baillie's 
'Antiochene'heritage via Theodore's theory of the 
incarnation.
3.(ii) Eudokia - A Neglected Option
The greatest exponent of Antiochene incarnational theory 
is undoubtedly Theodore of Mopsuestia. He more than 
Nestorius, who followed him closely, gave shape to the 
distinctive features of Antiochene Christology. Although 
his views were anathematised many years after his death 
at the Council of Constantinople in 553 A.D., this was a 
reaction to the Nestorian controversy and was an attempt 
to clear the Fathers of Chalcedon from the charge that
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they tolerated views which were Nestorian in tendency.
Despite this, it remains true that during the period of 
his lifetime Theodore's views formed part of the
acceptable range of Christological theory.
It is not part of the intention here to discuss how 
proper it is to characterise Theodore as a Nestorian(nor 
if it is even proper to characterise Nestorius as a 
Nestorian).(10) Suffice to say that there is nothing in 
the teaching of Nestorius that is not anticipated in the 
writings of Theodore, although Theodore perhaps expressed 
himself more carefully and less polemically than his 
unfortunate pupil. Instead concentration will be given 
to an analysis of the main features of Theodore's
conception of the incarnation.
Theodore, as is well known, thought that thé manner in 
which God was present in Jesus of Nazareth was by Eudokia 
or 'good pleasure'. His rejection of the language of 
substance (ousia ) for the mode of God's presence in 
Christ may seem radical but it must be remembered that 
the language of 'substance' was not used as a category 
for describing God's presence in Christ by any
significant figure in Alexandria or Antioch at this time. 
It was widely accepted that the terms which were to be 
used to describe the union were physis and hypostasis,
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or nature and person. Therefore, it cannot be assumed
that the eventual rejection of Theodore's position was 
due to the fact that he rejected the category of
substance as a way of explicating God's presence in
Christ.
The grounds for rejecting Theodore's position arose out 
of the Nestorian controversy and the suspicion that the 
Antiochene tendency to speak of a homo assumptus ,
sharply differentiating which properties could properly 
be applied to the divine and human natures in Christ, led 
to the intolerable and already rejected 'two Sons' 
doctrine of Paul of Samosata.
It is clear that Theodore never intended to return to 
the teaching of Paul of Samosata for he explicitly 
rejected that teaching. Yet he would not be the first
theologian to reject a particular view only to find
himself restating a similar doctrine in different words. 
In order to establish whether or not Theodore taught a 
'two Sons' doctrine some consideration must be given to
the key concepts in his thought. A number of questions 
immediately suggest themselves as requiring to be put to 
Theodore's scheme.What exactly did he mean by God's 
indwelling of Jesus by good pleasure? How might this
differ from an adoptionist or inspirational account of
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the person of Christ? What did he mean when he speaks of 
the divine and human natures in Christ? Are there two 
centres of will and activity? What does it mean to say 
that the two natures united to form one prosopon ? Is
this the hypostatic union under another name?
Theodore rejected the idea that God was present in Christ 
substantially or by activity. His reason for rejecting 
such concepts is that they belong to God's essence. For 
Theodore it is axiomatic that God is present everywhere 
at all times and is not spatially circumscribed. These 
are properties that belong to the substance or essence 
of God. Therefore to say that God was present in Christ 
substantially would be to argue that God's essence was to
be found only in those whom he was said to indwell to the
exclusion of all else, or it would mean that God is
present substantially in everything, even in animals and 
inanimate matter.(11)Yet, Theodore argues, scripture 
clearly teaches that God chooses to indwell certain 
people and not others, he promises to be near to some 
and not to others. If indwelling is thought to be a 
feature of God's essence then we cannot make sense of the 
scriptures or demonstrate how God can be present in some 
things and not in everything.(12)
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Theodore develops a similar argument for rejecting God's 
active operation as the manner by which he indwells 
Christ. Clearly God's activity is universal in scope. If 
his indwelling of Christ is said to be a matter of 
activity then one has to say that God's indwelling is 
universal or that God was limiting his operation only to 
those whom he was said to indwell.(13) Since God 
foreknows everything and governs everything and is 
actively working in everything, his manner of indwelling 
certain people in particular cannot be accomplished by 
this universal operative activity.
It is clear at this point that Theodore is trying to 
distinguish God's indwelling of those prophets and 
saints, with whom He is particularly said to be 
associated, from his general presence and operation in 
the world. It is possible to appreciate the attempt even 
if today the tendency would be to try to trace a 
connecting line between the manner by which God is 
present and active in all things and the way he is 
present in particular individuals. Theodore is basing his 
understanding of this differentiation of indwelling upon 
a particular understanding of certain scriptural passages 
where God is said to indwell certain individuals in a way 
in which he does not indwell others. Since this 
differentiation is clearly presented in scripture
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Theodore argues that the indwelling cannot be 
accomplished by substance or activity, for God is present 
everywhere and at all times in these categories.
Having rejected these two categories Theodore asks what 
is left to explain the manner of God's indwelling? He 
asks ,
"What explanation shall we use which, when we 
maintain it, will in these matters be manifestly 
appropriate? It seems evident ,we shall say, 
that the indwelling should fittingly be 
described as taking place by good pleasure .
And good pleasure means the best and noblest 
will of God.. (14)
The category which Theodore settles upon is that of 'good 
pleasure or ' Eudokia ' . This is to be thought of as the 
active, loving disposition of God towards those with whom 
he is pleased to dwell. This is the manner by which God 
drew near to the prophets and the saints of scripture, 
and it is through the same loving disposition that God 
can be said to indwell Jesus of Nazareth.
It is obvious at once why this way of speaking of God's 
presence in Christ ran into difficulties after the 
sensitivities of the Church were heightened by the 
Nestorian controversy. Yet it would be a mistake to think 
that Theodore taught that God's presence in Jesus of 
Nazareth was no different from the way he was present to 
other men. Had Theodore taught that he would have found
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no place in the Church of his time. Theodore explicitly 
teaches that God is present to everyone by virtue of his 
essence and his ruling activity, but that he draws
especially near to certain men and woman by the
indwelling of his 'good pleasure'. Yet this indwelling by 
'good pleasure' is not all of a kind, for even the mode
of the indwelling will vary according to the degree of
God's good pleasure.(15)
Having introduced the notion of degrees of 'good 
pleasure' Theodore explicitly counters the idea that God 
was present in Christ in precisely the same way that he
was present in the apostles. Theodore rejects this idea
saying,
"But we do not say that God's indwelling took
place in Christ in this way, for we could
never be so insane as that. On the
contrary, the indwelling took place in him
as in a son ; it was in this sense that
he took pleasure in him and indwelt him.
But what does it mean to say "as in a son"?
It means that having indwelt him,he united 
the one assumed as a whole to himself and 
equipped him to share with himself in all 
the honour in which he,being Son by nature, 
participates, so as to be counted one person 
in virtue of the union with him and so to share 
with him all his dominion, and in this way 
to accomplish everything in him, so that 
even the examination and judgement of the 
world shall be fulfilled through him and 
his advent. Of course, in all this the 
difference in natural characteristics is 
kept in mind .(16)
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This quotation provides everything that is attractive 
and everything that is worrying about Theodore's position 
at one and the same time. On the positive side Theodore 
is clearly trying to maintain a unique presence in 
Christ, he wishes also to speak of one person and to 
preserve the sense that the Word united himself with 'one 
assumed as a whole to himself. There is clearly no room 
in Theodore's thought for anything remotely approaching a 
doctrine of anhypostasia .The Word assumed a complete 
human being and had to if our salvation was to be sure of 
covering our complete humanity. This much had been 
learned in the controversy with Apollinarius and it forms 
a benchmark for Theodore's theology.
Yet what exactly does this 'indwelling as a Son’ consist 
in? Theodore seems to draw a clear distinction between 
God the Son who is indwelling Gesus of Nazareth,who is a 
Son by nature, and the one assumed, who shares in this 
sonship by virtue of the union that God has established 
through the act of indwelling. On a surface reading this 
would clearly seem to imply an adoptionist Christology. 
Vet one is bound to ask what Theodore means when he 
says that we are to 'count' the indwelling Son and the 
man assumed as one person by virtue of the union. What 
type of 'person' does Theodore have in mind at this 
point?
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Further light may be thrown on these issues by a wider 
examination of Theodore's writings on the incarnation. On 
a surface reading Theodore’s text seems to raise 
questions that would convict him fairly readily of 
adhering to the Nestorian heresy. Yet elsewhere much of 
Theodore’s terminology clearly prefigures later 
Chalcedonian dogma. For example,
"Thus there results neither any confusion of 
the natures nor any untenable division of the 
Person; for our account of the natures must 
remain unconfused and the Person recognised 
as indivisible," (17)And again,
"We display a distinction of natures but a unity 
of Person,"(18)
Undoubtedly too much can be read into this verbal 
similarity but it is nevertheless striking that 
Theodore's language can so closely resemble the great 
creed of christological orthodoxy,(19)This demonstrates, 
perhaps, the contention of a number of scholars that 
many in the Eastern Churches felt that Chalcedon had 
rejected to some extent the views of Cyril of Alexandria, 
However, though the issue of Theodore's prefiguring of 
later formulations is debatable; what is not debatable is 
the fact that he clearly sought to maintain the unity of 
Christ's person with God the Word, and that there was a 
unique union between God and man in Gesus Christ which 
was not equalled on any other occasion.
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This union or Henosis was effected or constituted by
God's indwelling of Gesus of Nazareth by 'good pleasure'.
The unity of the person is recognised by the fact that
the Word accomplishes everything through the person Gesus
of Nazareth.(20) Theodore argued that this union was to
be a lasting and real union. He writes,
"... For this reason in asserting that the Son of 
God will come as judge from heaven, we understand 
at one and the same time the advent both 
of the man and of God the Word, not because 
God the Word is degraded to be similar to 
him by nature, but because by good pleasure 
there will be a unity with him wherever he is, 
since through him the Logos accomplishes 
everything.(21)
Theodore's terminology at this point may be slightly 
unfortunate yet within the limitations of his terminology 
there is a clear intent to maintain a true and lasting 
union between God the Word and Gesus of Nazareth. It is 
Theodore's respect for the integrity of both natures and 
their mutual inviolability that leads him to distinguish 
the 'man' from 'God the Word'.
Theodore's fear of compromising the integrity of the 
individual natures in the incarnate figure of Christ led 
him to reject a view which was similar in many ways to 
his own. This was the incarnational theory of Gregory of 
Nyssa. Gregory, like Theodore, seemed to reject a
substantial union between God and man in favour of a 'God 
receiving man' christology.(22) Gregory argued too,
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that the God- man was hen prosopon ,or one person, but he 
seemed to prefer the terminology of 'mixture' rather than 
union to describe the way in which God was present in
Christ, For Gregory God's presence in Christ is
ultimately an impenetrable mystery. Yet if we are to 
understand it we must understand it in terms of the 
divine power filling Christ, a power of love which is 
most fully demonstrated in self-giving.(23) Gregory 
emphasises the fact that the presence of God in Christ in 
the incarnation is similar and parallel to, although of a 
different order from, His continual immanent presence in 
creation. The union of God and man in Christ, therefore, 
is related to the indwelling of Christ in everything.(24)
The similarities between Gregory's and Theodore's
position are too obvious to need spelling out. It is 
Theodore's rejection of the notion of 'mixture' which is 
most important here. Theodore rejected the concept of
mixture in favour of union because he stressed the 
completeness and the distinction of the two natures in 
one person. For Theodore the notion of mixture threatens 
the integrity of the two natures, particularly the divine 
nature. Theodore prefers the concept of union over 
mixture as it allows for there to be two complete natures 
side by side in the one person of the incarnate Christ. 
He writes,
"When we distinguish the natures we speak of 
Page 168 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
'Good Pleasure','Grace' and the Person of God Incarnate
the nature of God the Word as complete and 
of his person as complete (for there is no 
hypostasis without its person) Moreover, 
the nature of the man is complete and 
likewise his person, but when we consider the 
union, then we speak of one person.(25)
Theodore reinforces this terminology in the very next
fragment,
"...the essence of God the Word is his own and 
the essence of man is his own, for the natures 
are distinct but the person effected by 
the union is one. In this way, when we try to 
distinguish the natures, we say that the 
person of the man is complete and that 
of the Godhead is complete. But when we 
consider the union, then we proclaim that 
both natures are one person, since the 
humanity receives from the divinity honour 
surpassing that which belongs to a creature, 
and the divinity brings to perfection in the 
man everything that is fitting."(26)
Once again it is important to note the strong emphasis
upon the reality of the union between God and man and the
insistence that we properly speak of one person. Yet one
can immediately see the points which raised alarm in the
minds of his critics. If in the figure of Christ there
are two complete entities, the person of God the Word
being complete, and the person of the man being complete,
how can Theodore maintain that there is one rather than
two persons? How does he avoid the 'two sons' charge?
Theodore was alive to this issue and attempted to avoid 
the 'two sons' charge by arguing that properly speaking 
only God the Son is a Son by nature and that the 'man 
assumed' is bestowed the title and honour by virtue of
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the union which God the Son has with him. There are- not 
'two sons' as the union means that God the Son 
accomplishes everything through the man assumed. Once the 
union has been effected no separation other than a 
theoretical distinguishing of the natures is to be 
allowed.
Ingenious as this answer is it cannot suffice for the 
duality of persons in the incarnate figure of Christ. 
Theodore acknowledges two complete entities, two wills, 
two psychological subjects of attribution, for it is 
important to Theodore's scheme of things that Christ grew 
in moral stature through the exercise of his own will 
along with the co-operating power of the Word of God.(27) 
It is difficult, therefore, to maintain that Theodore can 
meaningfully speak of one person despite his best 
intentions.
A monograph devoted to Theodore's christology comes to 
precisely this conclusion.(28) In this work Frances 
Sullivan devotes himself to an analysis of what the 
concept of one prosopon meant to Theodore.
Interestingly, Sullivan suggests that the term had no 
single or univocal meaning for Theodore. For an 
examination of Theodore's writings reveals that the word 
had a very elastic sense. Theodore speaks of a person as
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a prosopon , the apostles as a group are a prosopon and 
even in one spectacular case it is suggested that the 
whole human race forms a prosopon .(29)
Sullivan is manifestly unsympathetic to Theodore's 
christology, declaring him to be the true father of 
Nestorianism. He concludes that Theodore teaches that the 
man assumed is an ultimate subject of attribution in his 
own right and that the unity of prosopon is nothing 
other than a unity achieved through a moral and dynamic 
relationship, a sharing of activity and prerogatives 
between the Word and the man assumed.(30)
The source of Theodore's confusion according to Sullivan 
can be traced to his failure to distinguish between that 
which can be predicated of the Word by virtue of his 
divine nature and that which can be predicated of the 
Word by virtue of the human nature which he assumed. 
Similarly, Sullivan argues that Theodore makes no 
distinction between human nature and the individual man, 
leading to the mistake of believing that we have to speak 
of a complete individual which the Word assumed to 
himself. Sullivan concludes that for Theodore the man in 
the incarnation is a human suppositum , a personal 
subject distinct from the Word.(31)
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It will be clear at this point that Sullivan is judging 
Theodore by the anhypostatic doctrine of Cyril of
Alexandria. Consequently, although Sullivan admits that 
Theodore's use of the term prosopon was fairly elastic, 
he has no difficulty in stating that whatever the 
prQsopic union was, it was not a union in one 
hypostasis. (32)
Despite the fact that Sullivan is manifestly 
unsympathetic to Theodore's thought, enough of Theodore's 
theory has been given to show that his conclusions are 
not unjustified. There is no doubt that it is extremely 
difficult to show that Theodore intended to teach 
anything that corresponded to the hypostatic union that 
has come to be the accepted interpretation of Chalcedon, 
particularly if that is interpreted through the concept 
of anhypostasia . However, the reason why Theodore could 
not teach anything that remotely corresponded to that 
notion is perhaps what makes him so attractive to 
contemporary theology. For whether it is regarded as a 
gain or not, there is no doubt that a Gesus who is said 
to have an impersonal humanity is not a viable option 
today. Theodore's explicit acknowledgment of Christ's 
concrete human individuality is an idea whose time has 
surely come.
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But to move in that direction is to confront exactly 
the same problem as Theodore faced: how to speak
meaningfully of one person in Christ when it is 
necessary to say that God and wholly God, and man and 
wholly man are involved in the act of the incarnation. 
Theodore's theory of prosopic union is generally judged 
to be a failure. Whilst this may be true, that it fails 
to say enough concerning the union of God and man in 
Christ to throw of the haunting shadow of dualism, it is 
equally true that the theory of the hypostatic union 
has, at least, equally grave difficulties attached to it, 
particularly with regard to the full humanity of Christ.
Before moving on from this consideration of Theodore's 
account of the incarnation it is perhaps worthwhile to 
consider briefly a sympathetic treatment of Theodore's 
position which offers an deeper analysis of the nature 
of the prosopic union.
The analysis to which I refer is that offered by Richard 
Norris in his book Manhood and Christ .(33) Norris 
asserts, as this paper has asserted, that Theodore's 
insistence upon a fully human and complete individual who 
is indwelt by the Word can be traced to his strong 
soteriological concerns. It is central to Theodore's 
understanding of the work of redemption that it involves
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 173
'Good Pleasure','Grace' and the Person of God Incarnate
a double agency, a deed of both God and man, the product 
of a divine self-giving and human obedience.(34)
This means that Norris agrees with the position developed 
here that Theodore teaches that the man and the Word are 
not just two logical subjects but psychological subjects 
as well. Two centres of will and activity.(35) Norris 
interprets this far more sympathetically than Sullivan 
when he maintains that 'the two terms of the 
Incarnational relationship represent action and
response.... The point of Theodore's usage is to show that
the Man and the Word are two intimately related agents 
bent upon an identical project.'(36)
The doctrine of inhabitation by 'good pleasure' is the 
basis of the union between the Word and the man assumed. 
This 'good pleasure' is the intentional presence of God, 
it is grace.(37) Norris argues forcefully, however, that 
the idea of co-operation is not a constitutive part of 
this union. At this point he is tackling head on those 
critics who argue that Theodore taught a mere 'moral
union' between God and man. The union is effected by
God's gracious indwelling of Gesus of Nazareth. The co­
operation between man and God which is evidenced in the 
life of Christ is a result of that union through 
indwelling and is not that which constitutes it.(38)
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The union which God the Word brings about is not due to 
any mutual or reciprocal action of God and Man, it is the 
result of the prior action of the divine Word who unites 
the man assumed to himself. This activity and prevenient 
choice of the divine Word is logically prior to the 
prosopic union which it effects, and to the co-operation 
between God and Man. It is this feature of the divine 
indwelling which distinguishes the indwelling of Christ 
from all other instances of indwelling.(39)
The priority of God the Word's activity in the union can 
be seen in Theodore's insistence that the assumed man was 
indwelt by God from his formation in the womb.(40) In 
this sense the man is passive in respect of the union and 
the Word is active. The union is not a result of human 
nature and is not a gradual achievement of human effort. 
The scriptures can speak of the assumed man growing in 
wisdom and knowledge, but this does not mean that the 
union is being progressively realised, but that the fact 
of the union is necessarily manifested in different ways 
and to different degrees as the assumed man grows from 
childhood to manhood.(41)
In summing up Theodore's position Norris reiterates the 
vitally important features of Theodore's account of the 
incarnation. Firstly, it cannot be said often enough that
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the idea that the union is a result of a co-operation 
between God and man is not Theodore's way of defining the 
manner of the union. Co-operation is a reality in the 
incarnate life, but as a result rather than a cause of 
the union.
Secondly, the union is a work of divine provenience and 
condescension which is prior to, and the basis of, all 
that is accomplished in the man. The essential point here 
is Theodore' insistence that there is a single source 
of all that Christ is and does (though) not a single 
subject.(42) Ultimately, the source of all that Christ 
does is the indwelling Word.(43)
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly,Norris argues that 
even the prosopic union is not a kind of union but is 
the outward expression of an underlying unity which might 
be any one of several different kinds.(44) Although this 
may seem to be surprising conclusion it is true that 
Theodore offers no explanation of the union between God 
and man in Christ other than his assertion that it is an 
indwelling. Therefore the prosopic union is not itself 
the basis of the union but is the expression of it. 
Certainly, Norris is right to say that when Theodore 
speaks of Christ as one prosopon he means that the■Lord
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presents himself to the world and the believer as a 
single object of knowledge and faith.(45)
Finally, with regard to how one might interpret the one
prosopon Norris is clear that it is what he terms a
persona communis and that it is not the hypostatic
unity of Chalcedon. Yet neither is it a merely 'moral'
union.(46) Norris concludes that Theodore's doctrine
does presuppose a basic dualism but that Theodore refuses
to assimilate the unique case of God's indwelling of
Christ to an ordinary instance of divine co-operation
with a man of good will.(47) Instead, Theodore sought to
overcome the limitations placed upon him by his dualism
by insisting upon the priority of the union. In a passage
which could equally be a commentary on Baillie's position
Norris writes,
"The doctrine of prosopic unity as Theodore 
propounds it has two equally important 
constituents, which when taken together 
define what is, for him, the essential 
nature of the paradox of the incarnation.
On the one hand,it seeks to preserve the 
reality of Christ's human nature as a 
concrete centre of human activity;on the 
other hand, it involves a systematic denial 
that the human will in and through which 
salvation is wrought is ultimately the 
agency by which salvation is wrought.(48)
Much has been made of Theodore's failure to overcome the 
dichotomy involved in maintaining two subjects of 
attribution in the person of Christ. It is felt that his
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concept of a prosopic unity, although interesting, cannot 
bear the weight of technical analysis. Sometimes it is 
argued that he lacked a sufficiently complex definition 
of the person and although he cannot be faulted for this 
he must nevertheless be judged to have failed.(49)
It is possible that there is some truth in this argument 
that Theodore can, in the end, only provide an external
unity between God the Word and the man assumed despite
his best intentions. Yet as was argued earlier there 
remains the sneaking suspicion that his attempts to speak 
of 'one person' are no more forced or stretched than the 
traditional or orthodox notion of the hypostatic union, 
which has had an altogether more favourable press despite 
the widespread recognition of its shortcomings.
In the discussion of the contemporary 'two-minds' 
theories in chapter one Morris was criticised for
utlising an extended and unique sense of the term person 
in relation to Gesus Christ. Morris, of course, did not 
invent this approach but found it in the writings of 
Aquinas who argued that although in all other occasions 
a mind, body and soul would suffice to constitute a 
suppositum , in the case of Christ they did not and that 
a suppositum or hypostasis was only constituted in
union with God the Son. It is surely pertinent to ask in
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what sense is Theodore's conception of a prosopic unity 
any more forced, external, ambiguous or stretched than 
the very extenuated concepts offered above? How does it 
compare with the classical theory of anhypostasia,wherein 
the Word is the ultimate subject of the human experience 
and activity of Christ, but in such a mysterious way that 
he manages not to undergo change or be affected by them? 
It is hard not to get the impression that the human 
nature, according to this model, has just been glued on 
in a purely external fashion. Certainly, if Theodore is 
accused of failing to achieve a real unity of person then 
it can also be asked if the notion of anhypostasia 
achieves a real humanity in anything other than a 
technical and formal sense.
This is a real problem that faces Morris, Brown and all 
contemporary defenders of Chalcedon. For despite their 
avowed intentions to reformulate faithfully the credal 
statements they cannot help but be modern people. 
Therefore, questions of psychology, such as what does the 
one person Gesus Christ ultimately believe about himself, 
inevitably arise. Even the attempt to answer the problem 
by recourse to a 'two-minds' view of Christ reveals their 
utterly different starting point from the formulators of 
Chalcedon. The result is that their attempts to argue for 
a special, unique category of person, which applies only
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to the incarnate Christ, lack ultimate conviction. What 
type of person is this? Is it still reasonable to hold 
that this human nature which Gesus of Nazareth is said to 
exemplify is anything like our human nature? And if it is 
possible what is there to prevent a follower of
Theodore from arguing that his concept of one prosopon 
after the union is at least as meaningful as Morris' 
resurrection of a special and distinct person or 
suppositum which applies only in the case of Christ?
The point that is being laboured here is that the concept 
of one person after the union is a concept which is very 
difficult to substantiate given the contemporary 
understanding of the person. Theodore, Nestorius, and 
the whole Antiochene tradition, have been obvious 
targets for criticism on this point but it is possible to 
maintain that no-one else has satisfactorily resolved 
this issue either.
The nub of this discussion is that the terms hypostasis 
and prosopon are used in a very special and extended 
sense in Christological discourse. Outside the bland and 
unthinking characterisations of the prosopic unity as 
somehow only moral and external, and the equally bland 
and unconvincing characterisation of the hypostatic 
union as real and internal, there is no satisfactory
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analysis of the two notions which finally explains why 
one is preferable to the other.
Indeed to pick up on the discussion of metaphor in the 
previous chapter, it is possible to see in both terms the 
type of tension inherent in words which are being applied 
in new ways as the result of a lively metaphor which is 
demanding conceptual articulation. The notion of person 
was extended and modified by the theory-constitutive 
metaphor of the incarnation. The early Fathers had to 
develop new terminology and to modify existing 
terminology in order to 'accommodate their language to 
the causal structures of the world.' The fact that 
history sanctioned hypostasis as the more adequate term 
should not blind us to the fact that Theodore was equally 
trying to express the same incarnational reality through 
the term prosopon Neither should we forget that the 
conceptual articulation of root-metaphors changes as the 
philosophical categories of interpretation change. 
Therefore, it is possible that Theodore's conception of a 
prosopic union better reflects the incarnational reality 
given the contemporary understanding of the person.
This extended discussion of Theodore's position is 
valuable in itself as an alternative articulation of the 
metaphor of incarnation to the majority position of
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Chalcedon. It certainly has a fierce imaginative power 
and is not uncongenial to the life of faith, to the way 
of being in the world, which is opened up by the 
incarnational metaphors of the New Testament. As such the 
neglected option of Eudokia must be considered as a live 
christological option today.
The discussion also serves as a basis for, and 
introduction to, the christology offered by Donald 
Baillie. That Baillie's position shares a certain family 
resemblance to Theodore's is undoubted, although the 
connection between Baillie's and Theodore's theories is 
somewhat circuitous. However, Baillie's theory may be 
thought of as containing and improving upon the valid 
insights of Theodore. Furthermore,the examination of 
Theodore's theory of the incarnation will prove useful in 
that the single greatest problem facing Theodore's 
theory, namely, the unity of the person of Christ also 
haunts Baillie's account of the incarnation.
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3, (ill) Baillie and the Analogy of Grace
Like Theodore, Baillie draws on an analogy from religious 
experience in order to elucidate what he feels to be the 
central truth of God's incarnation in Christ.(50) The 
analogy that Baillie wishes to make is drawn from the 
experience of grace in the individual's life. This is the 
famous 'paradox of Grace'. According to Baillie the 
believer in his own life acknowledges a 'divine 
provenience' in relation to his own acts. That is to say 
whenever he performs a good act the believer acknowledges 
that somehow in a paradoxical way the good that he has 
done is wrought not by himself but by God.(51
Baillie is anxious to point out that this sense of divine 
provenience does not abrogate human personality nor 
forestall personal responsibility for. the individual's 
actions. The wrong that the believer does is still of his 
own choosing. Yet in this paradoxical experience of grace 
it is possible, argues Baillie, to find a way of 
approaching the mystery of the incarnation itself. 
Baillie wants to suggest that this ' I , yet not I, but 
the grace of God in me,' this central paradox of the 
Christian life, this experience of grace, even in its 
admittedly fragmentary form is a reflection of that
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perfect union between God and man which occurred in the 
incarnate life. (52)
The 'paradox of grace' was for Baillie, then, a "faint 
analogue" of the union between God and man in Christ."It 
was not I but God," is a phrase which is true of human 
religious experience and which is true of Christ's human 
life. Gesus' life, which was a truly individual human 
life, with all its human choices and actions was at one 
and the same time, in a 'deeper and prior' sense the very 
life of God incarnate,(53) One advantage of Baillie's 
theory is that it is in accord with the historical 
picture of Gesus. Baillie was profoundly influenced by 
the portrayal of Christ in the Fourth gospel where Gesus 
is constantly found to be subordinating himself and his 
mission to the Father.(Ghn 5;30)( Baillie is aware that 
there are serious question marks as to the historical 
authenticity of the Fourth Gospel) Yét the suggestive 
power of a gospel which combines the highest christology 
with the deepest confessions of human dependence on the 
Father has exerted a powerful attraction on Baillie. He 
argues that here we find in Gesus not so much self- 
consciousness as God-consciousness,(54)
With the 'paradox of grace'concept Baillie is attempting 
to argue that the actions and choices of Gesus were
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purely human and, in a favourite phrase of his, "..in a 
sense everything depended upon them."(55) "Yet as soon as 
we have said that we must also say something else, we 
must say that in the last analysis such human choice is 
never prevenient or even co-operative but is wholly 
dependent upon divine provenience."(56)
The result of this paradox, according to Baillie, is 
that, "We must say that in the perfect life of Him who 
was always doing the things that are pleasing to God this 
divine prevenience was nothing short of Incarnation."(57) 
It is difficult not to be reminded strongly at this 
point of Norris' conclusion to his study of Theodore's 
Christology,"..Theodore, however haltingly, tries to 
resolve within the limits set by the Church's traditional 
confession of Christ: the problem of how the obedience of 
Man to God can be at once a genuinely human obedience and 
the decisive act of divine grace."(58)
Baillie's attempted reconstruction of Christology along 
the lines of grace raised, and still raises, many
problems, many of which Baillie himself anticipated. Most 
obviously there was the charge that his position was a 
return to a form of the ancient christological heresy of 
adoptionism. This charged Baillie with merely arguing- 
that God united himself with a man who lived a perfect
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 185
'Good Pleasure','Grace' and the Person of God Incarnate
life. As such could God really be said to have become 
incarnate i n .the traditional sense? And wasn't there a 
dangerously 'Pelagian' element to Baillie's views?(The 
form of this criticism if nothing else reveals Baillie's 
similarity with Theodore).
Another criticism was levelled against the notion of 
paradox. Was this not a retreat into mystification to 
cover up nonsense and poor argument? Others suggested 
that Baillie bypassed rather than solved the categories 
and difficulties of Chalcedon.(59) In addition to these 
difficulties there was the question as to whether or not 
Baillie taught that Christ was different only in degree 
and not in kind in terms of the divine presence within 
him. Finally, there seemed to be in Baillie's comments on 
the Trinity and the concept of Christ's pre-existence 
some unwelcome developments which arose from Baillie's 
method of approach.
Perhaps the most sophisticated charge of adoptionism 
against Baillie's Christology was that offered by Bohn 
Hick in an article reviewing Baillie's work.(60) Hick 
acknowledged that Baillie had attempted to defend himself 
from the straightforward charge of adoptionism by 
stressing that God's action was always prevenient and 
prior to the human choices of Gesus. However, Hick argued
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that Baillie must stress either God's prevenience or 
Gesus' choice. On the one hand Baillie seems to be 
arguing that God predestined Christ's choices, yet also 
,that these choices, from a human point of view, 
remained free. On the other hand Baillie seems to wish to 
argue that Gesus' choices were genuinely his own and
important as choices of the one who was always doing the 
will of God. Hick argues that if Baillie stresses God's 
prevenient activity, then he shows how the incarnation 
may have been possible, but only at the expense of making 
it unnecessary. For if God could have so influenced men's 
decisions so that they were always right and good 
decisions, yet remaining all the time free decisions, 
then the fall and sin and consequently the incarnation 
become inexplicable.(61)
Alternatively if Baillie wishes to stress the human 
choices of Gesus then he is guilty of a form of
adoptionism. According to Hick even a form of what he 
terms 'continuous adoptionism' is still adoptionism.(62) 
Hick's dilemma is a real one for Baillie's christology 
and for the Antiochene Christological scheme in general.
Both positions stress the prior action of God and the
genuine choices of the human Gesus. If Hick cannot be 
answered adequately then a blow is struck not only 
against Baillie but against the Antiochene scheme in
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general.
Unfortunately Donald Baillie was not alive when Hick 
reviewed his work and therefore it is not possible to 
know how he would have responded. However, we have the 
next best thing in that his brother John Baillie did 
respond directly to Hick. With respect to the 
predestination/adoptionist dilemma Gohn Baillie argues 
that his brother would clearly have embraced the 
predestinarian element.(63) He further argues that Hick 
downplays the paradoxical and mysterious nature of the 
relation between God's grace and man's free-will, 
asserting that the relation between the two is not one 
that can be overly simplified in the way that Hick 
attempts to do.(64)
An obvious response here would be to argue that Gohn 
Baillie is retreating into the notion of paradox to 
protect his brother's Christology from suffering a 
devastating blow. But this would be a harsh judgement, 
for the notion of the paradoxical and ultimately 
mysterious nature of the incarnation is central to 
Donald's thought. The concept of paradox had long been 
central to Baillie's thought as is evidenced by its 
frequent appearance in his unpublished writings and 
lectures. He tries to show throughout God was in Christ
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that the Christian faith is ultimately paradoxical at
every point.(65) The reason for this is that whenever the 
living God is the ultimate explanation of anything it is 
always as a deeper or higher dimension of explanation of 
something which, on the empirical level, can (and ought 
to be) explained otherwise.(66)
Paradoxes, according to Donald Baillie, can and must be 
admitted when they arise from experience.(67) As such 
paradoxes cannot be eliminated from the Christian faith, 
from the conception of the incarnation, without losing 
the incarnation itself.(68) Paradoxes according to
Baillie find their resolution in experience. That is to
say, a mystery might not be able to be formulated in
words without contradiction but it can be actualised and 
lived in religious experience."There should always be a 
sense of tension between the two opposite sides of our 
paradoxes, driving us back to their source in our actual 
religious experience of faith."(69) Only paradoxes which 
can be shown to spring directly from faith are 
justifiable for theology.( One is strongly reminded at 
this point of Ricoeur's treatment of the tensive nature 
of live metaphors which spring from, and speak to, an 
experience which strives after conceptual
clarification.But a live metaphor is one which always 
returns to experience so as to achieve a new description
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of reality, a new way of being in the world.)
The relation of all this to the paradox of the
incarnation is that on the one level one speaks of the
life of Jesus in purely human terms. He was a man, an
individual human being. Baillie is quite clear on this,
yet when one has finished saying all that could be said
from a human point of view there is still something left
unsaid, that is, in the life of this man we are
confronted by the very life of God incarnate.
"... is it not the same type of paradox taken at 
the absolute degree that covers the whole 
ground of the life of Christ..of which we say 
that it was the life of a man and yet also, 
in a deeper and prior sense, the very life 
of God Incarnate."(70)
Enough has been said to demonstrate that the notion of 
paradox was not an ad hoc argument invented solely for 
the purposes of overcoming a weak point in his theory. It 
is possible, however, that his defence of the notion of 
the paradoxical nature of God’s presence in Christ has 
left him open to another charge proffered by Hick, 
namely, that God’s presence in Christ differs from his 
presence in us only by degree and not in kind.(71)
Again we are left to rely upon John Baillie to provide 
some answer as to how his brother might have responded to 
this charge. John Baillie questions the degree/ kind
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distinction arguing that a difference of degree taken at
the absolute level is already a difference a kind.(72) As
a source for this particular view John Baillie refers to
H.R. Mackintosh the great Scottish theologian who was a
teacher of, and extremely influential upon, both Baillie
brothers. Mackintosh writes,
" Fidelity to moral fact,then, obliges us 
to emphasise, as a fundamental principle, 
the truth that Divine immanence is 
essentially a matter of degree ,....
...One true mode of describing Christ, 
accordingly,is to speak of His person 
as representing the absolute immanence 
of God. For the Divine indwelling must vary 
in quality and intensity with the 
receptiveness of man; hence as it deepens it
must from time to time involve new departures,
turning points, crises of an epoch making
character. Of these the life of Christ is 
the last and highest. He opens a new order; 
we may certainly put it so if we add that in 
this new order He is unique."(73)
The degree/ kind distinction charge is one that is often
levelled against Antiochene-type christologies.(7A) As
this criticism is so pervasive in relation to the type
of christology offered by Baillie it will be necessary to
deal with it briefly at this point. The argument seems
to run that if one pictures God's presence in Christ
after the manner of his presence in the prophets,
apostles and all believers, as assuredly the categories
of 'good pleasure', and 'grace' do, then one cannot
maintain a unique difference between Christ and the rest
of humanity. Christ becomes not God among men but only
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 191
'Good Pleasure','Grace' and the Person of God Incarnate
the man who is supremely filled, inspired, motivated by 
God.
Much of the language that Baillie and others have used 
lends itself to this type of criticism. The stress upon 
the complete and individual humanity of Jesus, and his 
oneness with us, tends in some eyes to detract from his 
absolute uniqueness as it has been traditionally 
conceived. Yet there is perhaps an indication in the 
writings of Baillie as to how he sought to deal with 
this problem. Baillie, you will recall, set himself the 
problem of solving in what way the life of Jesus was, 
not in some 'psychological' way but on a deeper 
level, in a more ultimate analysis, in a transcendent 
dimension, the very life of God himself?"(75)
Baillie with this reference to a 'more ultimate analysis' 
is explicitly invoking the notion of a higher level of 
description that is applicable to the human life of 
Jesus. One can describe his actions and choices from a 
purely human point of view for they are truly human 
actions and as such stand in relation to the historical 
and cultural circumstances which condition and affect all 
human actions. Yet when all this has been said there is 
still something more to be said , 'something of a higher, 
more transcendent dimension, something divine.'(76)
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Does this appeal to a higher level of description satisfy 
the criticism that, according to Baillie's scheme, Jesus 
is only different in degree and not in kind from us? I 
would suggest that it does and that properly
understood the notion of differing levels of
description does allow us to consider differences of 
degree as in effect differences in kind.
Consider the example of a computer operating a programme. 
On one level what is happening can be explained in terms 
of electrical circuits and switches which are activated 
by an electric current so that they are in an off or on 
state. Yet on another level of description the computer 
is solving a puzzle and providing an answer, or playing a 
game. The solving of the puzzle or the playing of a game 
is not separable from the activity of the current 
switching switches on and off, but neither is it 
reducible to it. Similarly, at the game playing or puzzle 
solving level notions such as winning or losing, 
problems and answers, become appropriate which are
meaningless at the level of circuitry, but which cannot 
be performed without the circuitry. (77) It is important 
to realise that it is not that one level of description 
is wrong and another right. It depends very much upon 
what you wish to know and what questions you wish to ask 
as to which level of description is most appropriate.
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Each level of description is a different but nevertheless 
complementary description of a single system
Once we are alerted to the distinction between levels of 
description we find that we are used to drawing degree 
/kind distinctions all of the time. For example, on one 
level both the chair I am sitting on and the person 
sitting on it can be described in terms of the atoms 
which compose us. If the chair is wooden or plastic we
may even both be seen to be predominantly conglomerations 
of carbon atoms. At one level such a description would be 
entirely accurate, yet no one would wish to deny that 
according to another level of description I am a being of 
a different kind from the chair. Such a secondary 
description would involve reference to higher concepts 
such as animate and living matter as opposed to inanimate 
and dead matter. Categories such as intention, volition, 
desire, memory, love could be appropriately predicated of 
the conglomeration of atoms which constitute me, whilst 
they would be inappropriate when applied to the chair. 
Yet in a fundamental sense there is nothing in my atomic 
make-up which cannot be found in the natural world of
inanimate objects. I am just a particularly complex 
organism in which the atoms and molecules are structured 
in sufficiently complex a way to produce life. There is
no difference in kind , at the most basic level of
Page 13k The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
'Good Pleasure','Grace' and the Person of God Incarnate
description, between myself and the inanimate world which 
I inhabit, yet it cannot be denied that we continually, 
and correctly, say that there is a such a distinction. 
The difference in degrees of complexity and organisation 
of atoms becomes a difference in kind when a certain 
threshold is reached and life is produced.
Another example of the differing levels of description 
approach is the famous mind/ brain identity problem. On 
the one hand the workings of the brain can be explained 
in terms of neural processes, electro-chemical impulses 
firing neurons. Yet on another level the mind is 
characterised by thoughts, emotions, memories etc. It 
makes little sense to say that the neurons are aware of 
the contents of our memories although they seem to be 
essentially connected to their workings. Similarly, our 
thoughts, memories, emotions are not aware of the firing 
of the neurons. The two are undoubtedly interconnected, 
but it would make little sense if someone was asked what 
they were thinking, for them to describe the path of 
the neurons as they fired in their brain. The mental life 
of concepts, emotions, memories, pains and desires 
requires reference to a wholly different order of 
discourse from the neural workings of the brain before it 
can be adequately explained.
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 195
'Good P l e a s u r e G r a c e ' and the Person of God Incarnate
These are analogies and all analogies break down at some 
point if pressed, but the point I think is clear. We are 
quite used to making kind distinctions from differences 
in degree that are sufficiently complex to warrant them. 
Therefore the mind is not simply the process of neurons 
firing, a computer programme is not simply switches and 
circuitry. More has to be said and it has to involve two 
different levels of description if a complete and
adequate account of these phenomena is to be given.
Mackintosh, it seems, was right, a difference in degree
can become a difference in kind. God's presence in Christ
can be conceived of after the manner of his presence in
us, but the difference in degree cam mean that there is
an absolute difference between that presence and ours. 
Christ's actions can on the one level be perfectly
described as human actions and choices, yet on another 
level they can only be explained by reference to the
activity of God himself in the 'incarnate' one. Of
course, these analogies, which are drawn from the world 
around us, do not prove there there was a difference in 
kind between Jesus and ourselves, it merely attempts to 
show that such a distinction is not one which we are 
unused to making.
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It seems that Baillie may have been intending this type 
of distinction when he argued that in one sense the life 
of Jesus was a purely human life of response and faith 
and love to God. Yet on another level something more 
needed to be said and that was that this life was the 
very life of God incarnate. Jesus' life was a perfect 
life because of God's activity in him and through him and 
yet it was a totally free human response to God. How this 
could be accomplished in a truly human life is ultimately 
a mystery, a paradox, but it is a paradox which finds its 
analogue in our own lives and as such we are able to 
grasp, however feebly, something of its import and 
relevance .
Enough has been said to show the close similarities 
between Baillie's 'paradox of grace' theory and 
Theodore's 'indwelling through good pleasure' theory. 
Indeed, they are virtual equivalents, for although 
Theodore did not use the term 'grace' to describe God's 
presence in Christ it is clear that for Baillie grace is 
never anything other than a loving personal relationship 
in which God gives of himself freely to the believer. 
Furthermore, both clearly wish to maintain that Jesus 
was a truly human individual in the act of incarnation. 
As such both Baillie and Theodore have to wrestle with 
the problem of how a human response to the divine
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initiative can be genuinely free at every moment, yet, at 
one and the same time, be the perfect realisation of the 
will and love of God.
Both wish to argue that this realisation of the divine 
will and purpose mirrors, yet transcends at every point, 
the types of prophetic inspiration which we read of in 
the pages of our bibles and which we occasionally
acknowledge among our contemporaries. That is to say it 
is a model of God's presence in Christ which accords with 
his presence in men and women throughout the ages and is 
understood today, although it transcends it in scope at 
every point.
To the criticism that such a perfect response to God at 
every moment is logically impossible and unrealistic for 
any truly human being, we would have to say that such a
criticism neglects the emphasis that is being made upon
the priority of God's action. Furthermore, one could 
paraphrase a famous argument in the philosophy of
religion, 'if there is no logical impossibility in man 
freely incarnating the purpose, will and love of God on 
one or several occasions there cannot be a logical 
impossibility in his incarnating the purpose, will and 
love of God on every occasion.(78)
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But it would have to be conceded that although Baillie
and Theodore clearly intend to maintain a unity of person
in Christ they do not explain how this is possible
according to their scheme of things. If anything,
Theodore makes a clearer attempt to at least acknowledge
this problem than Baillie, who does not address it in any
way. As such they fall foul of a criticism that John
McIntyre raised against the somewhat similar christology
of Norman Pittenger,
"....one wonders if he really faces the 
difficutlies of Nestorianism,... for while 
the latter might be able to say that it 
was dealing with a metaphysical structure 
and was not obliged to show "how it worked" 
Nestorianism based on the psychological 
inadequacies of its rival theories cannot 
afford to ignore such difficulties."(79)
Baillie, it would seem, would also be condemned to 
showing how his theory 'worked'. Baillie's only response 
to this type of criticism is to stress over and over 
again the 'paradoxical' nature of the incarnation, its 
ultimately mysterious nature. However, remorselessly as 
ever, McIntyre has also argued that closer attention 
should have been paid by Baillie to the notion of paradox 
showing,"..if you like, how it works."(80)
Powerful as McIntyre's critique is on this point there is 
perhaps support for Baillie's position from a somewhat 
surprising corner,namely,contemporary analytic
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philosophy. Within contemporary philosophical discussion 
of the philosophy of mind and with particular regard as 
to how one might explain the mystery of mental states 
within a physical and materialist perspective, Donald 
Davidson has developed the theory of 'anomalous 
monism'.(81)
'Anomalous monism' is a monistic theory because it 
maintains that psychological events are ultimately 
physical events. It is 'anomalous' because it maintains 
that when events are described in psychological terms 
they are not describable by strict physical laws. To say 
that psychological events are ultimately physical is to 
say that 'events such as perceivings, rememberings the 
acquisition of knowledge and intentional actions are 
directly or indirectly caused by physical laws'.(82) 
However, it is an important part of this theory that 
there are no psycho-physical laws which can cover the 
psychological beliefs, intentions, desires etc. which 
play a part in our acting and decisions. Therefore, 
although the theory believes that all psychological 
states are caused by physical events it does not believe 
that these events can be subsumed under general law-like 
physical statements. Ultimately, then 'anomalous monism', 
confesses a certain degree of ignorance about mental and 
emotional states which suggests a mystery at the heart of
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human personhood, of human acting and being in the world. 
Or as Adrian Thatcher puts it, "I think anomalous monism 
turns out not to be an explanation of human action, but a 
stylish confession of the absence of one. It recognises 
human transcendence and the inevitable anomalies 
transcendence brings."(83)
The relevance of this theory to Baillie's position is 
that the criticism that Baillie has failed to show how 
his theory 'worked' is less devastating if we have to
confess a certain mystery, a certain paradox or anomaly, 
in our own attempts to explain the relationship between 
physical laws and the mental states of the human person. 
If contemporary philosophers have to confess a certain
'cognitive' humility when faced with the mystery of the 
human person, might we not expect the same order of 
mystery to lie at the heart of the one incarnate person 
of Christ.
Of course a defender of strict Chalcedonian orthodoxy 
could equally well claim the support of the theory of
"anomalous monism" in order to defend the account of
Christ's person contained there from the type of 
criticism levelled in the first chapter of this thesis. 
There is some truth to this and in order to clarify the 
point it will be necessary to remind ourselves of one of
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the original points of this chapter, namely, to show that 
Stephen Davis was right to classify Baillie as one of the 
faithful reinterpreters of Chalcedon, although that such 
an estimation calls for an expansion of what the dogma of 
Chalcedon has been traditionally thought to allow. To 
demonstrate this will require a brief examination of the 
claim that Baillie's christology belongs to the 
Antiochene school.
3.(iv) The interpretation of Baillie*s Christology Today
Since the publication of God Was In Christ friend and 
foe alike have characterised the book as "Antiochene", 
Norman Pittenger in The Word Incarnate links Baillie 
with Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Antiochene tradition. 
In the same manner John Robinson in The Human Face of God
and Anthony Hanson in Grace and Truth follow Pittenger 
and place Baillie firmly in the Antiochene camp. (84) 
Pittenger, Robinson and Hanson are all admirers of 
Baillie's work and they place themselves and their work 
in that same Antiochene tradition (a tradition which 
sometimes includes Schleiermacher as well). David Brown, 
as was indicated earlier, also places Baillie in the 
Antiochene camp, although in his view that is a 
significant fault rather than a sign of strength.(85)
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Faced with this chorus of agreement it is strange to find 
that Baillie himself never appeals to either Theodore or 
Nestorius nor to any other Antiochene figure to support 
his position. Theodore does not appear at all in God Was 
In Christ and Nestorius only appears in relation to the 
discussion of anhypostasia .(86) Baillie makes no 
reference to any similarity between his own position and 
that of Nestorius, he merely makes the point that to say 
that Jesus was truly and fully human and also the 
incarnation of the divine Word does not commit us to the 
Nestorian heresy of dividing Christ into two persons.
It is not that Baillie is averse to seeking historical 
antecedents for his position for he does quite clearly 
delineate his theological 'forebears', but the historical 
figure he goes back to time and again is not an 
Antiochene, nor even a Greek father, but that father of 
Latin theology, Augustine.
Baillie cites Augustine as saying "The Saviour the Man 
Christ Jesus is Himself the brightest illustration of 
predestination and grace."Every man, from the 
commencement of his faith, becomes a Christian by the 
same grace by which that Man from His formation became 
Christ."(87)
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What then are the reasons for regarding Baillie as a 
disciple of the school of Antioch? Have Pittenger, 
Robinson and Hanson got it wrong? Enough has already
been said about the respective theories of Baillie and 
Theodore to establish at least the initial plausibility
of their claim, Baillie would seem to conform to the 
Antiochene pattern, at least in spirit, even if he did 
not draw on Theodore directly.
As has already been argued, the relationship between 
Baillie's concept of grace and Theodore's concept of 
'Eudokia' is that they are virtual equivalents. Grace, 
for Baillie, is never anything other than a loving 
personal relationship in which God gives of himself
freely to the believer and it is clear that this is 
exactly what Theodore means by "indwelling by good 
pleasure". Both accounts argue for the priority and the 
reality of the union achieved by God's indwelling of 
Christ. Both accounts maintain the importance of the free 
choices of Jesus within the union, but argue that such 
choices do not constitute the union but are a realisation 
of it. As such the choices and actions of the man Jesus 
can never be considered apart from the prevenient 
activity of God. Both accounts argue strongly for the
reality and concreteness of the human individual in the 
incarnation and also draw a parallel between the mode of
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God's presence in Christ with his presence in us, 
although it is nevertheless a unique mode of presence in 
Christ.
It is tantalising, but ultimately speculative, to dwell 
on the reasons for Baillie's failure to draw direct 
allusions between his theory and that of Theodore. It 
becomes all the more tantalising when we find that in his 
unpublished lecture notes he attributes to Theodore the
following idea, " Theodore emphasised the real human will
of Christ, and thought of him as the man in whom God 
supremely and uniquely dwelt, by a kind of moral union of 
wills. With the strong ethical interest of the Antiochene 
school Theodore conceived of the union of divine and 
human in Christ as rather an ethical than a metaphysical 
union. God dwelt in Jesus not substantially but by grace 
or favour."(88) Baillie goes on to credit Theodore 
with the notion that each good action can be viewed from 
two perspectives; one as an expression of God's power and 
the other as an expression of man's will.(89) That is 
he credits Theodore with the central idea in the 
celebrated 'paradox of grace'. However, we do not find at 
this point in the text, the cry of 'Eureka'.The point is 
merely noted, very briefly, before passing on. Baillie 
makes no reference to the similarity with his own
position
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It is possible that Baillie did not make explicit the
link with 'Antioch', and by implication, Nestorius, 
because he was aware that his own position was 
vulnerable to the same charge and consequently he did 
not wish to invite it upon himself by drawing direct 
parallels with a condemned school of thought. This may be 
true but can only remain at the level of speculation.
It may just be that although Baillie was aware of the 
similarity he made nothing of it because he was
consciously drawing his inspiration from another source, 
namely, St Paul via Augustine. This is perhaps the most 
plausible explanation and means that if Baillie is to 
be characterised as one of the "Antiochenes" then this 
has to mean his work is in the Spirit of the 'Antiochene 
Fathers' rather than forming a direct and conscious 
representation of their thought.
The notion that someone like Baillie could begin by
following hints in Augustine and end by developing a 
christology very similar to that of Theodore of
Mopsuestia is reinforced by the discussion, suggested by 
Harnack, at the beginning of this century as to whether 
or not Augustine preferred a dynamic 'grace' centred
model for the chr istological union to that of the more 
'substantial' language of Cyril and Chalcedon. Harnack
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argued that Augustine started from the human-nature or 
soul of Jesus which received the Word into its Spirit. 
"This receptiveness of Jesus was, as in all other 
cases,caused by the election of grace; it was a gift of 
God, an incomprehensible act of divine grace;nay,it was 
the same divine grace that forgives us our sins which led 
the man Jesus to form one person with the Word and made 
him sinless."(90)
This idea is explored in an article by John McGuckin 
entitled "Did Augustine's Christology depend on Theodore 
of Mopsuestia".(91) McGuckin agrees with Harnack's
suggestion that Augustine's christology could not be 
understood along the lines of an unreapeatable 
localisation of the Word in him, but should instead be 
thought of as a singular receptivity of Christ to the 
presence of God.(92) Such an estimation of the Father of 
Latin theology was of course vigorously opposed by 
Catholic theologians. However, the charge that Augustine 
was more in line with Antiochene Christology than 
Alexandrian Christology has never gone away.
The category of grace came to the forefront of 
Augustine's thought in letter 107 written in 417 AD, 
Here Augustine elaborates a doctrine of the degrees of 
the presence of God in a manner similar to that of
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Theodore. Augustine maintains that God is present to all 
things everywhere but dwells only in beings which have 
understanding and volition. And these he indwells only 
to the extent that they are with him, oriented towards 
him in love and attention. Augustine goes on to suggest 
that God only indwells those who are inluenced by his 
grace. He develops this thought in relation to the 
person of Christ in a passage where he is commenting on 
Colossians 2;9 where it says 'in Christ the fulness of 
the Godhead dwells bodily.' Augustine argues that this 
cannot be taken to mean a material presence but rather 
that Christ is the head and sum of what is represented in 
the saints, who are his body. Therefore, although the 
christological union is unique, it is effected by grace 
just as much as the indwelling of God in other men-only 
more so, for here there is a 'singular grace' of assuming 
him into a unity of person with the Word,(93)
So great is the similarity of thought between Augustine 
and Theodore at this point that some have argued that 
not only is there a similarity between Augustine and the 
Antiochene Father but that Augustine is directly 
dependent on the work of Theodore. McGuckin, however, 
gives good reasons for rejecting this thesis, arguing 
that it is very unlikely that Augustine was sufficiently 
fluent in Greek in 41 6 AD to be able to read the
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translations of Theodore's writings. McGuckin also J
suggests that the similarity of theme can be explained 
without reference to Antioch at all, for the doctrine of 
the degrees of presence of God is also a concern of 
Plotinus and Porphyry who we know influenced Augustine 
deeply . (94)
Yet it is also the case that Augustine was heir to a long 
standing Latin tradition which elaborated the union of 
God and man in Christ in the technical formula of one 
person in two substances inherited from Tertullian,(95)
Yet Augustine did not appear to view the union of 
grace and the more 'substantial' or ontologically based 
union of the Latin tradition as conflicting. Four years 
after writing letter 1 87 he wrote a synopsis of 
christology which returns to the traditional terms of 
substance so prevalent in Latin theology. McGuckin 
suggests that Augustine did not appear to hold the two 
views as incompatible, Augustine seems only to qualify 
the one person in two substances formula when there was a 
danger of implying that God's presence in Christ was a 
material entity.(96)
McGuckin concludes that the fact that the two models of 
'grace' and 'substance' may not be conflicting is a 
position which was missed at Ephesus in 431 and 449 AD.
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He conludes that the Antiochenism of Augustine is not a 
Syrian influence at all but a long standing aspect of 
traditional Latin Christology coming back to the East 
through Leo's Tome which owed much to Augustine and which 
decisively shaped the interpretation of Chalcedon,(97)
Therefore it is plausible to assume that Baillie could 
have arrived at very Antiochene conclusions via Augustine 
without consciously drawing on Theodore or Nestorius. 
Furthermore, it would seem that Baillie,following 
Augustine, is someone who is offering an alternative but 
complementary account of the person of Christ using the 
language of grace. This language is an advance on the 
traditional formulation but it is not a sheer rejection 
of it. It is an explanation of the phenomenon of the 
incarnation at a different level from that of Chalcedon 
and is perhaps, in the light of today's presuppositions, 
a more heplful form of explanation than the language of 
Chalcedon, but it is not fundamentally incompatible 
with, or contradictory to, the intention of Chalcedon.
3.(v) Conclusions
To return to the stated intent at the beginning of this 
chapter to show that Hick was wrong to classify Baillie's 
christology as 'inspirational'. Augustine foresaw the
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same dilemma and attempted to forestall the charge of 
offering a merely 'inspirational' christology' by 
arguing that "it has never been,nor is it, nor will it 
ever be, possible to say of any of the saints; And the 
Word was made flesh. None of the saints by any excellence 
of grace of any kind ever received the name of Only 
Begotten."(98) Baillie, (and indeed Theodore) would make 
exactly the same response and Hick is therefore wrong 
to continually read Baillie's christology as an example 
of an 'inspirational' christology. To do so, Hick has to 
continually play down the element of divine initiative 
and provenience which so dominated Baillie's thought. 
Baillie, as indicated earlier, argues as forcefully as he 
can that, although in a sense everything depended upon 
Jesus' human choices, at a deeper and prior more 
fundamental level everything depended upon the prevenient 
grace of God. This was also true of Theodore's position 
as outlined earlier.
As such Hick cannot merely choose to disregard Baillie's 
efforts to save himself from the charge of adoptionism by 
saying that his position does not logically require a 
unique Christ. Baillie would not concede this point, his 
position does logically require a unique Christ- for he 
repeatedly argues that Christ taught of a God who reaches 
out to man before we reach out to him, a God who was
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preveniently seeking us in grace, if God is not in Christ 
then Christ was wrong about the God whom he served. 
Consequently the Christian church cannot make the same
claims about the nature of God apart from the theory- 
constitutive metaphor of incarnation, for this would mean 
that God was not seeking us out. Hick, can of course
develop an inspirational christology if he so wishes, but 
he does violence to Baillie's position by suggesting that 
it can serve as a basis for a merely 'inspirational' 
christology.
As for the second stated intention enough has now been 
said 'vis a vis' Baillie and Augustine to justify the 
claim that Davis was right to place Baillie among the 
faithful interpreters of Chalcedon, although to do is to 
expand the terms of Chalcedon to include christologies of 
'grace' and ' good-pleasure ' . But this may not be too 
great an expansion after all. For a plausible
interpretation of Chalcedon is that it was a step back 
towards the 'Antiochene' position from the excessive
Alexandrianism of Ephesus. If this is true then it may be 
possible to find in the christologies of 'grace and 'good 
pleasure' an account of God's presence in Christ which 
satisfies both the demands of faith and the contemporary 
stress upon the reality of the human person at the
heart of that faith. As such it offers a genuine middle
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way between Chalcedonian christologies and mere 
'inspirational' christologies.
To turn finally and briefly to -the objections of David 
Brown. Brown rejected Baillie's position as a return 
to the Antiochene/Nestorian model in modern guise. 
(Suitably qualified by the above discussion this is an 
acceptable proposition). Brown also accuses Baillie of 
failing to maintain a unity of person in Christ and for 
holding essentially a non-interventionist
christology.(99)
As to the first of these charges it has been shown that 
Baillie is not simply an Antiochene and that any 
characterisation of him as such will have to place 
Augustine there too. On the question of Baillie holding a 
non-interventionist position Brown is simply mistaken. 
Brown confuses a non-interventionist model with having a 
different model of intervention. It is quite clear that 
for Baillie the model for understanding God's 
intervention in the world is that of grace. God is 
present, he intervenes and acts in human life through 
grace. Baillie's model is not an intrusive model of 
intervention, it is not incompatible with human 
experience as we know it, but it is not a non- 
interventionist model.
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Finally consideration must be given to Brown's charge 
that Baillie cannot maintain a unity of person between 
God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth, In order to respond to 
this it will be necessary to consider briefly Brown's own 
attempt to overcome this problem. Considerable space was 
devoted to this in chapter one so a brief resume is in 
order here. Brown defends the two-nature definition of 
Chalcedon by means of a 'two-mind' hypothesis. That is, 
in the one person Jesus of Nazareth, we have two ranges 
of consciousness , one human and one divine. There is a 
flow of information between the two centres of 
consciousness limited only by what it is possible and 
proper for each to possess. We are to imagine a constant 
infusing of knowledge on the part of the Divine mind to 
the human mind and the constant receiving of human 
experiences on the part of the Divine mind from the human 
mind. The human mind does know that it is participating 
in the Divine mind, participating indeed, in the 
Trinitarian relations of the Divine life. The reason that 
it does not know this is that it has no basis for 
distinguishing between what it participates in and any 
other case of prophetic inspiration or mystical
vision.(100)
Brown is aware that on any standard definition of 
omniscience, an omniscient divine mind would have access
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to the individual mind of Jesus anyway. Therefore, we 
need a stronger reference to an ontological bond between 
the two minds to justify talk of one person.In other 
words more than a flow of information is required, there 
is need also for a sharing of experiences. Brown argues 
that such a sharing of information and experience would
mean "that in this case and in this case alone, God
allows himself to be directly affected by human 
experience in some sense beyond that of merely knowing 
that certain things are happening". (101)
Brown goes on to say that the difficulty lies in 
specifying precisely what this further sense is, but it 
remains vital if talk of one person is to be justified. 
At this point Brown turns the normal ’two-minds theory’ 
on its head. Normally, the divine range of consciousness 
takes priority; it is the initiator of action and the
true subject of human experience as in the classical 
theory of anhypostasia . However, on Brown’s model it is 
the thoughts, experiences, words and deeds of the human 
mind which receive expression in the life of the
incarnate one rather than the divine mind.(102) This 
does not deny the commitment of the divine mind to what 
is happening in the single person; it is just that the 
usual position is reversed in that the divine mind
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receives things as it were at second hand from the human 
mind .
One is tempted to respond here that if this is Chalcedon 
that is being defended, it is Chalcedon turned on its 
head. It is surely Chalcedon from a very Antiochene 
perspective,with the stress on the priority of the human 
mind going further perhaps than even the boldest 
Antiochene would ever have dreamed of going. However, 
the essential point being made is that there is nothing 
here that is incompatible with Baillie's position. 
Baillie would not have expressed himself in this manner, 
he was quite sure that we should not explicate the 
incarnation by reference to an abnormal psychology in the 
person of Christ.(103) But there is nothing here that 
violates the logic of the ’paradox of grace’, and 
consequently one fails to understand why Brown so 
vehemently rejects Baillie’s position.
Indeed, Brown may have unwittingly done Baillie’s theory 
a service by suggesting the type of theory which is 
required to undergird and support Baillie’s type of 
approach. For the point which Brown draws our attention 
to, is the question, what allows us to justifiably talk 
of one person in Christ? As indicated earlier in the 
discussion Baillie never addresses this question
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satisfactorily, resorting instead to the notion of 
paradox. Brown's position develops a theory which speaks 
of the Divine mind 'allowing' itself to be uniquely 
affected by the human experience of Jesus of Nazareth, of 
a divine commitment to the human actions and words of 
Jesus. Baillie's position, the paradox of grace, calls 
for just this type of explication.
Baillie would surely have rejected Brown's advocating of 
an abnormal psychology in the figure of Christ and this 
would seem to imply that he would reject the 'two-minds' 
approach. However, as Brown has outlined it the 'two- 
minds' approach stresses the reality of Jesus' human 
religious experience. Jesus could not distinguish his 
relationship with the Father from any other human 
relationship with God (except of course in the normal 
manner of being aware of his exceptional devotion to 
God). Baillie would have to concede at least this much to 
the 'two-minds' approach, unless he wanted to say that 
God was unaware of Jesus' response or not involved in his 
actions and Baillie clearly wanted to say that he was. In 
this sense every incarnational theory is a 'two-minds' 
theory. For every theory which acknowledges the reality 
of Jesus' intellectual and cognitive processes must also 
acknowledge an awareness on the part of God of that human 
mind and of his involvement in the choices and actions of
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that human mind if talk of an incarnation is to be 
justified. However, as suggested in chapter one there is 
another category of interpretation which undergirds 
Brown's divine 'allowing' and Baillie's 'paradox of
grace' and that is the concept of God's identification
with Jesus of Nazareth.
With this notion of identification we return to a 
perceptive comment of John McIntyre who had much to say 
about the notion of identification in On The Love of 
God .(104) At the end of his review of the critical
discussion of God was in Christ McIntyre argued that 
Baillie's position had to be developed in a number of 
ways. One of these would involve a development and 
discussion "of the state of play in the logic and 
metaphysics of substance, and also what has come to be 
known as the philosophy of mind..the borderline between 
philosophy and psychology.(105) His own concept of
identification is perhaps the best way forward in these 
areas and is potentially the most fruitful way of 
explicating Baillie's Christology today.
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IDENTIFICATION AND INCARNATION
The Basis of Unity
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4.(i) Introduction
In the previous three chapters the implications for 
incarnational language when viewed initially as literal 
statements of identity and then subsequently as
metaphorical statements have been discussed. It was 
argued that the literal interpretation of incarnational 
language, particularly in the classical formulation of 
Chalcedon, led to insuperable difficulties surrounding the 
question of the real human personhood of Jesus of 
Nazareth. This difficulty has always been felt and the 
ensuing tension resulted in many of the 'heretical' 
presentations of the person of Christ in the patristic 
period. The difficulty,however, has been exacerbated for 
contemporary believers with the development of the modern 
psychological understanding of the person as a centre of 
consciousness, will and agency. Such a theory of the 
person does not allow for the traditional solutions to 
this difficulty such as anhypostasia or enhypostasia .
As a consequence of the modern understanding of the person
virtually every contemporary christology begins with the
realisation that no matter what else may be said about
Jesus of Nazareth the fact that he was a real, historical,
individual person is the basic starting point for all
\
discussion. However the manner of the divine presence in 
Jesus of Nazareth is portrayed it is generally agreed that
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it must not violate the reality of his historic individual 
humanity. This presupposition is accepted as basic and 
given in the presentation of the incarnation to be 
outlined in this chapter
In the discussion of incarnational language as 
metaphorical it was shown that the ontological
implications of the christological claims of the New 
Testament cannot be avoided by simply asserting that such 
language is merely figurative and metaphorical. Following 
Ricoeur’s treatment of metaphor it was agreed that an 
ontological and conceptual demand is put to our thinking 
by the suggestive 'is' of metaphorical predication. If the 
claim is made that Jesus Christ is metaphorically the Son 
of God then we have to examine what this means. In what 
way is Jesus Christ the Son of God? How are we to construe 
the variety of implications that that metaphor throws up?
As such the history of chr is tological discourse can be 
viewed as the conceptual response to the chaotic 
suggestiveness of the New Testament claim that God was in 
Christ, the Word became flesh. Rather than seeking refuge, 
as some authors have done, by stating that incarnational 
language is 'merely' metaphorical it was argued that such 
a realisation is only a beginning point to understanding 
what is involved in such language and that the
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implications of the metaphor need to be elaborated. If the 
the claim is made that God became man then our
understanding of the world is shattered by this
incarnational claim. A new possibility of understanding is 
opened up to us that this is a world in which God is
present to us as human beings by being completely and 
totally involved and immersed in the human situation.
Similarly, the understanding of what it is to be a
person, a human being, is at once shattered and expanded. 
Any understanding of the person which precludes the
possibility of God incarnating himself in a human life is 
destroyed by the metaphorical yoking of two literally
understood impossibilities in one sentence,God became man. 
With the shattering of the literal understanding of both 
these concepts a new possibility of interpretation is put 
to thought to rethink the categories of divinity and 
humanity in terms of this metaphorical predication.
Chalcedon, indeed the whole Christological discourse of
the early Church represents the attempt to conceptually 
clarify the New Testament claim that God was in Christ. 
Yet this clarification of the metaphor of incarnation is 
capable of a number of interpretations and is not
reducible completely to any single one. The problem with 
the Chalcedonian interpretation is that it precluded other
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valid interpretations of the metaphor by usurping the 
place of power as the single literal and true account of 
the incarnation. This meant that the suggestive power and 
interpretative possibilities opened up by the metaphor of 
incarnation were illegitimately reduced to a single 
option.
Realising that there are many possible conceptual 
interpretations of the incarnational metaphors of the New 
Testament consideration was given to the christologies of 
Donald Baillie and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Both these 
christologies were considered to be valid interpretations 
of the New Testament picture of Christ. Both possessed the 
singular virtue of taking seriously the true historical 
humanity of Jesus of Nazareth and as such are marked as 
genuine possibilities for the development of a modern 
christology. However,it was also argued that in their 
interpretation of the person of Christ they had failed to 
pay sufficient attention to the question of the unity of 
that person. Both Baillie and Theodore clearly wished to 
maintain a unity of person in Christ but they failed to 
give a clear indication how that might be achieved in 
practice. The present chapter then is best viewed as an 
attempt to continue in the school of Baillie and Theodore 
with a christology which shares a 'family resemblance' to 
that of the 'paradox of grace' and indwelling by 'good
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pleasure' christologies. It certainly takes place within 
what could be termed a 'call and response' situation, 
but which nevertheless attempts to provide a conceptual 
interpretation which justifies talk of one person in the 
incarnate figure of Christ by utilising the concept of 
God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth.
The concept of identification has already implicitly 
arisen at a number points throughout the discussion but a 
systematic treating of it has been postponed until this 
point. In the critique of the 'two-minds' theories in the 
first chapter we discovered, in the most promising version 
of that theory, in the position offered by David Brown, 
reference to a 'divine allowing' whereby the human 
experiences of Jesus of Nazareth were uniquely experienced 
by the divine mind of the Son of God. It was argued that 
only such a unique experiencing of the human life of Jesus 
by the divine mind legitimised talk of a unity of person 
in the incarnate figure of Christ.It was suggested that 
any talk of such a 'divine allowing' more closely 
approximated the language of identification than the 
language of Chalcedon which Brawn's theory sought to 
represent.
It will be remembered that the discussion of metaphor 
acknowledged the need for certain bridging concepts
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between the chaotic suggestiveness of live metaphors and 
the abstract precision of conceptual clarity. It will be 
argued here that the concept of identification is ideally 
suited to perform this bridging function as it oscillates 
between the richness and variety of metaphorical language 
and need not necessarily suggest that it is the one 'true' 
definitive interpretation of incarnational metaphors.
The discussion of metaphorical predication also 
suggested that there were certain 'root' or dominating 
metaphors which controlled the network or association of 
ideas thrown up by other more subsidiary metaphors. These 
dominant metaphors control the association of ideas 
suggested by other metaphors by filtering out meanings 
which are not compatible within the fields of reference 
which the dominant metaphors have established. Therefore 
such metaphors as 'Son of God', Logos, 'Messiah' control 
the ideas suggested by other metaphors such as 'suffering 
servant', 'Son of David', 'Son of Man' etc. In the 
discussion of metaphor consideration was given to the 
claim that one root metaphor from the New Testament is 
the statement 'God Is Love'. However, it was briefly 
argued that the statement 'God is Love' requires to be 
interpreted within the context of the New Testament 
placing of that statement within the larger scope of God's 
activity in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
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Christ. It was claimed that this larger metaphor of God's 
incarnation in Christ was a theory-constitutive metaphor 
which meant that the same claims could not be made apart 
from that metaphor. So that for the Christian community 
the statement 'God is Love' is justified and given content 
and meaning within the framework of the metaphor of 
incarnation.
4.(11) The Theological Articulation of Identification
Happily for this thesis a recent work of profound 
theological insight and power has analysed the statement 
'God is Love' through the root New Testament metaphor of 
God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth in a 
provocative and compelling way. Eberhard Juengel's 
monumental work GOD AS THE MYSTERY OF THE WORLD devotes a 
considerable portion of its length to a recurring 
treatment of these topics.(1) In this work Juengel 
discusses how we might speak responsibily about God in the 
modern age. Central to his argument is the claim that the 
the New Testament context demands that the statement 'God 
is Love' be understood in the light of God's 
identification with the dead man Jesus of Nazareth.(2)
Identification for Juengel is a relation of love; it is a 
going forth on behalf of God to establish a unity with
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that which is other than himself. God's identification 
with Jesus of Nazareth is an event which establishes and 
expresses a 'still greater similarity between God and man 
taking place within a great dissimilarity'.(3) For Juengel 
the identification of God with the man Jesus expresses a 
nearness between God and man which surpasses 'mere' 
identity. Juengel argues that the establishing of an 
identity between God and man which abolished every 
difference between them would be the end of the original 
distance without the establishment of nearness between the 
two entities.(4)
What Juengel appears to be saying here is that a 
relationship of identification between God and man 
establishes a closeness or unity which respects and 
retains the distinction and integrity of the two natures 
involved without compromising the reality of the union 
which is achieved. Though Juengel's language is typically 
convoluted at this point it would seem that he is trying 
to laboriously rework the classical language of one 
personC nearness, similarity) in two natures (distance, 
difference) without the natures being confused or 
separated.
Of importance to the earlier discussion of metaphor is the 
fact that Juengel places this discussion within a wider
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discussion of theological language as analogical, 
metaphorical and parabolic. Here Juengel argues that in 
evangelical speech the ontological difference between God 
and man, 'the establishment of a still greater similarity 
within a great dissimilarity,' is mirrored in the tensive 
'is and is not' quality of all human speech about God. It 
is only by recognising this tensive quality in evangelical 
speech about God, whether it be analogical, parabolic or 
metaphorical, that one can risk the Easter confession that 
Jesus Christ is true God and true man. 'Only in this 
sense, recognising that ontologically and hermeneutically 
one is asserting a still greater similarity in the midst 
of such great dissimilarity, can one say that the man 
Jesus is the parable of God.'(5)
Juengel's understanding of metaphorical and parabolic 
language will not be pursued at this point as it is 
largely in accord with the position outlined in the 
previous chapter on metaphor. Suffice it to say that in 
metaphorical and parabolic language a new dimension of 
reality comes to expression through the revelation of 
possibilities revealed in the novel predication suggested 
by metaphorical language. The hearer of the metaphor is 
drawn into the reality described by the metaphor through 
its character as addressing speech which involves and 
includes the hearer in the new possibilities, the new
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reality which is being described. For example, Juengel 
argues that in the parables of Jesus God comes closer to 
his human hearers than they are to themselves and 
consequently if Jesus is the parable of God then God has 
come closer in him to humanity than humanity is able to 
come close to itself.(6)
Juengel develops this theme to argue that if we understand 
the Cross as God’s identification with the dead Jesus then 
this is a moment in which the divine life is revealed and 
defined as a life that exists for others. Being for others 
God is identical with himself in his triune nature. This 
determination of the divine life as being for others is 
the essential meaning of love. Therefore theological 
speech about the death of God is revealed through the 
event of God’s identification with Jesus as the most 
original self-determination of God for love.(7)
This is not of course to suggest that God did not become 
'love' until the death of Jesus, rather it means that the 
death of Jesus discloses the depths of the divine life. 
The eschatological event of the identification of God with 
the man the Jesus is the innermost mystery of the divine 
being.(a) Here, Juengel is arguing that God's 
identification with Jesus of Nazareth is the revelation of 
the eternal being of God."God is from all eternity in and
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of himself in such a way that he is for man."(9) As such 
the eschatological event of God's identification with 
Jesus is an event which moves the eternal being of God to 
self-determination. This being for others in 
identification with Jesus requires self-differentiation 
within the being of God and is therefore the beginning of 
the Christian understanding of the triune nature of God.
Juengel's discussion of God's identification with the dead 
man Jesus is set within a discussion of how one might 
meaningfully speak of God today with particular attention 
being paid to the statements on the death of God. As such 
he is addressing the difficult problem of God's unity with 
perishability and placing it within the larger framework 
of narrative theory. As stressed at the beginning of this 
discussion Juengel argues that the narrative context of 
the New Testament insists that the statement 'God is love' 
be understood in relation to the cross of Jesus Christ and 
God's self-identification with that cross. Within the 
narrative framework of the New Testament this means that 
the believer is entangled in the stories of Yahweh's 
dealings with Israel and in the stories of God's dealings 
with his newly called people. For this is the story of 
God's humanity which is revealed and fulfilled in the 
identification of God with the man Jesus. This 
identification expresses itself in that the man Jesus
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merits being called the Son of God. For in this 
identification with the man Jesus, which is presented in 
the narrative as God's sending his only Son into the 
world, God demonstrates that he is love itself,(10)
However, as intimated earlier, such an identification of 
God with the man Jesus requires the self-differentiation 
of God. For the essence of God is love, but this is not 
the self love of an isolated 'I'. Rather it must be 
understood through the event of God's identification with 
Jesus which reveals the eternal being of God as 
differentiated being. In this differentiation within 
himself God is 'lover and beloved or in New Testament 
terms he is Father and Son'.(11) Developing this line of 
thought Juengel argues that the perfected identification 
of God with the crucified man Jesus is the mutual work of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
The love relationship that exists in the eternal being of 
God is not to be thought of as a simple expansion of the 
usual 'I-Thou' relationship of love. Rather we have to see 
that God is not only the loving one and the beloved one 
but as the Holy Spirit goes out beyond himself and thus 
determines the loving 'I' to the beloved 'Thou'. God's 
love is therefore eternally going forth to include the 
other, to include man, God is always giving himself to the
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other and the New Testament idea for this is that of the 
Son of God who has been given to the world. If God were 
only the one who loved himself eternally then the 
differentiation of God would not be necessary and God 
would not be love at all in his absolute identity.(12)
Yet to understand God in unity with death and 
perishability, to understand God's identification with the 
crucified Jesus of Nazareth, we have to understand that 
God is love precisely in that he loves his Son in his 
identity with man.Juengel argues that God loves the world 
in which sin and death dominate. God's love radiates into 
lovelessness. And more than that God's love involves 
itself completely with that lovelessness by identifying 
himself with it in Jesus Christ,
So far Juengel has provided a powerful analysis of what it 
means to speak meaningfully of God in the light of God's 
identification with the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. It 
has been necessary to dwell at some length on Juengel's 
contribution as he shows both the necessity of some 
conceptual clarificiation of the New Testament metaphors 
for God's presence in Christ and the usefulness of the 
concept of identification as a means of providing that 
clarification .
Page 232 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Identification and Incarnation
Juengel, however, does not dwell upon the details of what 
might be involved in the process of God's identification 
with Jesus of Nazareth. He tends merely to assert it as a 
fact or implication of the cross of Christ. Yet his 
insight that the concept of identification has ontological 
implications for the very being of God itself and the 
realisation that identification is the deepest meaning of 
the love of God are insights that will be carried 
forward in the discussion of this topic.
Insightful as Juengel's analysis of the love of God from 
the standpoint of identification is, it is nonetheless 
predated by the work of John McIntyre in ON THE LOVE OF 
GOD .(13) McIntyre's analysis not only predates Juengel's 
but is itself a model of clarity and brevity where 
Juengel’s is dense and ponderous. McIntyre's analysis of 
identification takes place as the penultimate point in a 
discussion of seven determinations of the love of God. 
Like Juengel, McIntyre suggests that the concept of 
identification is the deepest determination of the love 
of God and is itself the concept in which all the other 
determinations such as concern,commitment, communication, 
community, involvement and response and responsibility 
find their deepest meaning.(14)
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McIntyre begins his analysis with the baptism of Jesus and
asks 'for what reason does the sinless one go forth to
receive a baptism of repentance'? This baptism makes no 
sense unless it is viewed from the perspective of a 
righteous God's identification with sinners. In the 
baptism of Jesus we see righteousness going forth beyond 
itself to identify itself with its very opposite.(15) Thus 
the true meaning of Jesus's baptism only becomes clear 
when viewed from the perspective of identification. The 
difficulty in understanding why this baptism of repentance 
and remission of sins is undergone by the sinless one is 
overcome by understanding that in this process of 
identification love vindicates the unloving and justifies 
the ungodly. McIntyre writes, "They pass over, from being 
on one side,even on the one transcendent and totally other 
side, to identify themselves with that which is their 
negation."(16) Here McIntyre anticipates Juengel's theme 
of the love of God radiating out into a loveless world.
McIntyre is quite clear that identification is not to be 
read as mere sympathy. It is to be understood as a 
movement by God which involves the real taking on of the
human condition even to the extent that Jesus took upon
himself the sinful human condition and did not just suffer 
the consequences of sin. Love can go no further than this 
type of identification which is complete and total. Such
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an identification must be protected against any dilution, 
any appearance of a feigned experience on the part of God. 
Identification was something that took place, something 
through which Jesus actually lived and experienced and 
above all something that happened to him in his death.(17) 
In an important passage McIntyre argues that we must 
acknowledge that in this act of identification the divine 
person entered into the depths of human life including its 
shame and sin and experienced those to a degree of 
sensitivity beyond our understanding.(18)
To show the true depths of this identification McIntyre 
outlines how all the other determinations of the love of 
God come to fruition in it. Of particular importance to 
our theme is his treatment of love as concern. Through 
identification love as concern is amplified and we find 
that mere concern for another is transcended until;
"it has crossed over and literally made 
itself one with the subject of concern.... 
...concern is a bi-polar conception involving 
a subject of supreme value and a person to 
whom he is of ultimate concern. When concern 
reaches its fulfilment in identification then 
the bi-polar field becomes unicentral.The Word has been made flesh and God has made him to he sin for us,who knew no sin. The two poles of supreme value and of ultimate concern have coalesced in One who is God-man."( 1 9)
At this point McIntyre's analysis of identification which 
has primarily concentrated upon God's identification with
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humanity through Jesus shows its appropriateness and
indeed almost its necessity as a model for the act of 
incarnation itself. Indeed McIntyre argues that,"... - the 
fact of identification is central to the Incarnation 
itself-in taking our humanity Jesus Christ made Himself
one with us."(20)
In a manner which again anticipates Juengel's later 
treatment McIntyre suggests that the concept of
identification has implications for our understanding of 
the Trinitarian nature of God. We are, he says, 
accustomed in the doctrine of the Trinity to read of the 
notion of perichoresis , the interpenetration of the
persons of the Godhead into one another,so that while they 
are held to be distinguishable from one another, they 
nevertheless dwell within one another and share each 
other's nature. McIntyre suggests that,"... it is not too 
far- fetched to suggest that a transcript of that 
situation has occurred ... to produce the identification 
in which love in community results in the penetration of 
the love of God into sinful human nature and in the 
outpouring of that love in the death of Christ on Calvary. 
Because in that Person community passed beyond itself to 
become identification."(21)
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It is clear that McIntyre has provided, in concentrated 
form, a powerful model for understanding the incarnation. 
It is true that McIntyre’s primary purpose is to 
understand God's identification with sinful humanity 
through his presence in Jesus of Nazareth rather than 
dwelling upon the notion of identification as the manner
by which God was present in Jesus of Nazareth but one is
clearly implied in the other and the transition from one 
to the other is justified.
It is worth noting that McIntyre clearly draws
ontological implications for the very being of God from 
the category of God's identification with Jesus of 
Nazareth in a manner which again anticipated Juengel's
later treatment of the topic. Similarly,Juengel and 
McIntyre are in perfect agreement in saying that the Cross 
is the definitive revelation of what it means to speak 
of the love of God and that it finds it deepest 
explication through the notion of God's identification 
with Jesus of Nazareth. Although McIntyre focuses his 
attention primarily upon God's identification with 
humanity through his action in Christ, and Juengel's
analysis is an exposition of the meaning of the death of 
God viewed from the fact of his identification with the 
dead man Jesus, both accounts presuppose a prior 
identification between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth
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which is the basis and presupposition of speaking about 
God's identification with sinful humanity.
Neither McIntyre nor Juengel specifically utilise the 
concept of identification to spell out the precise nature 
of the union between God and man in Christ, but enough has 
already been said to show the value of their treatments 
for this purpose. Certainly they are suggestive of further 
development and some indication will be given in the 
following account of identification and the incarnation 
as to the direction that that development might take.
4.(ill) Identification and Incarnation
Enough has already been said to clearly establish that 
the concept of identification is not to be confused with 
mere sympathy, being a much stronger concept.Indeed both 
writers argued that God's identification with Jesus of 
Nazareth is the deepest meaning of God's love for man and 
as such has ontological implications for the very being of 
God and, by extension, for the very being of man. In this 
sense God can go no further than a complete and entire 
identification with Jesus of Nazareth which is a real 
taking to himself the full reality of a human life.
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Those sensitive to theological difficulties will 
immediately be asking if the concept of identification 
does not necessarily involve some form of adoptionism. 
This difficulty can only be exacerbated by the statement 
made at the opening of this chapter that whatever else may 
be said about Jesus of Nazareth the fact that he was a 
real, historical individual person is not to be 
questioned. It is clear that both McIntyre and Juengel 
acknowledge the true individuality of Christ in their 
approaches also. However, the acknowledgement of Jesus' 
real and particular humanity need not necessitate an 
adoptionist christology. For the concept of God's 
identification with Jesus does not imply that it is the 
result of a response by God to the worthiness of Jesus. 
Juengel's discussion brought out clearly that the event of 
God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth reveals 
something of the eternal being of God in that God is 
constantly going forth from himself in love. God's being 
is such that he is from all eternity for man and this is 
revealed in his being from all eternity for this man Jesus 
of Nazareth. Such an analysis of God's identification with 
Jesus of Nazareth requires a self-differentiation within 
the eternal life of God. In that discussion Juengel 
reveals the ontological implications of identification and 
rescues it from the charge of mere empathy and
subjectivity.
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The force of duengel's and McIntyre’s discussion was to 
show that identification is not an afterthought on the 
part of God.It is not as it were a response by God to the 
sinful nature of the human condition. Instead, as Barth 
might have put it, God’s identification with Desus of 
Nazareth reveals that the very being of God is determined 
as being for man. Identification, properly understood, is 
part of the essential meaning of love and if God is love 
then it is part of the essential meaning of God that he 
goes forth to identify with that which is not himself.
In this sense God’s identification with Gesus of Nazareth 
cannot be separated from the eternal being of God as love. 
The identification which reaches its culmination in Gesus 
of Nazareth is part of a continuous going forth on the 
part of God to identify with that which is other than 
himself. In this way identification is related to 
creation, to the election of Israel and her story and it 
continues today in God’s presence in the world through his 
Spirit and the Church. If identification in love is part 
of the very life of God then the incarnation ceases to be 
a divine irruption in a history which is separate from God 
but is instead the fulfilment and deepest meaning of that 
history which is nothing other than the history of God’s 
going forth in love. In this adoptionism is precluded, for
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there is no sense in which God has responded to a good and 
holy man in a way which was separate from his previous 
activity and purpose. Rather the concept of 
identification, in agreement with the traditional 
incarnational theories, argues that God’s identification 
with Gesus of Nazareth is nothing other than the 
fulfilment of God’s activity in creation, the calling into 
being of a human life which is the human life of God 
himself,
To phrase it thus is perhaps immediately to run the risk 
of that perennial alternative to adoptionism, docetism, 
although such a conclusion would be a misunderstanding of 
the intention of this thesis. What does it mean to say 
that God called into being a human life which was the 
human life of God himself? In a subsequent chapter an 
attempt will be made to show what is involved for the
concept of an incarnation based on identification given a 
contemporary understanding of the person, but here it is 
enough to assert that this was a truly human life. It was 
complete and concrete and particular. Gesus of Nazareth 
was a human individual as Tom, Dick and Harry are human 
individuals. In saying this of course one averts the 
charge of docetism only to run into that other great 
difficulty facing all christological theories, namely, 
inserting an unwanted duality into the person of Christ,
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and consequently failing to remain faithful to the 
classical insistence that there was only one person in the 
incarnate figure of Christ.
Yet in the analysis of the concept of identification we 
touched upon issues that possibly can throw light on the 
vexed problem of the unity of the person of Christ. John 
McIntyre, for example, demonstrated the possibilities 
inherent in the concept of identification by saying that 
in the process of identification love as concern moved 
from being a bi-polar concept to one that was uni­
central.(22) That is to say that in God’s identification 
in love with Gesus of Nazareth, God no longer stands on 
the other side of humanity but has crossed over and 
literally made himself one with the subject of his loving 
concern. Concern, as McIntyre intimated, involves a 
subject of supreme value and and a person to whom he is of 
ultimate concern. Yet, "...when concern reaches its 
completion and fulfilment in identification then the two 
poles of supreme value and of ultimate concern collapse 
into one. In this sense the Word has been made 
flesh."(23)
McIntyre is suggesting here ( and I wish to pursue the 
suggestion further than he does) that there is something 
in the nature of divine love expressed through the concept
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of identification that makes it possible to transcend the 
limitations of individual personhood so that God, so to 
speak, can literally pass over and become one with that 
which is other than himself.(24) Great care must be taken 
at this point to avoid the suggestion that God becomes 
something other than God in such an act of identification. 
This is, of course, the great charge made against kenotic 
theories of the incarnation that God necessarily becomes 
something less than God by divesting himself of his divine 
attributes in order to become incarnate. But an
incarnational theory based on God's identification with 
Gesus of Nazareth will not presuppose an alteration to the 
divine nature in terms of a diminution. Rather it will 
assert that the divine nature adds to its specifically
divine mode of existence a human mode of existence through 
an identification in love with the historical, individual 
and particular life of Gesus of Nazareth.
This suggests that the basis of the unity of God and man 
in Gesus Christ is an identification on the part of God
the Son with Gesus of Nazareth, This identification is 
prior to, and is the presupposition of, any response made 
by Gesus of Nazareth. In this sense an incarnational 
theory based on God's identification with Gesus of 
Nazareth is faithful to Baillie's insistence that we
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cannot forget the prevenient activity of God in the 
incarnate life of Christ.
It has to be admitted that many will perceive this to be 
an unresevedly dualistic picture of the person of Christ. 
Fortunately help is at hand from a number of sources. 
Firstly, it has already been asserted that there are 
definite hints in McIntyre's and Guengel's analyses to 
suggest that a divine identification in love can transcend 
the boundaries of individual personhood and become one 
with that which is other than itself. Certainly any 
genuinely incarnational theory will have to assume, and if 
possible show, that it is possible for a human life to 
manifest the divine nature in such a way that its 
integrity is not violated or the whole christological 
enterprise would necessarily come to an end.(25)
The category of God's complete identification with Jesus 
of Nazareth is required in order to lift us out of a 
christology of 'address and response.'(26) Such a 
Christology might be valid and enjoy some considerable 
biblical support but it would not amount to an incarnation 
of the divine life. A christology based merely on an 
addressing God and a responding man would not be able to 
differentiate itself from any other situation, such as the 
call given to the great Old Testament prophets, to justify
Page 244 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Identification and Incarnation
the belief that it was an incarnation of God. This is the 
dilemma from which Baillie's position ultimately could not 
escape despite his best intentions. His unwillingness or 
inability to clarify the 'paradox of grace' left him 
unable to differentiate his account of God's presence in 
Christ from God's presence in us.
This is not to denigrate the value of viewing christology 
from an address and response perspective. Indeed much that 
a christology of identification has to offer will
presuppose just this type of situation. But it must be 
asserted that the response of Gesus of Nazareth to the 
address of God is the result of a prior identification by
God and is not the basis of it.
The idea that in the act of divine identification a unity 
of person between God and man in Christ can be achieved 
can find some conceptual support in the patristic notion 
of perichoresis McIntyre has already shown the
possibilities pertaining to this term drawn from its 
Trinitarian use where it describes the mutual indwelling 
or interpenetration of the three persons of the Trinity so 
that we can meaningfully speak of three persons yet one 
God, Before pursuing this further it is worth pointing out 
that the term perichoresis had a prior and original
Christological use to explain the nature of the union
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between God and man in Christ before it was reserved for 
Trinitarian reflection.(27)
Perichoresis presents to us the very type of movement
that I have been suggesting takes place in God's 
identification with Gesus of Nazareth. It can be seen as a 
going forth in love which involves itself completely and 
entirely in giving itself to that which is other than 
itself which nevertheless maintains the integrity of the 
individual natures involved whilst achieving a true unity 
of person. God's identification with Gesus of Nazareth 
then follows the pattern of the Trinitarian relations 
within the Godhead which are reciprocal relations of 
selfless love and self-giving. These relations do not 
posit an isolated understanding of the person, but instead 
a relational understanding which nevertheless does not 
lead to an absorption and loss of the self in relation but 
instead is the maintenance of the validity of the person 
within relationships of mutual self-gift.
Hegel summed up the relational understanding of the person
beautifully in his account of the Trinity;
"..when we are dealing with personhood, the 
character of the person, the subject, is 
surrendered. Ethical life,love, just mean the 
giving up of particularity, of particular 
personhood, and its extension to universal!ty-~ 
so,too, with friendship. Inasmuch as I act 
rightly towards another person, I regard 
him as identical with myself. In friendship 
and love I give up my abstract personhood and
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thereby win it back as concrete. The truth of 
personhood is found precisely in winning it 
back through this absorption, this being 
absorbed into the other."(28)
Elsewhere in his writings on christology Gohn McIntyre
has cited his appreciation of Ephraim of Antioch's concept 
of a fusion of the divine and human hypos taseis in the 
person of Christ. Although this would at first sight seem 
to be verging very close to the often rejected idea of a 
hybrid God- man, a tertium quid according to the Fathers, 
McIntyre attempts to forestall this criticism by
suggesting that although the natures are not to confused 
the hypostaseis may be.(29) The great advantage of this 
position is that the real, complete and individual 
humanity of Gesus of Nazareth is maintained in the union. 
McIntyre could have perhaps usefully related his two 
separate discussions of identification and Ephraim here,
although he would probably feel that to do so would be to 
confuse logical and psychological categories.
Yet the model of a composite hypostasis can only be
helped by explication in terms of a fusion achieved 
through the self-identification of God the Son with Gesus 
of Nazareth, For only by asserting that the basis for 
this fused hypostasis is found in such an act of 
identification can we hope to avoid the misunderstandings 
that the concept of a composite hypostasis all too readily
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lends itself. Such an identification is total and 
complete as it mirrors the divine going forth in love 
which is the Trinitarian nature of God. The humanity of 
Christ is safeguarded by acknowledging that a composite 
hypostasis achieved through identification includes the 
wholeness of the humanity of Christ.
Again it must be reiterated that this understanding of
identification must be read as transcending mere empathy 
and concern. It is to be understood that the human
experiences and decisions of Gesus of Nazareth are really 
and truly experienced by God the Son as his experiences. 
This is to develop the idea , used earlier by David Brown 
in the discussion of the'two-mind' theories of the person 
of Christ, that the Son "allows* himself to affected in a 
unique and total way by the human life and thoughts of
Gesus of Nazareth. Indeed the full value of Brown's 'two-
minds' theory can only be realised when it is removed from 
the situation of defending a Chalcedonian interpretation 
of Christ to a situation where it is defending the type of 
approach that Brown rejected as Nestorian( including 
Baillie's). This experiencing of the life of Gesus must 
be an experiencing that is unique to this relationship. 
That is, the Son must experience the life of Gesus of 
Nazareth in a way that is distinct from his omniscient
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awareness of the experiences, thoughts and actions of 
other individuals.
That is to say that the unity of the person of Christ 
cannot therefore be found only in the knowledge that the 
Son has of Gesus of Nazareth but must found in a taking 
on, 'an assuming’, of the experiences of Gesus of Nazareth 
from the inside as it were. This taking on of the 
experiences of Gesus of Nazareth is best expressed through 
the concept of identification. Such a concept is of course 
itself metaphorical in that we are attempting to 
articulate a work of God which lies at the heart of the 
mystery of the gracious initiative of God and the perfect 
freedom of a human response. Nevertheless its usefulness 
lies in its ability to enable us to arrive at some
understanding of the processes involved although its
application is understandably limited.
For it is in the nature of one human being’s
identification with another that it is always incomplete 
and fragmentary. This arises from the limited nature of 
the knowledge that we have of other persons and our 
inability to ’feel’ or imagine their experiences no matter 
how much we may be concerned for them. Identification at 
the human level is also limited due to the understandable 
desire not to lose one own's identity in the act of
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 249
Identification and Incarnation
identifying with another. However, in the case of a divine 
and omniscient and omnipotent being whose very nature is 
to go forth in love these limitations do not apply. In a 
way transcending our understanding God the Son, through
his omniscient range of knowledge, can actually identify 
with and experience the human life of Jesus of Nazareth in 
a way that we as human beings cannot do with one another. 
This participating in the human life of Jesus of Nazareth 
has to be understood as transcending normal examples of 
interpersonal intimacy and also transcending the internal 
relationship that God has with everyone as part of his 
providential indwelling of the whole of creation.(30)
Perhaps the closest analogy that can be offered is that 
of a parent’s love for its child or of one person’s love 
for their partner.There is a sense in which in these
relationships of love we can share another's joys, hurts 
and triumphs as though they were our very own. No parent 
who has watched their child undergo a deeply disappointing 
experience will deny the fact that the child’s sorrow is, 
in a deep and real sense, experienced by the parent. Nor 
will they deny that it is possible to enter into and
celebrate a child's joys and triumphs in such a way that
the child’s joys and triumphs are intrinsically more 
meaningful and important to them than their very own.
Nevertheless, even here, it is not a true experiencing of
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the child’s pain or joy, but is rather a limited 
identification whereby the child’s pain is mirrored in us 
as we identify with them and put ourselves in their place 
and imagine what they must be feeling.For in the final 
analysis we are unable to truly experience another's 
pain or know their inner thoughts. Although our powers of 
identification, the ability to place ourselves in 
another's shoes through the exercise of imagination, are 
considerable, the analogy finally breaks down.
It is precisely at the limits of human identification that 
we see the possibility of divine identification. For here 
there is no limitation in knowledge, here the divine Son 
knows us better than we know ourselves. Here there is no 
inability to experience another’s sorrows and hurts as 
one’s own. This entails a rejection (common in much 
contemporary theology) of an absolute divine 
impassibility. Yet as has been so famously argued the 
Cross of Jesus Christ demands that the divine apatheia be 
abandoned.(31) For the Cross of Christ tells us that God 
is supremely able to take upon himself the sins, hurts and 
sorrows of our troubled world. Similarly, there is no need 
to presuppose a corollary of the human fear that in a 
relationship of complete identification we will lose our 
essential self. For the meaning of the Trinity-, as Hegel 
so rightly pointed out, is that it is precisely in
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 251
Identification and Incarnation
relation, in absorption, in identification with the other 
that true personhood is achieved.
In order to sum up this part of the discussion an attempt 
has been made to show that the concept of identification 
is a legitimate conceptual tool which can bring insights 
into the doctrine of the incarnation. That it is not an 
alien import into such discussion has been shown by the
demonstration of its theological pedigree in the works of 
McIntyre and Juengel, where it is specifically related to
the love of God as it is revealed in the life and death of
Jesus of Nazareth. The insights of these authors have 
been developed to show that the concept of identification 
can provide the basis for the ontological unity between 
God and man in Jesus Christ in a way that safeguards the 
’one person’ stipulation of christological theory. This 
unity is found in the assertion that it is through an act 
of divine identification that the life, thoughts and 
activity of Jesus of Nazareth are uniquely experienced and 
’owned’ by God the Son as his own experiences. The
position thus outlined shares a ’family resemblance’ to 
that of the ’paradox of grace’ christology of Donald 
Baillie. It is the contention of this thesis that it 
provides the type of conceptual clarification that
Baillie's position is felt to require, particularly with 
respect to the question of the unity of Christ. Yet
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mention of Baillie's Christology immediately reminds us of 
his insistence that'in a sense everything depends upon the 
human choices of Jesus'. It is to the application of the 
concept of identification to this human dimension of the 
doctrine of the incarnation that we now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IDENTIFICATION AND INCARNATION
The Human Dimension
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5.(1) Introduction
Despite the claim that the concept of identification is 
able to establish a unity between God and man the question 
could still be raised 'in what sense is this an 
'incarnation'? According to the account so far developed 
God the Son has identified himself with an individual 
human life but as yet nothing has been said about the 
nature of that life to show that it is an incarnation of 
the will and purpose of God. An act of identification by 
God with Jesus of Nazareth need mean nothing more than 
God's involvement in a human life with all its flaws, 
mistakes and false beliefs. As such it could not be said 
to reveal anything about the nature of God as love far 
less could it be said to be the manifestation of the grace 
and truth and purpose of God within the framework of human 
existence.
It is not being denied that there have been those who have 
argued that the human life that Jesus lived revealed 
nothing special about the divine nature. For it has indeed 
been asserted that there was nothing remarkable about him 
as a man so that one might speak of a divine incognito in 
the life of Jesus.(1) But this position does not seem to 
satisfy the demands of faith or account for the powerful 
impact of Jesus amongst his early followers. The position
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being developed here would wish to argue that it is 
necessary to expand this account of the incarnation in 
terms of identification so that it becomes possible to say 
that the human life lived by Jesus was the human 
expression of the very life of God himself.
Yet it has to be realised that any account of the life
lived by Jesus must take very seriously the assertion 
already made that Jesus was an historical, concrete, 
individual person with all that that entails. As such he 
was a subject of action and intention and will and the
life that cams to expression through him must have come to
expression through the agency of his will with him as its 
subject. Concepts which would replace a real human subject 
in the person of Christ with a divine subject must be
rejected as failing to provide an adequate account of the 
full humanity of Christ.
As this commits a theory of incarnation based on 
identification unreservedly to a contemporary account of 
human personhood some indication will have to be given as 
to what this means in order to demonstrate that the 
concept of the person that is being proposed allows both 
for the type of identification, perichoresis, fusion etc. 
suggested, and for the manifestation of the will and 
purpose of God in such a way that the freedom and
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integrity of the person is not violated.
5.(11) The Contemporary Understanding of the Person
The beginning point of this analysis of the person is 
taken from an unpublished paper by D.U.D.Shau entitled 
"Identification and Incarnation." Shaw argues that the 
contemporary understanding of person is not that of an 
isolated and self-contained static essence but is instead
one which views persons as coming to be in relation to
other persons. In other words the relations which a person 
enters into are not external to that person but are 
instead relations which constitute that person as who and 
what they are.(2) Such an understanding of the person
immediately invites the question, ' if I am nothing more 
than a series of relationships, if I am constantly on the 
move, what constitutes the real me?' What and who is the 
basis for the enduring sense of self, for the 'I' existing 
through time, that seems to be so self-evident upon a 
moment's introspection and about whom I am ultimately 
concerned and convinced. For I can certainly acknowledge 
the value of the relational account of the person whilst 
still querying whether or not it provides an adequate
explanation for the enduring person through time that I 
know myself to be.
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 257
Identification and Incarnation
Shaw is sensitive to this point and he picks up a 
throwaway line fay Paul Tournier to the effect that only 
'God knows' the true person.(3) Shaw argues that there is 
something in this remark and further argues that God does 
know the individual in ways that he does not even know 
himself. And this knowledge of the individual provides 
the unity of the individual as a person which he needs 
amid the myriad of fluctuating relationships that he 
shall enter into. In this sense God's love for the 
individual bestows an identity upon him.
Shaw in a relatively short paper does not attempt to 
expand upon this insight to develop a full-blown 
relational account of the person. However, he is 
signalling a possible approach to the person of Christ 
which utilises a contemporary insight into the nature of 
human personhood. That is to be a person is possible and 
is only possible within relationships with other human 
beings and, from a Christian perspective, ultimately with 
God.
The classical, and until relatively recently, received 
approach to personhood, by contrast, asserted the absolute 
static and individual nature of the person. To be a person 
was to be a whole of a particular kind, an essence 
complete and entire to oneself.Originally deriving from
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the term persona which meant a party to a contract having 
rights and obligations and also referring to the role of 
an actor in a play its original sense stressed the public 
role or appearance of an individual. This would be true of 
the cognate Greek term prosopon of which persona is an 
approximation.
The stress on individuality and unrelatedness which had 
already attached itself to the concept of person was 
accentuated by the famous definition offered by Boethius 
that a person was a naturae rationabilis individus 
substantia , an individual substance of a rational 
nature.(4) This definition dominated the Western 
understanding of person since its formulation and reaches 
its natural and most complete expression in the isolated 
and self-positing rational ego of Descartes.( 5.)
In contrast to this a relational theory of the person 
stresses the fact that persons can only be persons within 
relationships with other persons. This approach finds 
inspiration in the dialogical personalism of Martin Buber 
but its roots are much older than that as was evidenced in 
the previous treatment of Hegel's understanding of the 
persons of the Trinity.(6)
This relational theory of the person was further developed 
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in our century by John Mac Murray in his Gifford lecture 
series where he argued that;
"As persons we are only what we are in relation 
to other persons.... the Self exists only in 
dynamic relation with the Other...The self is 
constituted by its relation to the Other,... 
it has its being in relationship."(7)
Prior to MacMurray's Gifford lectures, John Robinson 
anticipated much of what MacMurray would later say in his 
unpublished doctoral dissertation "Thou Who Art"[1946].(8) 
Robinson draws much of his inspiration from the dialogical 
personalism of Martin Buber's 'I' and 'Thou' philosophy,
but he traces the beginnings of this understanding of the 
person further back still to the writings of Feuerbach,
Kierkegaard and to the Trinitarian/Unitarian disputes of 
the eighteenth century. It is within the context of these 
disputes that Robinson finds the beginnings of the 
relational understanding of personality. He cites E.G. 
Geijer (1 783-1 847) as one who insisted upon the 
impossibility of existence in isolation from other
persons. Geijer argued that even the Divine personality is 
unthinkable in isolation. 'God can only be conceived as a 
person if He has from all eternity made his counterpart as 
free as H i m s e l f . (9)
Robinson rejects the classical theory of the person
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because it pays no attention to the factor which he argues 
is a minimum requirement for any definition of personhood 
or personality, namely the responsibility to exist in 
loving relationship with other persons. Robinson argues 
that a person properly understood is someone who ought to 
live in a relationship of love. This responsibility to 
live in a relationship of love is not accidental to 
personhood, but constitutive of it, irrespective of 
whether or not the person realises the obligation laid 
upon him.(10)
Robinson is aware of the difficulty of retaining the 
importance of the individual in the relational theory of 
the person, but he argues that is it only because a person 
is an object of love that he can be fully an individual. 
Robinson argues that the individual is loved for what he 
is because of the uniqueness of his own particular nature. 
Indeed it is love which bestows significance and value to 
that element in man which makes it impossible to exchange 
or replace him with anyone else. Here Robinson is echoing 
the point made by Shaw that the love of God bestows an 
identity upon the individual person. Robinson makes the 
point explicitly, "Love not only appreciates individuality 
it bestows it".(11)
The particular value of Robinson’s discussion of the
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nature of personality to the topic of this thesis is that 
it is his explicit intention to relate his analysis of the 
person to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. 
Drawing heavily upon Buber, Robinson argues that there is 
no 'I’ taken in itself; there is only the 'I' in 
relationship. One can exist in ’ I - It’ relationships 
which are impersonal and in which the world and other 
persons are related to purely as objects. The alternative 
relationship is the ’I - Thou’ relationship which is a 
personal and loving relationship with others. Like Buber 
he acknowledges that the moment of the ’I -Thou’ encounter 
is always in the creative now and that it cannot be 
adequately expressed except in negative terms, for as soon 
as it is expressed it has passed into the past and belongs 
to the world of ’I -It’ relationships.(12)
Robinson pictures persons as caught inextricably in a 
world of relations which constitute them as the persons 
they are. These relations will be ’ I - It’ or ’I -Thou’ 
and it is always possible to move or fall from an ’ I- 
Thou’ relationship to an ’I -It’ relationship, indeed, it 
is done all the time. Yet in the midst of all these 
finite ’thou’ experiences we encounter the claim of the 
absolute 'Thou' from whom no escape is possible.(13)
Again drawing heavily upon Buber, Robinson asserts that
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every contact of an ’I ’ with a finite ’thou' points beyond 
itself to encounter with an infinite ’Thou’. Robinson 
argues that this realisation leads us to the conclusion 
that as man cannot be defined in terms of himself but only 
in relation to God and the awareness of his responsibility
in face of God's absolute claim, then man's essential
being, his personhood, lies in his responsibility to 
God.(14)
Robinson returns to argue that the 'I - Thou' relation 
does not negate the concept of individuality but demands 
and creates it. He returns to the theme that love creates 
individuality and argues that we are what we hear from 
God. That is to say we are the particular person we are 
because we hear a particular word from God. Our
individuality rests not in ourselves but in the particular 
Divine word which has called us into being and which
addresses us and to which our whole life is the response 
we have to make.(15)
It is this "Thou" relationship which we have with God, 
mediated through the relations which we have with our 
finite enviroment, that constitutes us as the persons we 
are. This is the very basis of our individuality which 
determines the particular relations which we have.
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Individuality, then, lies not in our own substance but in 
the Divine word to which our lives are the answer.(16)
Robinson sums up his own position succintly in the
following words;
"To every individuating creative word or logos 
which proceeds out of the mouth of God there 
corresponds an individual who exists as its 
analogos -he who is called to return that word 
by simply being truly what he is- the essence 
of man is existence as an analogue and his nature 
can only be defined by reference to God...
.... Man is not a finished product. He is 
possibility which is to be fully realised only 
by his own response. He has to make the answer to 
God which he is. That answer will differ for 
each man according to the Word which calls it 
forth. Individuality is constituted by the fact 
of a difference of Divine address".(17)
Enough has been said to anticipate the way in which 
Robinson will apply this to the person of Christ but 
before doing that some consideration will be given to the 
deep similarities between Robinson's approach and that of 
a recent approach to the concept of the person, namely, 
A.I.McFadyen's THE CALL TO PERSONHOOD .(IB) McFadyen too 
draws heavily upon the personalist philosophy of Martin 
Buber and he attempts to construct a dialogical theory of 
the person around the themes of call and response. 
Following the same pattern as Robinson human beings are 
understood as being constituted by the call of God to be 
his dialogue partner, a personal relationship with God 
which respects the individual's freedom and independence.
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This call of God McFadyen represents as the vertical image 
of human nature. To be a human being is not to be a 
static unrelated substance but is instead a response to an 
external address. Because this address respects human 
freedom and allows the human dialogue partner to make what 
response they will it is conceived in terms of grace.(19)
This human openness towards God marks > the exocentric
nature of the ontological structure of human beings’ which
is to be conceived as a ’being in gratitude.’(20) Parallel
to this vertical address by God there is the horizontal
image or address which is the mediation of the response to
God’s address in a distorted or undistorted fashion in the
social world of the individual.(21) McFadyen sums up his
basic position by saying that
"Persons ... are structures of response sedimented 
from past relations in which they have been 
addressed, have been responded to and have 
communicated themselves in particular forms...
.... The process through which one’s own 
identity is received is simultaneously one 
in which it is uniquely borne for others.
For one’s identity as an 1 is inextricably 
linked to the reality of the 1 of other 
people: an 1 only for an 1.”(22)
McFadyen develops this account to argue that personal 
identity is socially formed through the sedimentation of 
significant relationships which are determinative for that 
person’s identity. The individual is placed in a public 
sphere where communication takes place and an identity is
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bestowed upon the individual through the ways in which he 
is communicated with, regarded, and placed by others. The 
personal appropriation of this socially bestowed identity 
may be conceived as the formation of the self. The self in 
this theory is not an inner essential core but a theory 
which one has about oneself that enables oneself to centre 
one’s experience and to organise one life as a subject of 
communication, (23)
Wolfhart Pannenberg in his ANTHROPOLOGY IN THEOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE argues for a very similar theory to that of 
Robinson and McFadyen except that his account is
specifically directed towards overcoming the tension 
between the absolute unrelated concept of the person and 
the relational account offered by Buber’s dialogical
personalism.(2A) Again the basic characteristic of human 
being is found in its openness to the world. This
exocentric feature of human beings means that they are 
always present to what is other than themselves in a way 
that is distinct from animals. For human beings are aware 
of what is other as an object to them, yet they also are 
aware of the object and themselves in distinction from 
other objects. Pannenberg argues that this capacity for
objectivity is a feature of human self-transcendence.(25)
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Pannenberg argues that this perception and awareness of 
the world of objects, as over and above oneself as an
object, provides the platform for a return from experience 
of the object to an appreciation of oneself as a self or 
ego. The point of this phenomenological beginning is to 
ground what has in fact already been assumed in the 
treatment of Robinson, that it is in and through 
experience of the world that human beings reach
experience of themselves.(26)
Developing this line of thought Pannenberg argues that the 
basic form of human behaviour as being present to the 
other as other leads back to the otherness of the behaving 
entity itself as it knows and appreciates that it is not
the other. In this way self-consciousness can be seen to
be socially mediated.(27) From this realisation 
Pannenberg begins a lengthy treatment of the history and 
development of the theory that the self is fundamentally 
socially mediated. The precise details of the theory need 
not concern us here except to say that Pannenberg is 
concerned with the goal of unifying the tension between 
the exocentric understanding of human nature and the 
centrality of human beings, which is the structured 
condition necessary for self-consciousness. In other words 
although acknowledgment is given to the relational
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formation of the person there is still an 'I’ or 'ego' who 
is the subject of these relationships.
Pannenberg makes a prolonged journey through a number of 
options before finally distinguishing between the self and 
the 'ego'. This distinction draws a line between the 
spontaneous 'ego' or, the 'I' of the present, and the
'self which is the ego that is given to itself as an 
object of reflection upon itself.(28)This distinction is 
located in the fact that 'I' can reflect upon 'itself 
and in this way can treat 'itself as an object to
'itself ' .
This process of self-reflection is a product of social 
interaction with other individuals. In this fashion the 
individual experiences himself not directly but indirectly 
from the viewpoint of other persons. The creation of the 
self, the enduring ' I ' , is based upon the capacity of 
human beings to identify and internalise the role that is 
bestowed in social interaction and thus memory is the 
presupposition of the enduring 'I' in the myriad of social 
relations which the individual enters into.
The concept of identification is of vital importance here 
for it describes the process by which the judgments,
values and estimations of other persons become
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internalised and no longer stand over against the 
individual as alien or co-ercive. Pannenberg takes the 
notion from Freud who used the concept to explain how the 
child identifies with the parental expectation regarding 
it. This process of identification is vital for the 
formation of personal identity for it provides a principle 
of selection from the constellation of relationships in 
which the individual is located and also provides an 
explanation as to why not any and every person can equally 
determine the self by passing judgement on it.(29)
Pannenberg goes on to develop the concept of self-
identification by arguing that the 'ego' or 'self only 
achieves endurance through this process of self-
identification (This account parallels McFadyen's concept 
of the sedimentation of relationships and Robinson's 
portrayal of the mediation of the self through
relationships). This process of self-identification is a 
mark of human openness to the world and requires the 
phenomenon of basic trust. Pannenberg views the human
project as being the reconciliation of the 'ego' with the 
self. This search for wholeness, which transcends the 
limitations of life at any given moment, is summed up in 
the word Person. 'Person signifies the human being in its 
wholeness, which transcends the fragmentariness of reality 
at hand . '(30)
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For Pannenberg this viewpoint surmounts the opposition 
between the "absolute"(unrelated) concept of person and 
the relational concept which looks to the conditioning of 
the 'ego' by the 'Thou'. For he has argued that the self 
is mediated socially while the ego knows itself to be 
identical with the 'for-itselfness of its self- 
consciousness '.( 31 ) In the concept of the person the whole 
of the individual's life appears in the present. For at 
every moment the life of the individual is partly past and 
partly still future, yet in that moment it is implicitly 
present as a whole. Pannenberg concludes his discussion by 
focussing upon the openness of persons to their divine 
destiny beyond the limits of any finite fulfilment. This 
openness to the divine destiny is the basis of the 
inviolability and dignity of the person. (32)
5.(111) The Person of Christ
The point and purpose of this extended treatment of the 
relational theory of the person is to establish its 
suitability and validity for a theory of the person of 
Christ. For if the incarnation is to involve a truly 
human person then it is this understanding of the person 
that it is meant. In other words the human life that Jesus 
lived, the person that he was, came to expression within a 
world of social relations which in large measure
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constituted the possibilities and form of his existence. 
That is to say if the incarnation is understood to be the 
result of a specific address of God to Jesus of Nazareth 
then that address is mediated as a possibility for Jesus 
through the language, images, concepts and thought forms 
presented to him in his social world. Put more bluntly
God’s gracious call to Jesus was mediated to him through 
his encounter with other people. And the perfect human 
response of an obedient life which Jesus made to the 
specific call of God was presented as a possibility to, 
and for Jesus, within the nexus of personal and socio­
cultural relationships.
To be a person according to the relational theory is to 
inhabit a ’public space’ which is made available for it in
community and disclosed to it in language. A person is an
agent, a self-aware centre of consciousness. But self- 
awareness includes the idea of being open to different
significances, of making evaluations, of coming to be a 
person by actualising possibilities which are opened up 
for it in dialogue with a community,In the words of 
Charles Taylor: "I become a person and remain one only as
an interlocutor."(33)
From this discussion of the nature of human persons it is 
clear that^ an individual person cannot exist or be
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created in a vacuum. If it is true to say that the person 
is born and comes to be in relation, then for God to 
become man he has to enter this world of relations. This 
means that the theory of an anhypostatic Christ with an 
unrelated Word operating as the subject of his actions 
must finally be rejected. For an 'impersonal' Christ 
divorced from the real world of human relations is not a 
possibility for a valid christology given a relational 
theory of the person. For God to call into being a human 
life which is the very human life of God it has to be 
possible for such a life to emerge within human 
historical and social life. That is concepts and ideas 
such as the call of God, obedience to God, prophetic 
vocation, service, response, have to exist and form part 
of the 'public space' of the individual person so that 
the individual, in the concrete form of his existence, 
can identify and internalise these concepts and make them 
his own.
In this way an incarnation of the will and purpose of God, 
issuing forth in a life of perfect obedience, presupposes 
a pre-history of God's dealings, of God's address and 
human response in which a gradual realisation of a life 
lived wholly in response to God becomes a possibility. As 
such any account of the incarnation of the love of God in 
the life of Jesus cannot be separated from the larger
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story of creation, from the election and call of Israel, 
from the prophetic role of the prophets, which was the 
cultural world, the 'public space' which Jesus inhabited 
and as such was the necessary presupposition of the 
sedimentation and mediation of the address and call of 
God made by him.
It seems then that parallel to God's identification with 
Jesus of Nazareth there is a reciprocal identification 
made by Jesus to the call and address of God. This 
identification takes the form of a total and obedient 
response in the life of Jesus to the claim of the absolute 
"Thou". It is possible to develop here the idea, found 
earlier in Pannenberg's discussion of Freudian theory, 
that the creation of the enduring self is made possible 
through the identification with socially mediated and 
externalised models which are internalised through the 
process of identification and as such no longer stand over 
against the self but become part of one's own self 
identity. This picture has the virtue of according with 
the basic N.T. picture of Jesus as one overwhelmingly 
conscious of, and responsive to, the claims of his Father. 
A person who found that the essence of freedom and 
selfhood lay in obedience to the will of the Father who 
sent him.
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The notion of a reciprocal identification on the part of 
Jesus to the address of God returns us to Baillie's 
insistence that in a sense everything depended upon the 
human choices of Jesus, A theory of reciprocal
identification also has the virtue of allowing for growth 
and development in the expression of the will and purpose 
of God in the life of Jesus.(34) A developing expression 
of the incarnation is required by what is known of human 
development and the growth of religious sensibilities in 
the human person. But it is important to realise that it 
is only possible to speak of a development in the 
outworkings of the call of God in the life of Jesus 
because it is not being suggested that the unity between 
God's will and Jesus' response is the ontological basis 
for the unity of the person.(35) There is no question of a 
growth towards an ever-increasing unity of person so that 
the climax of Jesus' life is the event of incarnation. 
Instead the basis of the unity of the person is 
established in God's prior identification with Jesus of 
Nazareth, so that the experiences and activity of Jesus 
are experienced uniquely and directly by God the Son. The 
reciprocal identification and obedience of Jesus is a 
response that presupposes this prior activity of God. 
Interpreting this in terms of the historical life of Jesus 
it may be said that Jesus responded to the claims of his 
Father through the power of the Spirit and the Son
Page 274 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Identification and Incarnation
identified completely with his perfect response of 
obedience and gratitude.(36)
By suggesting that the concept of identification is the 
presupposition of the unity of Christ within an address 
and response christology the attempt is being made to 
forestall the criticism, raised against Baillie’s 
approach, that any perfectly obedient life would therefore 
be an incarnation of God. For the life of Jesus cannot be 
separated from God's prior identification, nor from the 
divine address which comes to him, and precedes hijn, and 
which comes to no other individual in this way. And it is 
stressed that it is only to Jesus of Nazareth that the 
particular address by which God constitutes and incarnates 
himself as the human life of God comes. This is a basic 
datum point for every adequate christology. No other 
individual is called or addressed by God to incarnate the 
divine life.
John Robinson developed his account of personality in 
relation to the incarnation by focussing upon the 
concept of a particular divine address to Christ. 
Robinson's theory. shows the possibilities for such a 
christology as is described here within a 'call and 
response' situation. Robinson argues that God himself 
constituted himself in the "Thou" relation to himself. To
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be a fully personal individual is to live in this "Thou" 
relationship to God. Therefore it is Christ's taking upon 
himself this "Thou" existence in responsibility which is 
the fundamental meaning of the incarnation. "He (Christ) 
was man simply because He stood in the human relation to 
God, other men and the world. Yet He who existed in this 
relationship was none other than God himself. God 
constituted himself man by assuming the "Thou" relation to 
God."(37)
Robinson is quite clear that in his theory the divinity of 
the Son is not, and must not, be impaired, and his 
attributes are not to be abandoned. Yet in agreement with 
the theory outlined in this chapter he wishes to argue 
that these attributes come to expression solely through 
the medium of the human faculties which condition the 
existence of Jesus of Nazareth. In other words, Christ has 
no awareness of God except as a "Thou" in polar relation 
to himself, an awareness which is given through the normal 
processes of a developing religious consciousness. All he 
knew and all he was was built up out of his relations in 
which as a child he found himself. Like every human being 
he was his relationships. "To become man was for Christ to 
change his status from being the subject of the Divine 
relation to men to being also the analogue of his own 
Word ."(38)
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It is easy to misunderstand Robinson’s terminology at this 
point perhaps because he is attempting to deal with 
problems which do not arise from his construction and 
which lead him to attempt to solve the dilemmas of Greek 
metaphysics from a very different starting- point. For it 
is clear that for Robinson, in agreement with the position 
outlined here, existence in this "Thou" relationship is 
necessarily individual and is historical. Christ is a man 
in every sense of the word historical, particular and 
individual, a product of a particular age and society.
Despite the broad agreement with Robinson's approach it 
is only by uniting it with the concept of God's prior 
identification with Jesus of Nazareth that we can justify 
talk of an ontological unity of person between God and man 
in Christ. Robinson tries to achieve such a unity by 
stressing the function of Jesus as a human being living in 
response to a specific word addressed to him and to which 
he is the analogue. Such an 'analogical' response might 
create a life that reflected God's will and purpose but it 
would not be experienced by God as uniquely his own. 
Consequently, the unity between God and man in Christ 
would be a unity of will and purpose but not experience. 
As such there would be a duality of persons in the 
incarnate figure of Christ. It is the contention of this 
discussion that only the notion of identification, or some
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such related concept, can provide the unity of the 
underlying hypostasis which constitutes the one person, 
God incarnate, whilst retaining the integrity of the real 
historical human existence of Jesus of Nazareth.
As intimated earlier there are significant implications 
attached to this approach. In taking a relational view 
of the person it is necessary to abandon as untenable the 
anhypostatic viewpoint of the Alexandrian position. There 
can be no human nature without a human person that is 
formed and mediated through the fabric of social and
personal relations. Jesus of Nazareth is an historic 
individual. Indeed using this terminology we would have to 
reverse the traditional order and speak of an anhypostasis 
of the Son in the incarnation.(39) Through the process
of identification the Son has made the life of Jesus his 
own human hypostasis . This identification is so complete 
that everything we wish to say about the Son is an
implication drawn from what we know of his activity in the
life of Christ. This position of course accords with the 
actual history of the development of Trinitarian 
reflection where language concerning the Son follows from, 
and is a reflection upon, the life and impact of Jesus. It 
also testifies to the true element in the claim of neo- 
orthodoxy that everything we wish to say about God(and
man) is shaped by the revelation of Jesus Christ.(40)
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Yet there is an element of truth in the related concept of 
enhypostasia For the relational view of the person
reveals that all persons properly speaking are 
enhypostatic in that they find themselves as persons only 
in relation with other persons. Indeed in a prior sense we 
are all constituted by the address of God which defines 
our personhood and is found only in relation to it. And
our future lies in the realisation that the full story 
concerning the persons that we are can only be known at 
the end of our story. But the true end of the story is not
the end of our temporal lives but lies in the future with
God. This is surely the significance of the resurrection 
of Jesus. It is not primarily a claim about a continuing 
temporal bodily existence. It is a claim that the full 
story about the person of Jesus, who he is and was, can 
only be told from the perspective of its telos in the 
future of God. It is the claim that the identification
made by God with Christ, the specific address made to him 
and the response which he encapsulated, have become part 
of the divine existence and cannot be separated from it. 
God’s future and Christ's future are bound together in 
this reciprocal process of identification which shapes our 
understanding of the event of the divine life as a being 
for others in love. This is the meaning of the 
resurrection of Jesus from the perspective of 
identification.
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Similarly our personhood might be said to be enhypostatic 
in that it is grounded in, and won through, relations with 
others and ultimately it is found in God's gracious call 
to us which enables us to be the people we are . For human 
existence is existence before God, and in responsibility 
to God, whether this is acknowledged or not, God's 
identification with Jesus Christ and his identification 
with us reveals that God is for us and that our future, 
our completion lies in the future of God too.
The relational theory of the person and the concept of
identification may go some way towards clarifying the 
mystery of God's gracious address to man which yet allows 
for a genuinely free human response. This dichotomy lies 
at the heart of Baillie's 'paradox of grace' that we are 
never more free than when we live in obedience to God. 
Such an understanding of freedom implies the well-worn 
distinction between freedom from something and freedom for 
something. From the Christian perspective we are beings 
set free by God who live in relation to him and his 
gracious call. The proper response to God is to exist as
'beings-in- gratitude' who actualise the call and address
of God in the concrete form of their existence. This 
freedom is not freedom from God but freedom for God to 
whose gracious call we are called to correspond.(41)
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Yet it has been argued that the primary locus for the 
mediation of the grace and call of God to us is the social 
world,(42) That is, we encounter the grace of God in our 
encounters with others in relationships of trust and 
openness which point beyond themselves to the claims of 
the infinite "Thou" beyond. The claim of God encounters us 
as we become persons in dialogue with others, as we are 
open to significances, evaluations, concepts and thought 
forms which make up the 'public space' which we must
inhabit. The reference to 'must' here is important for we 
are not free not to inhabit some 'public' space if we 
are to engage upon the project of the creation of our 
person. And the space which we inhabit has to be
coherently formed if we are to act in a uniform and
purposeful manner rather than in a random, arbitrary 
fashion. Therefore, freedom properly understood is not 
unlimited freedom, for we must choose certain paths rather 
than others if we are to inhabit a well formed 'public
space'.
But of course we do not perceive the fact that we must 
make some evaluations rather than others, that we must be 
open to certain significances rather than others, to be a 
limitation of our freedom. Rather our freedom is found 
precisely in the fact that we choose certain paths, make 
certain evaluations and are affected by certain
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significances. And in choosing them they do not stand over 
against us but become ours, freely chosen, as we identify 
ourselves with them. The ongoing project which is the 
creation of the person within a publicly defined space is 
the mediation and sedimentation of these choices into an 
enduring self which conditions the future choices that the 
person will make. But this conditioning of future choices 
is not a limitation of personal freedom.For that would be 
to desire a freedom from having to make some choice and
this is not possible. Instead it is the freedom for
certain choices against others.
The essential thrust of what has just been said was
anticipated in Pannenberg's elaboration of the 
distinction between the spontaneous ego and the socially 
mediated self. In this distinction we find that the 
mystery of grace and freedom is mirrored in the mystery 
between the socially created self and the spontaneous ego. 
The spontaneous ego represents our understanding of 
ourselves as free agents acting in the world, in
Pannenberg’s terminology it is the 'for-itselfness' of the 
individual. The socially mediated self testifies to our 
awareness of ourselves as exocentric beings, as coming to 
be in relation to society and others.
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In other words we know ourselves to be neither totally 
free, self-realising individuals nor totally bound and 
constrained by society's pressures. The Freudian concept 
of identification was utilised by Pannenberg to describe 
the process by which the ego internalised the demands of
society to create an enduring self. Here we may have a key
to the mystery of God's gracious address to us which calls 
us to realise ourselves as the persons he desires us to 
be. The gracious address is not co-ercive but is rather 
internalised through an identification with the claim of 
God which makes the claim our own claim and which then 
becomes part of the normative identity of the self. In 
this way a continual response of obedience is sedimented 
into the self which finds its freedom in faithfully 
responding to God 's address,(43)
To say that Jesus Christ freely chose to obey God at every 
point and that he therefore incarnated the purpose and 
love of God is neither to deny his genuine freedom nor to 
restrict the prevenient claims of God.(44) It is through 
Christ's identification with the address of God, mediated 
through the religious and cultural concepts of his time, 
issuing forth in love and solidarity with others, that the 
incarnation took place. The address of God was not co­
ercive, it did not force the response that Christ made. 
But neither was the response that Christ made random and
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arbitrary, it was a possibility for him only because of 
the prevenient activity of God, Christ chose to identify 
with the address of God and so to internalise the claim of 
God that it no longer stood over against him as something 
separate but was part of his person. This freedom of
choice was the freedom of his spontaneous ego choosing 
certain significances and making certain evaluations from 
within his cultural world. The mediation and sedimentation
of those choices was part of the project of the ongoing
creation of the self in obedience to God which led to the 
growing realisation of the will and purpose of God in the 
life that Jesus lived.
If it is felt by some to be impossible for a human being 
freely to choose to manifest the will of God on every
occasion then one is tempted to offer a paraphrase of a 
very famous argument originally developed as a criticism 
of theistic belief. That is, if there is no logical 
impossibility in a man freely choosing to obey God on one 
or several occasions, then there cannot be a logical 
impossibility in him doing so on every occasion.(45)
It has to be stressed that everything that has been said 
so far about Jesus' identification with the address of 
God presumes a perfectly normal mental life on the part of 
Christ. There is nothing abnormal in his psychological
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framework. The claim of God came to Christ in the same 
manner as it came to the prophets and as it comes to us. 
Without claiming to know anything about the historical 
consciousness of Jesus this theory requires no 
awareness of a continuity on the part of Jesus with the 
pre-existent activity of God the Son. Jesus knew how to 
live and to respond to God as a faithful son of the 
Father, but no claim is being made that he knew himself to 
be the eternal Son of God. That Jesus was overwhelmingly 
aware of the presence of the Father seems to be a 
justifiable historical claim even in these radical times.
But all that is required for the issuing forth of the will 
and purpose of God in the life of Jesus is a relationship 
which is indistinguishable from that of prophetic 
inspiration except perhaps in intensity, ( and of this we 
can never know) . The proviso that must continually be 
restated,however, is that the identification made by Jesus 
in the perfect life of obedience which he lived is an 
outworking and is not the basis of the unity established 
by God's prior identification with him. As such a 
christology based on God's identification with Jesus of 
Nazareth does not embrace the ' two-minds'approach of the 
first chapter, at least in the sense that there is no 
continuity of memory and life on the part of Jesus of 
Nazareth that he was the pre-existent Son of God, In as
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much as most contemporary theories of the incarnation 
allow a human mind which is limited in range to Jesus of 
Nazareth this could be said of most accounts. If all the 
'two-minds* accounts of the person of Christ eventually 
wants to maintain is that God was aware of the continuity 
of experience between his divine mode of existence prior 
to the incarnation and thereafter during it, it is hard to 
see how any incarnational account can dispute that claim.
The concept of identification has proved to be a 
legitimate conceptual tool which can clarify our 
understanding of the incarnation. It does so primarily by 
providing a basis for the unity of person in the prior 
identification of God the Son with Jesus of Nazareth. Yet 
it allows for a genuinely free and reciprocal 
identification on the part of Jesus with the claim of God 
that neither diminishes the prior activity of God nor 
destroys the integrity of the humanity of Christ. It is 
the type of theory that is in the best tradition of 
Theodore and Baillie and is a legitimate development of 
the christologies that they offered. The concept of 
identification without doing violence to the basic thrust 
of their positions, and without claiming that either one 
of them would have so developed their own position, does 
provide the conceptual support and explication that many 
commentators have felt their theories required.
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The continuing value of the concept of identification is 
found in the suggestion that as the appropriate 
underpinning of the type of position offered by Baillie it 
represents a genuine middle way between absolute rejection 
of Chalcedonian christology and blind acceptance of it. 
That this is so is perhaps demonstrated by the fact that 
it is able to unite the best insights of the 'two-minds' 
defences of Chalcedon with an unequivocal assertion of the 
complete humanity of Christ in the best 'Antiochene' 
tradition. Furthermore the fact that it suggests itself 
as a suitable concept for explicating the root-claim of 
the New Testament that 'God is Love and his love was 
disclosed to us in this, that he sent his only Son into 
the world to bring us life'(1Jhn 4:9) testifies to the 
need for the type of examination of the concept that has 
taken place in this thesis.
The concept of identification then is a term suggested by 
the theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation as a 
way of articulating the claims made by that metaphor. That 
it brings real explanatory power to the nature of the 
unity between God and man in Christ, and to the integrity 
of the true humanity of Jesus, whilst accounting for his 
genuinely free response to the gracious activity of God, 
indicates that it is a concept which is faithful to the 
lively suggestiveness of the metaphor of incarnation and
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that it has a real role to play in 'accommodating our 
christological language to the causal structure of the 
world' as it is pervaded by the divine reality which is 
constantly coming to us in the 'public space' which we 
inhabit.
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ATONEMENT. TRINITY AND UNIQUENESS
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6.(i) Identification and Atonement
Having offered an account of the incarnation based on 
God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth it is 
necessary to show how that theory impinges upon the 
related doctrines of atonement and the Trinity. Obviously 
this can only be very briefly alluded to at this point, 
in broad brush-stroke fashion, but some indication will 
be given of the implications of the discussion so far on 
these related matters.
For many learned readers this work will already have 
committed the grave sin of separating the account of 
Christ's person from his work. The author has much 
sympathy with that criticism yet the demands of space and 
time necessitated that the principal focus of discussion 
should be the manner of God's presence in Christ.
With respect to the doctrine of the atonement, no 
particular model will be suggested here, instead some 
hints and pointers will be given as to how the concept of 
identification might usefully be developed in the area of 
soteriology. Already in the writings of McIntyre and 
Juengel the single most basic principle of the concept of 
identification has been discussed. God's identification 
with Jesus of Nazareth is an identification with and for
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humanity as a whole. The event of God's identification 
reveals that God is for us and with us, he is completely 
involved and immersed in the human situation. In the 
death of Christ God has involved himself in the darkness 
and the pain and the ambiguity and negativity of our 
world and he has taken it to himself in his 
identification with the despised, rejected and crucified 
Jesus of Nazareth,
This is the most basic presupposition of atonement that 
God is for us and with us in his identification with 
Jesus of Nazareth. This basic conviction underlies all 
models of the atonement. In a recent article entitled 
"Christology Today" Richard Bauckham has argued that the 
combination of Jesus' unique identification with the will 
of the Father and his unlimited loving identification 
with men and women make him the one who embodies God's 
loving identification with all humanity. Jesus is "God's 
solidarity with the world."(1)
But this solidarity with the world has to be expressed 
and made available to people who never met Jesus; it has 
to be articulated as a possibility before it can be a 
live issue for men and women today. In the terminology of 
the previous chapter the concept of atonement, the idea 
of forgiveness, has to be part of a 'public space' which
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the individual can inhabit and take hold of. Bauckham's 
answer to this dilemma is to suggest that it is through 
the proclamation of the narrative of Jesus that Jesus' 
potential universality, God's solidarity with the world, 
becomes known.(2)
Obviously Bauckham's appreciation of a 'narrative
theology' sits easily with the earlier discussion of the 
role of metaphor and the text in the expansion of our 
horizon of being in the world. To have the possibility of 
forgiveness, the concept of redemption, expressed in the 
narratives of the New Testament is to offer a
redescr iption of reality to the individual and to make 
possible for him a new mode of existence in the world as 
one who is the object of God's Fatherly love, as one who 
is redeemed. And this is not just telling stories to one 
another so that we feel good. The metaphors, of
incarnation and atonement disclose reality as being a 
world of grace and forgivneness, a world in which God is 
with us and that he is engaged upon the process of 
recreating us as persons, as new creatures in Christ.
If incarnation and atonement are ultimately about the 
recreation of us as persons in the image of Christ then 
we are reminded of the discussion of the previous chapter 
where it was discovered that the development of the
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person takes place in social and public space. The person 
inhabits a world of possibilities which are opened up to 
him as real possibilities through language,concepts and 
images. In this sense the present Christ is the narrated 
Christ, present forgiveness is narrated forgiveness.
For it is through the creation of a 'public space' of 
redemption by language that forgiveness becomes a 
possibility for us. In the hearing of the narrative 
promise of forgiveness we hear the address of God and the 
possibility of redemption is mediated to us. In 
entering into the promise of the narrative we identify 
with Jesus Christ as God's solidarity with the world and 
are in turn identified by God as being in Christ.
In response to the charge that this is a wholly 
subjective theory of the atonement we return to the claim 
that this is accomplished and made known through God's 
real identification with Christ. This event is a real 
objective event in the life of God which affects the very 
being of God as he knows and experiences human frailty 
and finitude and transcends it through the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ, Indeed the objective/subjective side of 
the atonement should not be overstressed. For Ricoeur 
alerted us to the fact that the expression of human 
possibility, human transcendence, through words,images
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and concepts is a truly real, and indeed truly human, 
mode of existence. If atonement is a possibility for us 
as individuals then that possibility has to be mediated 
to us in language which is the peculiarly human way of 
actualising possibilities so that they become real for 
us .
Forgiveness then, presented to us as a gift of God 
finds its outworking in the life of the individual in 
the process of sanctification through the indwelling 
power of God as he leads us into becoming the people he 
wants us to be. If the project of person formation is to 
be open to certain significances, to make certain 
evaluations, then through embracing the narrative promise 
of the New Testament we become open to the significances 
and evaluations of the Kingdom. As individual persons we 
are open to the future and our destiny is to be conformed 
to Christ by the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit. We 
are to become new creatures in Christ.
Yet this project of sanctification, of the practice of 
discipleship, takes place in a 'public space' shaped by 
the scripture narratives and the church's practice of 
those narratives. This is not to rule out the indwelling 
power of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer, 
(after the manner of Alston), but it is to acknowledge
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that one of the ways (if not the main way) in which the 
Spirit prompts us to growth is through making us aware of 
certain significances and evalauations which are 
displayed for us in the 'public space' of the church.
In identifying with Christ we identify with his 
resurrection which is to know that the full story of 
Christ's person did not end with his death but belongs to 
the future of God and his Kingdom. In this sense the full 
story of the people that we are does not end with this 
life but can only be fully known from the perspective of 
God who is drawing us to realise ourselves as the people 
he wants us to be. It is from the perspective of God's 
future that the ultimate story of our personhood, our 
identity, is known and made safe and this is the hope 
of the resurrection.
6.(11) Trinity and Identification
Perhaps the most vexed question arising from the 
treatment offered here of the incarnation is what is its 
effect on the traditional understanding of the Trinity? 
For a full-blown relational theory of the person was 
developed to give an account of the incarnation and this 
relational theory of the person was shown to have
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received an original impetus from Trinitarian 
discussions.
I
There is no doubt that recent treatments of the Trinity 
have stressed the social and relational aspects of 
Trinitarian relations ,(4) David Brown is even prepared 
to say that each of the three persons of the Trinity have 
separate minds and wills. In this sense they share a 
generic identity.(5) Brown should at least be accorded 
the virtue of consistency, as there is no doubt that the 
'two-minds' position as advocated by himself and Morris 
does seem to imply that the members of the Trinity can
act separately and distinctly from one another.(6) The
Trinitarian adage opera ad extra sunt indivisa would seem 
to be being violated here. Whether or not such theories 
of a social Trinity must necessitate some form of 
Tritheism cannot be decided here as it would require an 
in depth analysis of the contemporary state of play in 
Trinitarian discussion.
Suffice it to say that an incarnation based on 
identification is ultimately neutral on the issue of a 
social or unitive model of the Trinity. If the discussion 
of the relational concept of the person is felt to
incline it towards the social view of the Trinity then it 
is necessary to remind ourselves of Baillie's warning
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that God is always personal but is not a person in the
sense that we are persons.(7) As such discussions of the
nature of God should always begin with the clear 
affirmation that no matter which model is being used, the 
ultimate story about the nature of God in his purpose,
will and activity is that he is one unified reality. 
Personally the author inclines towards the view of 
Baillie and sees the whole being of God involved in God's 
identification with Jesus of Nazareth, although 
recognising the appropriateness of the attribution of 
this work to the Son. However, there is no essential 
logic in the concept of identification which rules out
the social model of the Trinity in advance of any further 
discussion about its suitability.
The concept of the Trinity should perhaps be viewed as a 
theory-constitutive metaphor which has itself been 
generated by the theory-constitutive metaphor of the 
incarnation. That is to say there is an inherent tension 
in the claim that God is one yet in some sense three 
which is not resolvable apart from the metaphor of the 
Trinity. For as soon as one stresses absolutely the unity 
of God one fails to encapsulate the Christian claim about 
the nature of God's activity in Christ and in the world 
today through his Spirit, Yet stress upon the threeness 
immediately runs the risk of tritheism and fragmentation
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of the unity of God. It would seem that as soon as one 
begins to resolve the metaphor one is incapable of making 
the same claim about God apart from the metaphor. As such 
it may be that the church will have to accept the 
multiplicity of interpretations, some stressing unity, 
some stressing tri-unity, in order to say everything that 
it wants to say about the ultimately mysterious nature of 
God.
6.(iii) Uniqueness - A Concluding Scientific Postscript
One of the most perplexing issues facing Christians today 
is undoubtedly the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. How can 
one historical figure be of unique significance for 
everyone else in human history? Is this not a claim which 
denigrates the truth claims and spiritual value of other 
faiths? Obviously the account of the incarnation provided 
here argues that Jesus is unique. For it is the life of 
Jesus of Nazareth that God identifies himself with and 
allows himself to experience, in a unique and distinctive 
way. In this unique identification a change is brought 
about in the very being of God himself as he knows and 
experiences this particular human life as his own human 
life .
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Jesus is thus unique in the sense that God's presence 
and activity in him is unique to him. The Christian 
conviction is that at no other point and in no other life 
has God so incarnated himself so as to take within the 
divine life a fully human experience. Therefore the 
uniqueness of Jesus and his universal relevance are based 
not on his maleness, Jewishness or any other incidental 
feature of his person, but on the activity of God in him. 
Obviously this is a claim of faith made by the Christian 
community and is not strictly demonstrable.
Yet it is felt that this claim to uniqueness excludes 
other faiths and denigrates their claims to truth. There 
are a number of possible responses to this dilemma. One 
could allow the possibility of multiple incarnations in 
the lives of men and women of different faiths. But this 
brings its own problems. For although it seems to accord 
other faiths the same status as Christianity it is not at 
all clear that they would all wish to make an 
'incarnational' claim for the leader or pioneer figure of 
their faith. It is not clear, for example, if Islam would 
make, or wish to make, any such claim for Mohammed.
Perhaps a more serious difficulty is the question what 
precisely is gained by multiple incarnations? If the 
point of the incarnation is that God has taken to himself
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the full reality of human existence then once he has 
identified himself completely and fully with an 
individual human life and taken it into the very life of 
God, God's purpose is accomplished. Nothing further is 
added to the life of God by a series of incarnations, for 
God's identification with humanity in Jesus of Nazareth 
is complete and total. Even God can go no further than 
this.
If the response is still made that this seems to exclude 
other faiths then further responses could be made. It 
could be argued that the ultimate truth about each 
religious system is ultimately expressed in the Christian 
story of an incarnate God and that therefore each sincere 
believer is in some way in Christ already. But this would 
seem to be a rather patronising attitude in arguing that 
'sincere believers' are ultimately Christian whether they 
acknowledge Christ or not. Yet there is a modified 
response which is less patronising. This is to make use 
of the patristic notion of Christ as the fulfilment of 
the activity of the Logos spermatikos of God which is 
constantly reaching out to men and women everywhere at 
all times. Here the claim is that Christ is the fullest 
expression of God's universal activity and that 
consequently, although there may be alternative ways of 
articulating God's nature and activity, nothing that
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fundamentally conflicts with the message that God loves 
us and is with us, as revealed in Christ, can be true of 
God. Here God's particular and concrete identification' 
with Jesus of Nazareth is the culmination and completion 
of that going forth to identify with his whole creation 
which is the eternal life of God itself.
Support for this type of approach can be found in the 
earlier discussion of faith as a research programme. This 
theory, drawn from the work of Imrie Lakatos in the 
philosophy of science with his theory of scientific 
research programmes, argues that faith can be understood 
and characterised after the manner of scientific 
research programmes. Such a programme is constituted by 
a set of core hypotheses which constitute the identity 
and shape of the programme and suggest the way that it 
should proceed forward.(8) These hypotheses which 
constitute the hard-core of the programme cannot be 
modified or abandoned without in effect ending that 
particular programme and initiating another.(9) Tensions 
and problems surrounding the application of the programme 
are resolved through the modification and discarding of a
series of auxiliary hypotheses which constitute the
■:ipresuppositions which support the hard-core of the |i
programme.(10) To modify or extend the auxiliary 4
hypotheses does not end or radically reshape the
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programme. In Lakatos’ theory embarking upon such a 
programme implies commitment to its truth as is 
evidenced by the decision not to abandon the hard-core of 
the programme unless absolutely necessary. Any inadequacy 
that is found in the match between the research programme 
and the experience of the real world is contributed not 
to the hard-core hypotheses but to some other part of the 
theoretical structure.
Christian faith understood as a 'research' programme in 
this way can be seen to be a programme whose essential 
core is constituted by the theory-constitutive metaphor 
of the incarnation. This is the hard-core of the 
programme, incarnation and atonement, the goal of which 
is the re- creation of the individual person in lives 
that issue forth in worship of God and service of others. 
It is part of the nature of embarking upon this programme 
that the individual confesses it to be the programme 
which he thinks will ultimately prove to be true. In 
other words there is an implicit truth claim upon joining 
a programme that this programme is the correct one and 
that its essential core hypotheses point in the direction 
in which one should move. This is not to be unaware that 
there are other programmes pointing in different 
directions. One may even acknowledge that they 
'theoretically' might prove to be successful programmes,
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but it does not negate the fact that choosing one 
programme rather than another makes at least an implicit 
claim that this programme will prove to be the true one.
And this aspect of choosing is important. For the 
individual has to choose one programme rather than 
another, or at least make the choice that there is no 
'true' programme which is available. Yet if the 
religious research programme is to issue forth in a 
concrete life of worship and service then the individual 
has to occupy an identifiable and coherent 'public space' 
which is opened up by the hard-core hypotheses which
shape the programme. If the argument is offered that the
individual's programme could become the search for the 
programme that combines all other programmes, then this
is to effectively end involvement in the particular 
programme upon which he was engaged and to initiate a new 
one. And there is the demand in the concrete life of the 
individual that the religious programme maps out a 
coherent way of being in the world, serving God and
loving others. It is not clear that a synthesis of 
various programmes with very different core-hypotheses 
will provide the individual with the coherent and clearly 
articulated 'public space' that he needs.
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The search for a grand unified programme may also, in 
religious terms, mean the exchanging of a research 
programme which is meant to involve the individual in a 
life of worship and service for one whose aim is not 
this but is rather the search for the ultimate 
programme. In religious terms this may be thought of as 
exchanging the ultimate object of faith, which is worship 
of God, with a penultimate object, which is the harmony 
of all religious research programmes.
In as much as religious programmes involve the worship of 
God, and given the presupposition that worship should 
only be directed to that being which has an absolute 
claim upon the individual, it is hard to see how any 
faith, any particular programme, can avoid the claim to 
truth. The individual believer can acknowledge these 
other claims to truth as real possibilities, they may in 
the end prove to be valid 'research' programmes. However, 
as long as the believer is about the business of serving 
God in the concrete and coherent public space upon which 
he has embarked and that this is a progressive programme 
issuing forth in a life of worship and service, then this 
acknowledgment of the possible truth of other programmes 
can only be a theoretical acknowledgment. For the 'truth' 
of the matter is that he has embarked upon a specific 
programme with an identifiable shape and direction and
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for as long as he remains with that programme there is an 
implicit claim that it is the programme which will 
ultimately prove to be true.
As such there is no real escape from the problem of 
uniqueness. The way of life opened up by the metaphor of 
the incarnation makes certain claims about the nature and 
purpose of God which cannot be made apart from that 
particular metaphor, they are integral to the programme 
which that metaphor opens up. To say that we are less 
than committed to the ultimate truth of that programme is 
to do less than justice to the claims of the metaphor and 
is likely to prove religiously less than satisfying. 
However, this is true of other faiths too. For they are 
embarked upon programmes which are distinctively shaped 
by certain metaphors and stories and the claims which 
they make are constitutive of their faith. The demand 
that each faith sacrifices its own distinctive claim in 
order to satisfy some ’nobler’ demand to find the true 
heart of all faith is to misunderstand that the nature of 
faith is not to seek a universal explanation of all 
religious yearning, but to call people into lives of 
service and worship and this necessitates an implicit 
claim to truth.
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At this point the discussion of contemporary questions arT 
the incarnation begun in the first chapter draws to a 
close. It is admittedly a brief and unsatisfactory 
treatment of these vital issues and much more should and 
could be said. However, the point was not to provide an 
exahaustive treatment of these subjects but to suggest 
how a theory of incarnation based on the concept of 
identification might approach them. As such the hope is 
that the concept of identification has shown both its 
appropriateness as a model of the incarnation and its 
potential explanatory power in the areas of atonement. 
Trinity and uniqueness.
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The Logical Concerns of the Patristic and Mediaeval Ages
It is not my intention at this point to offer a detailed 
account of the development of christological doctrine in 
the centuries leading up to the Council of Chalcedon in 
451 A.D. That subject has been covered at length in many
standard text books on the subject.(1) My concern at this
point is merely to shed some light on the contemporary 
logical debate by examining how similar concerns were 
dealt with by certain patristic authors through a 
representative sampling of their texts.
It may help at this point to set down the Chalcedonian 
definition so that it will be before us as we consider 
the issues which generate so much concern. It reads as 
follows :
"Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all 
with one accord teach men to acknowledge one 
and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once 
complete in Godhead and complete in manhood,
truly God and truly man, consisting also of a
reasonable soul and body; of one substance with 
the Father as regards his Godhead,and at the 
same time of one substance with us as regards 
his manhood; like us in all respects, apart 
from sin, yet as regards his manhood begotten, 
for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the 
Virgin,the God bearer;one and the same Christ,
Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognised in two 
natures, without confusion, without change, 
without division, without separation, the 
distinction of natures being in no way
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annulled by the union, but rather the 
characteristics of each nature being preserved 
and coming together to form one person and 
subsistence not parted or separated into two 
persons, but one and the same Son and Only- 
begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ; 
even as the prophets from earliest times spoke 
of him, and our Lord Jesus Christ himself 
taught us, and the Creed of the Fathers has 
handed down to us."(2)
Here we have in nuce everything that generates the 
charge of logical incoherence. God and man in one person 
without confusion or division. The two natures complete 
in themselves yet not combining to form a hybrid third. 
The manhood of Jesus begotten in time, a category which 
obviously does not apply to the eternal Word. The 
definition itself offers no suggestions as to how one 
might deal with these problems, it merely states the 
boundary conditions and indicates what is definitely 
ruled out in any christological theory.
Although Chalcedon does not offer a solution to these 
dilemmas it is a response which attempts to outline the 
framework within which any solution to the problems must 
be found. The problems, dilemmas and difficulties, which 
are inherent in the Chalcedonian definition were the 
subject of great debate in the centuries prior to the 
formation of the definition. The definition itself is 
often viewed as a compromise between two conflicting
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responses to those difficulties, the celebrated 
Alexandrian/Antiochene divide on christology.
In the writings of Athanasius, easily the most celebrated 
figure of the Alexandrian tradition, we find the 
beginnings of a response to the logical difficulties of 
the incarnation which persists in Chalcedon and which is 
being advocated again today. An examination of book three 
of the Orations against the Arians and sections of De
Incarnations Verbi Dei reveals that many of the charges 
which are being levelled today against the coherence and 
meaningfulness of Chalcedon were being made by the Arian 
and Jewish opponents of Christianity in the time of 
Athanasius .
For example, we find Athanasius dealing with the question 
of how the incorporeal Word can become incarnate in a
fleshly body.(3) Athanasius is forced to give an account
of how the impassible Word can suffer in the flesh.
Similarly, the ignorance of Jesus as revealed in certain 
New Testament passages requires explanation if Jesus is 
truly the omniscient Word of God. Again, in addition to 
the question of suffering, Athanasius is forced to 
consider how it is possible to speak of the Word of God 
enduring death on the Cross. Finally, Athanasius reveals 
that his Jewish opponents were asking the very same
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question that is being asked by modern commentators, 
namely, "..How,being human, can he be God?"(4)
Athanasius* response to these difficulties is well known 
and it shaped the development of Alexandrian Christology 
for the succeeding generations. He begins by arguing 
that as the Word of God was immanent in the whole of 
creation there was no particular difficulty in conceiving 
of him being enfleshed in a particular body. An analogy 
is drawn between the indwelling of the incorporeal soul 
in the human body and the Word’s indwelling of Jesus. 
This enfleshment, however, does not detract from the 
Word's transcendent qualities for the Word is still the 
rational and governing principle of the cosmos whilst at 
the same time being enfleshed in Jesus of Nazareth.(5)
Athanasius attempted to defend both the impassibility of 
the Word and the oneness of person in the incarnate 
Christ by drawing a sharp distinction between what could 
be predicated of the Word qua Word and what could be 
predicated of the Word qua the body which had been 
assumed. On this theory Christ performed miracles and 
healings by virtue of his divine power. He grew in 
knowledge, suffered and died by virtue of the flesh which 
the Word made his own. We can then rightfully speak of 
Jesus healing and performing miracles and the impassible
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Word suffering and dying for they are one person, 
provided we realise that a proper attribution of the 
properties will distinguish between what is appropriate 
to the Word as Word and what is appropriate to the Word 
through the flesh which it has made its own.
Athanasius outlines it in the following words:
"..Though he was God he had a body for his own
and using it as an instrument he had become man 
for our sakes. Thus it is that the properties of 
the flesh are said to be his,since he was in that 
flesh ; hunger, thirst,pain, weariness, and the 
like,to which the flesh is liable; while the 
works belonging to the Word himself(raising the 
dead,restoring sight to the blind,curing the 
woman's haemorrhage) he himself did through his 
own body,The Word 'bore the weakness of the 
flesh as his own;for the flesh was his flesh: 
the flesh assisted the works of the godhead,for
the godhead was in the flesh;the body was
God's ."(6)
This distinction between what belongs to the Word 
properly and what belongs to him by virtue of the flesh 
which he assumed is a hallmark of the Alexandrian 
approach to christology. It has distinctly docetic 
features and consequently it is always accused of doing 
less, than full justice to the humanity of Christ. Note 
that Athanasius constantly refers to the flesh which was 
assumed and never the man. It is a matter of debate 
whether or not this means that Athanasius attributed a 
rational soul to the person of Jesus. Certainly, as Canon
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Kelly has argued, it plays no part in his theological 
scheme . (7)
Apollinarius in his development of Athanasius* thought 
was to explicitly deny a rational soul in the person of 
Christ as he felt that not to do so resulted in a 
possible conflict of wills in the incarnate figure of 
Christ which he felt was untenable.(8) What is becoming 
increasingly clear is that Apollinarius, rather than 
being a wilful heresiarch, may just have been making 
explicit what was in fact implicit in Athanasius' 
christology. For although certain properties are amenable 
to the type of division of attribution that Athanasius 
envisages, others are not. Take,for example, Jesus' 
ignorance of certain issues as revealed in the gospels. 
Athanasius is forced to argue that the Word feigned 
ignorance, although the Word itself remained omniscient, 
because ignorance is appropriate to the flesh.(9)
Athanasius' manoeuvre here, reveals, that for him, the 
ultimate subject of thought and action in the incarnate 
figure of Christ is the Word. It is this insistence upon 
the priority of the Word, vital though it may be for 
maintaining the reality of the incarnation, which 
eventually leads to the doubts concerning the full and 
true humanity of Jesus of Nazareth under this scheme.
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As is well known the Apollinarian development of 
Alexandrian thought was checked by the Cappadocian 
insistence 'that what is not assumed is not healed.'(10) 
This insistence by Gregory of Nazianzus upon a rational 
soul,upon a complete and undiluted humanity in the 
incarnate Christ, was never subsequently gone back on, 
although it remained a feature of Alexandrian christology 
that no useful function could be assigned to it.
The next major development in Christological thought 
arose out of the dispute between Nestorius and Cyril of 
Alexandria. In this dispute Alexandrian christology 
reaches its apex in Cyril's notion of a hypostatic union 
in the incarnate figure of Christ. Nestorius representing 
an Antiochene tradition stretching back through Theodore 
of Mopsuestia to Diodore of Tarsus stressed the full and 
complete humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus was a man 
assumed by the Word through his gracious initiative or 
Eudokia Each nature, the human and the divine, was 
complete and entire in itself and they were not to be 
confused before or after the union. They were united in a 
single person or prosopon .(11)
The Antiochene stress upon the full humanity of Christ 
was in part a response to Apollinarius' diminution of the 
true and full humanity of Christ, but it was also
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conditioned by an unswerving belief in the impassibility 
of the divine nature. The Alexandrian scheme never lost 
the taint of Apollinarianism to the Antiochenes and its 
attribution of suffering to the impassible Word seemed a 
contradiction in terms. The Antiochene response to the
dilemma of the sufferings of Christ was to draw a sharp
distinction between the two natures. As such it was the
man assumed who suffered and died, grew in knowledge and
was tempted etc. The hypostatic union of Cyril seemed to 
involve the Word far too closely in the sufferings of the 
flesh for the fathers of Antioch.(12)
As is well known the issue came to a head over Nestorius* 
refusal to allow the term theotokos or God-bearer to be 
applied to Mary. In accord with his principle of 
distinguishing between the natures it made no sense to 
say that the Word had been born, it was the man Jesus who 
was born. Therefore Mary was not theotokos but rather 
should be designated christotokos or Christ-bearer.(13)
To Cyril and the Alexandrian school this sounded very 
much like a splitting asunder of the person of Christ 
into two distinct individuals and he repudiated it.In an 
early instance of the principle of communicatio 
idiomatum Cyril argued that it was appropriate to 
transfer attributes which belonged to the human nature to
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the divine nature and vice versa because of the unitary 
nature of the subject of the incarnation. The principle 
of the hypostatic union, wherein the person of the Word 
united himself personally to a human body, made such a 
sharing appropriate.
In Cyril's terminology the hypostasis of the Word meant 
the concrete instantiation of the divine ousia in the 
second person of the Trinity. The hypostatic union, 
therefore, was a union which took place personally or 
naturally in the Word. The Logos took to himself a human 
nature with a rational soul which found its hypostasis, 
its concrete instantiation, in the hypostasis of the 
Word.(14) The Alexandrian scheme tended to think not of 
two natures coming together but of two phases of the 
eternal existence of the Word - a phase prior to 
incarnation, and a phase in which the Word became 
enfleshed (ensarkos ) in a particular human life.
In contrast to this the Antiochene stress upon the 
complete humanity of the man assumed tended to lead them 
to deal with the problem from the perspective of 
attempting to show how two distinct natures could come 
together and yet retain their respective integrities.
Ultimately the difference is one of perspective. The 
Alexandrian insistence upon the hypostatic union is due '¥
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to their conviction that in the incarnation we have to do 
directly with the Word of God. To them the Antiochene 
idea of the assumption of an individual man seemed to 
threaten that fact. To the Antiochenes such a direct 
association of the Word with suffering humanity 
threatened the impassibility of the divine nature. To 
their credit the Antiochenes also saw that anything less 
than a complete and individual humanity threatened the 
completeness of our salvation.
Although Cyril triumphed in the early debates, and at the 
council of Ephesus in 431 A.D., it is clear that
Chalcedon represents a move back towards certain of the 
Antiochene concerns. This was due in no small measure to 
the influence of the Western theologians, who had, since 
the time of Tertullian, been used to acknowledging a 
duality of natures (substances) in Christ. Consequently, 
Chalcedon affirms that the two natures are to be clearly 
distinguished, yet, in favour of Alexandria, there is 
clearly only one person at the centre of the incarnate 
Christ, no division of the person is to be countenanced.
As intimated earlier the point of this discussion is not 
to give a detailed account of the early development of 
doctrine but to attempt to show that it is the logical 
difficulties which are being raised today which, in large
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measure, shaped the development of christological 
doctrine. How can God become man and remain God? What 
does it mean to say that a particular man can be the 
embodidment of God the Son and remain a man? How can two 
complete natures form one person? What does it mean to 
say that the eternal Word died? What involvement by God 
is necessary for our complete salvation? These questions 
undergird the christological disputes of the fourth and 
fifth centuries. Apart from the last they are remarkably 
similar to the logical questions which are being asked 
today. The answers given to these questions may not be 
our answers, but it is foolish to suggest that the 
fathers were unaware of the difficulties, or that they 
did not deal with them within their own framework of 
thought.
Chalcedon did not entirely settle the christological 
issue. Large parts of the church remained Nestorian and 
went off into schism eventually to be lost when Islam 
spread into Asia minor. Controversies raged on as to 
whether or not there was one or two wills 
(monothelite/dyothelite ) in the person of Christ. In 
part these disputes were due to the Alexandrian legacy 
contained in Chalcedon. This legacy, the doubt as to 
whether or not there is a hypostasis for the human 
nature has been termed the vacuum at the heart of
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Chalcedon by John McIntyre. (15)
There is no doubt that the concept of anhypostasia, 
implicit in Cyril's notion of an hypostatic union, has 
been the majority interpretation of Chalcedon. But this 
theory, wherein the Word assumes an impersonal humanity 
that has no independent existence apart from the Word, 
cannot fail but threaten the full humanity of Jesus of 
Nazareth. It was the inadequacy of the theory of 
anhypostasia which led to the development of the theory 
of enhypostasia by Leontius of Byzantium in the sixth 
century. The theory of enhypostasia does not say that the 
human nature of Christ did not have a hypostasis but 
that the human nature found its hypostasis in the 
hypostasis of the Word.(16)
It has been suggested by John McIntyre that Chalcedon, 
(and by implication both the theories of anhypostasia 
and enhypostasia ) , breaks the logical categories of 
Aristotelian philosophy. In Aristotle's discussion of 
primary substance (prote ousia) and secondary substance 
(deutera ousia) there can be no instantiation of 
secondary substance without a particular instantiation in 
a primary substance. In the terms of physis and 
hypostasis in which Chalcedon was framed,this means that
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there is no physis without a hypostasis , or no nature 
without a person. (17)
Despite this logical lacuna at the heart of Chalcedon the 
definition imposed a framework upon christological 
discussion which lasted until modern times. The mediaeval 
discussions of the subject although intricate in their 
own right, tended to repeat the pattern of the early 
fathers. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries we find 
that three theories of the incarnation were propounded.
The assumptus theory associated with Abelard maintained 
that the Logos assumed a complete man at the 
incarnation.This is essentially the Antiochene/Nestorian 
position represented.
The habitus theory which is attributed to Peter Lombard 
understands the incarnation after the old image of 
indwelling or the putting on of a garment. This idea has 
a long history and the analogy of a garment was a
favourite image of the Alexandrian school, but its fault
lies in a merely external assuming of humanity without a
real change in the person of the Logos. Indeed some 
proponents of this theory did argue that the Logos did 
not add anything substantial to himself in the
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incarnation. As such this theory veers towards a docetic 
interpretation of the humanity of Christ.
The subsistence theory is the theory associated with 
Thomas Aquinas. According to this theory the rational 
soul and body of Christ were taken on by the Logos and 
united by him. They have no concrete subsistence apart 
from the Logos.(18) Thomas here is expounding a version 
of the classical theory of enhypostasia . Thomas is of 
interest in that he shows a deep awareness of the 
difficulties that the theory might run into. The foremost 
difficulty is that he wishes to acknowledge a rational 
soul and body in the person of Jesus of Nazareth and this 
would seem to lead to the conclusion that, as the union 
of soul and body constitute a person, hypostasis or 
suppositum , we must then have two persons in the 
incarnate Christ, the person of the Word and the human 
person.(19) (For Thomas, person, hypostasis and
suppositum have very similar meanings. A person is a 
hypostasis of a particular type, namely, a hypostasis 
with a rational nature. Every person is a hypostasis but 
not every hypostasis is a person, A hypostasis is a 
particular instantiation of an abstract nature. A 
suppositum is a bearer of properties and as such is very 
close to the meaning of hypostasis .
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Thomas solves this dilemma by arguing that there is a
unique union in the case of the incarnation. The Word is
united to the human nature (body and soul) of the man
Jesus personally and hypostatically. Although this would 
normally suffice to produce two distinct persons it does 
not in this case for the body and soul of Christ are
united in the person of the Word.(20)
Thomas' theory, like its classical counterpart, argued 
that a separation of properties between what is proper to 
the Word qua Word and what is proper to the assumed 
human nature saves the doctrine from impugning the 
impassibility of the Word. Like its classical counterpart 
it seems to threaten the complete humanity of Jesus by 
arguing that the human nature only found its individual 
instantiation in the person of the Word. It also has the 
deficiency of arguing for a unique and distinctive use of 
the term person in this instance.The insistence on the 
'oneness of person' has become a shibboleth for 
christological theories, but its value has surely to be 
questioned when what is meant by the term 'person' is 
different from every other use to which the term is put,
A similar type of approach to the doctrine of the 
incarnation can be seen in the writings of William of 
Ockham. Ockham, like Aquinas, favoured the subsistence
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theory of the incarnation and sought to explicate it by 
distinguishing between the terms homo and humanités . In 
the case or individual humans such as Socrates or Plato, 
or you and me for that matter, homo and humanitas
represent precisely the same thing. However, in the case 
of the hypostatic union they refer to distinct 
entities.(21)
In the case of the incarnation, homo refers to the
substance of the Son of God as a divine person; humanitas 
refers to the human nature which is carried by the
divine person. As Alistair McGrath writes of Ockham's 
theory, within the context of the hypostatic union-
and in no other context - homo refers to the substance, 
and humanitas to the form,of the humanity of the word 
incarnate."(22) Again we return to the idea that within 
the unique and specific context of the hypostatic union 
the human nature of the man Jesus has no independent 
existence outside of the union with the Word.
Although this account is far from being exhaustive it 
does indicate the main lines of development of
christological theory. It would be true to say that the 
Reformers accepted the classical development as given and 
did not themselves dwell upon the nature of the person of 
Christ in any great depth. However, the principle of the
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communicatio idiomatum was transferred from its early 
christological application into the discussions of the 
real presence in the Eucharist. The Lutheran principle of 
ubiquity demanded that there be a real participation in 
attributes between the divine and human natures. The 
extra Calvinisticum of the Reformed tradition argued that 
the finite could not be contained in the infinite and 
therefore although the principle of communicatio 
idiomatum was a valid turn of speech it did not describe 
a real transference or sharing of attributes.
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Footnotes to Chapter One
(1) There is a surfeit of literature outlining the 
difficulties facing the contemporary articulation of 
christology. For a representative sample see CHRIST, 
FAITH AND HISTORY (Ed) S.W.Sykes & J.P.Clayton Cambridge 
University Press 1972; J.P.Mackey JESUS THE MAN AND THE 
MYTH SCM Press 1979; GOD INCARNATE STORY AND BELIEF 
(Ed) A.E.Harvey SPCK 1981. From a more positive 
perspective see W.Pannenberg JESUS GOD AND MAN (E.T.) SCM 
Press 1968; P .Schoonenberg THE CHRIST (E.T.) Sheed & 
Ward 1 972; E . Schillebeeckx JESUS (E.T.) Collins/Fount 
1983. All of these works deal with the question of the New 
Testament evidence for classical christology. The 
possibility or impossibility of a classical christology, 
that is to say a christology dominated by Greek- 
Metaphysics,for today. They also seek to address what 
might be termed the post-enlightenment questions of 
finality, uniquness and the rationalistic refusal to allow 
divine interventions in the causal nexus of world history. 
That these questions continue to dominate the question of 
christology can be seen from their treatment in the recent 
work of J.MacQuarrie JESUS CHRIST IN MODERN THOUGHT SCM 
Press 1 990 see also J.Moltmann THE WAY OF JESUS CHRIST
(E.T.) SCM 1 990 for a rejection of the classical
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categories of christology in favour of a biblical and 
narrative christology.
(2) THE MYTH OF GOD INCARNATE (Ed) J.Hick SCM Press 
1977 Hereafter referred to as M .G .I For a pertinent
review of the issues involved here see G.M.Newlands "On 
the Myth of God Incarnate" p.1B0-192 in NEW STUDIES IN 
THEOLOGY 1 (Ed) S.Sykes & D.Holmes Duckworth 1980
(3) A.Harnack expresses his thesis of the "Hellénisation" 
of the original gospel message in WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY 
(E.T.)Harper & Brothers 1957 p.199-215 He writes, "The 
identification of the Logos with Christ was the 
determining factor in the fusion of Greek philosophy with 
the apostolic inheritance and led the more thoughtful 
Greeks to adopt the latter. Most of us regard this 
identification as inadmissible, because the way in which 
we conceive the world and ethics does not point to the 
existence of any logos at all." Again "The proposition 
that the Logos had appeared among men had an intoxicating 
effect, but the enthusiasm and transport which it produced 
in the soul did not lead with any certainty to the God 
whom Jesus proclaimed."of his HISTORY OF DOGMA (E.T.) 
Vols 3-5 Williams & Norgate 1898. Also D.F.Strauss in 
THE LIFE OF JESUS CRITICALLY EXAMINED (E.T.) Fortress 
Press 1 972 In this work Strauss utilised the concept of
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myth to interpret the N.T. "With respect to our own 
opinion... we are prepared to meet with both legend and 
mythus in the gospel history;.."p.63 Strauss also
anticipated the contemporary rejection of an absolute and 
final christology in any idealised sense "This is indeed 
not the mode in which Idea realises itself; it is not 
wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar,... it 
rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity 
of exemplars which reciprocally complete each 
other.."p.779/780 For E .Troeltsch's discussion of the 
issues of absolutism and relativism see THE ABSOLUTENESS 
OF CHRISTIANITY (E.T.) SCM Press 1972
(4) The idea of a 'functional' christology is developed by 
Oscar Cullmann in his THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT (E.T.) SCM 1 977 p.3f "When it is asked in 
the N.T. 'Who is Christ?' the question never remains 
exclusively, or even primarily,'What is his nature but 
first of all,What is his function?" Cullmann argues that 
the biblical writers primarily thought in terms of 
Christ's role in salvation history rather than dwelling 
upon his person or nature which was a Greek concern. He 
acknowledges however, that the titles used in the N.T. 
raise the question of the relationship between God and the 
origin and person of Jesus Christ. R.H.Fuller in NEW 
TESTAMENT CHRISTOLOGY Collins/Fount 1979 p.247/248
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agrees that many of the N.T. titles are functional in 
nature, stressing what Christ is doing or will do as 
Israel's eschatological ruler.The predominately Gentile 
mission advanced beyond this to make ontic statements 
about Christ, but this need not be an illegitimate move as 
action implies being and therefore 'functional' titles 
demand ontological clarification. See J.P.Mackey op cit 
p.214 who argues that the distinction between function and 
nature is overstressed arguing that 'Nature' is as 
functional a word as any used of Jesus in the New 
Testament. See also J. A.T.Robinson THE HUMAN FACE OF GOD
SCM Press 1973 p.183f for a contrast between
'mythological',ontological' and 'functional' ways of 
speaking about Christ. Robinson argues that functional 
language is an equally serious way of asserting identity 
as ontological and mythological language,
(5) F.Young "A Cloud of Witnesses" M .G .I . p.22-23
(6) D.Cupitt "Stanton on Incarnational Language" 
INCARNATION AND MYTH;THE DEBATE CONTINUED (Ed)M .Goulder 
SCM Press 1 979 p.167
(7) G.Stanton "Cupitt on Incarnational Language" ibid 
p.170
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(a) M,Goulder (Ed) op cit This volume is a response
to the original M.G.I. debate involving the original 
contributors in discussion with commentators more 
sympathetic to the classical doctrine,
(9) The diversity of opinions that exist on the 
interpretation of the christology of the N.T. is vast and 
makes it exceedingly difficult for the non-specialist to 
arrive at an estimation of what the N.T. may reasonably be 
held to say about Jesus Christ.For example,C.F.D.Moule in 
his THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY Cambridge University Press 
1977 p.4-9f argues that a 'high' christology can be
detected from the earliest strata of tradition and that 
such a christology is historically true of Jesus 
himself.Moule feels that the appoaches of Cullmann and 
Fuller already cited support his approach. A more nuanced 
estimate of the N.T.evidence can be found in the work of 
J.D.G.Dunn especially his CHRISTOLOGY IN THE MAKING SCM 
Press I960 p.254f Dunn argues that first century
expressions of christology were appropriate reflections on 
Jesus' sense of sonship and eschatological mission.p.255 
Dunn argues that there is not a full-blown incarnational 
christology in the writings of Paul who offers a second 
Adam christology (he doubts if Paul teaches the pre- 
existence of Christ p.114-117) p.256-258 Dunn proceeds to 
argue that an incarnational christology is only achieved
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at the very end of the first century with the emergence of 
a Logos christology, cf.W.G.Kummel THEOLOGY OF THE NEW 
TEST AMENT (E.T.) SCM Press p.169 Kummel argues that Paul 
does teach the pre-existence of Christ. See also 
I.H.Marshall PESOS THE SAVIOUR SPCK 1 990 p.169 where 
Marshall specifically takes issue with Dunn's reading of 
Philippians 2:6-11 and argues that Paul clearly believed 
in Christ's pre-existence. Marshall goes so far as to say 
that the concept of incarnation is the principal 
christological explanation of the N.T. p.175 The non­
specialist's dilemma in knowing how to interpet the N.T. 
picture of Christ is increased by recent studies of Jesus 
which place him firmly within the socio-cultural milieu of 
first century Palestine. See G.Vermes JESUS THE JEW 
Fontana 1981 p.223f which clearly places Jesus within
the tradition of Galilean prophetic 'holy' men. Another 
recent work which places Jesus decisively within the 
Jewish setting, particularly Jewish 'restoration 
Bschatology', is E.Sanders JESUS AND JUDAISM SCM
Press 1 985 p.335f. The clear implication of both
these works is that the later ontological development of 
the person of Christ are alien to Jesus' own Jewish self- 
understanding and also unnecessary once the Jewish setting 
of Jesus's teaching is understood.
(10) W.Pannenberg op cit p.335
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(11) D.Brown THE DIVINE TRINITY Duckworth 1 985 p.147
(12) D.Brown ibid p.146f
(13) D.Cupitt "The Finality of Christ" THEOLOGY 78 
1976 see also "Jesus and the Meaning of God" in 
M.Goulder (Ed) op cit p.31-40 for a fuller treatment 
of the logical difficutlies of the incarnation, cf. J.Hick (f:
GOD AND THE UNIVERSE OF FAITHS Fontana 1977
(14) D.Cupitt "The Finality of Christ" p.625
(15) J.Hick "Jesus and the World Religions" M.G.I 
p.1 78
(16) N.Lash "Jesus and the Meaning of 'God' - A 
Comment" M.Goulder (Ed) op cit p.41
(17) For a contemporary analysis of the theory of identity 
statements see T.V.Morris UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY
ST ATEMENTS Aberdeen University Press 1 984 also
D.Wiggins SAMENESS AND SUBSTANCE Blackwell 1 980 p.21 
Wiggins makes the self-evident point, "How if a is b could 
there be something true of the object a which was untrue 
of b. After all, they are the same object?" In a similar 
vein Richard Cartwright has argued that the principle of
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identity is a self-evident truth in "Identity and 
Substitutivity" PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press 1 987 p.133. For an 
outline of the relative identity thesis where to say that 
'a' is identical to ' b ' has to be expanded into the 
expression 'a' is the same F as 'b ' where F is some sortal 
kind term. On this theory 'a' and ' b ' are identical with 
respect to F but may differ with respect to some property 
G. see P.T. Geach LOGIC MATTERS Blackwell 1972 p.238ff
This thesis holds that there is no such thing as absolute 
identity between two objects. Objects are identical with 
respect to a particular property and may not be identical 
with respect to another property. The relative identity 
thesis therefore rejects the principle of indiscernibility 
of identicals and the principle of substitutivity which 
belong to strict identity theories. Wiggins op cit has 
rejected the thesis of relative identity as it violates 
the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals which 
is the majority position of most contemporary philosphers.
(IB) To see how the thesis of relative identity can be 
used to defend the doctrine of the Trinity see 
A.P.Martinch "Identity and Trinity" JOURNAL OF RELIGION 
58 April 1978 p.169f Martinch argues that the doctrine
of the Trinity can be saved from logical contradiction by 
the thesis of relative identity by asserting that The Son
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is the same God as the Father but not the same person. Cf 
R .Cartwright "On the Logical Problem of the Trinity" op 
cit p.187f for a response to this argument.
Interestingly, T.V.Morris in THE LOGIC OF GOD INCARNATE 
Cornell University Press 1 986 p.29 suggests that the 
denial of the principle of indiscernibility is too high a 
price to pay to save the doctrine of the Trinity, or by 
implication the incarnation, from the charge of 
incoherence. He argues that the only reason for denying 
the principle of indiscernibility in the case of the 
incarnation is to allow that there are certain properties 
which Jesus had which God the Son lacked. Such a move he 
argues would be vulnerable to Cyril of Alexandria's attack 
upon Nestorians for dividing the person of God incarnate. 
It is interesting to note for the further development of 
the argument in this chapter that Morris clearly states 
that it was the view of Cyril which became recognised as 
orthodoxy at Chalcedon. THE LOGIC OF GOD INCARNATE will 
hereafter be referred to as L.G.I.
(19) M .Wiles & H.McCabe "The Incarnation : An Exchange" 
NEW BLACKFRIARS 58 December 1977 p.543f
(20) A.D.Smith "God's Death" THEOLOGY July 1977
p.262-268
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(21) A .D .Smith ibid p.264
(22) A.D.Smith ibid p.264
(23) A .D ,Smith ibid p.265
(24) A.D.Smith ibid p.267
(25) A.D.Smith ibid p.267
(26) B .Hebblethwaite "Incarnation - The Essence of 
Christianity" THEOLOGY March 1977 p.86
(27) T.V.Morris L.G.I op cit See also the
author's treatment of the logic of incarnation in 
UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY STATEMENTS op cit and
ANSELMIAN EXPLORATIONS University of Notre Dame Press
1987 and in "The Metaphysics of God Incarnate" in 
INCARNATION, TRINITY AND ATONEMENT (Ed) R.O.Feenstra & 
C.Plantings Onr. University of Notre Dame Press 19B9
(28) T.V.Morris L.G.I p.20 Morris takes as one
of his principal opponents Don Cupitt unaware that 
subsequent to the 'Myth' debate Cupitt expressed 
reservations as to whether or not the doctrine of the 
incarnation could be said to maintain a logical
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contradiction, cf. D.Cupitt THE DEBATE ABOUT CHRIST
SCM Press 1979 p.25-26
(29) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.39
(30) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.40
(31) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.40-45
(32) T.V.Morris L.G.I p.42
(33) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.65-66
(34) K.Barth CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol. IV part 1 (E.T)
T & T Clark 1 956 Hereafter referred to as C.D. p.16 
Barth argues that "...This means that all the concepts and 
ideas used in this report(God,man,world,eternity,time .... ) 
can derive their significance only from the bearer of this 
name and from His history and not the reverse.They cannot 
have any independent importance or role based on a quite
different prior interpretation They can serve only to
describe this name - the name of Jesus Christ" For
Barth's argument that the covenant, which is God's
decision to be man for us in the person of his Son, is
the internal basis, or necessary presupposition, of 
creation see K.Barth C.D. Vol. 3 part 1 p.230 Here
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Barth argues that human existence is not accidental or 
contingent but was essential in that it realises the plan 
and purpose of God to be God for us and with us. It is 
interesting that a contemporary work of rational 
philosophical theology should mirror at so many points 
Barth's monumental dogmatic construction.
(35) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.65
(36) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.66
(37) K.Barth C.D. Vol. 3 part 2 p.225-226
Barth states "When we ask: What is humanity, human
creatureliness? we must first ask: What is it basic form? 
In other words, to what extent does human essence 
correspond to the determination of man to be the covenant 
partner of God? Our criterion in answering this question 
is the humanity of the man Jesus,"
(38) S.Kripke "Identity and Necessity" in PHILOSOPHY AS 
IT 15 (Ed) T.Honderich & M.Burnyeat Pelican 1979
p.495f In a difficult and technical essay Kripke 
separates the traditionally associated concepts of 
necessity and the related notions of a priori and
analyticity. He argues that that there are certain truths 
which we can only discover a posteriori but which
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nevertheless are necessary truths. For example, the 
discovery that Hespherous is Phosphorous is obviously a 
truth which can only be known from experience. Yet once it 
is known it is undoubtedly a necessary truth about 
Hespherous and Phosphorous. Similarly, a person's natural 
origins are such that they can only be known after the 
fact. However, once they are known they constitute the 
necessary truth about that person that he had that manner 
of origin and no other.
(39) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.69-69 John Hick
responds directly to Morris in his article "The Logic of 
God Incarnate" RELIGIOUS STUDIES 25 p.413f Hick
argues that all that is required to counter the difficulty 
that Morris raises is that our definition of humanity 
should read 'being Adam or Eve or a descendant of Adam or 
Eve'.
(40) T.V.Morris L.G.I p.69
(41) J.Hick "The Logic of God Incarnate" op .cit p.413 
Hick pertinently asks, if an orthodox christology requires 
Morris' admittedly optional intuition at this point, is it 
not weakened rather than strengthened?
Page 336 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
■ • ■< -A#
Footnotes to Chapter One
(42) O.Knox THE HUMANITY AND DIVINITY OF CHRIST
Cambridge University Press 1982 p.67-68
(43) 0.A.T.Robinson op cit p.41 Note also that
J.Hick "The Logic of God Incarnate" op cit p.412 agrees 
with Knox and Robinson that sharing in the biological pool 
of humanity is a necessary criterion for being human.
(44) J.Hick ibid p .41 4
(45) J.Hick ibid p.41 4
(46) J.Hick ibid p.414-415
(47) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p . 70
(48) For the distinctively British development of Kenotic 
theories see C.Gore THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD
Murray 1891 p.159-161; P.T.Forsyth THE PERSON AND PLACE
OF JESUS CHRIST Independent Press 1961 p.291f;
H.R.Mackintosh THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST T & T Clark 
1912 p.463f
(49) For a contemporary philosophical defence of kenotic 
theories of the incarnation see D.Broun op cit p.245f
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also R.O.Feenstra "Reconsidering Kenotic Christology" in 
(Ed) R.O.Feenstra & C.Plantings p.12Bf
(50) That contemporary defences of kenoticism often
revolve around the vexed issue as whether or not 
omniscience is an essential or relative attribute of God 
see S.T,Davies LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF GOD Macmillan 
Press 1 983 p.125f also R.O.Feenstra op cit p.140-
141. Both argue that althouh omniscience may be an 
essential attribute of God it is somehow possible for the 
Son of God to freely divest himself of that attribute 
and yet remain divine. I remain unconvinced by the lack of 
anything other than sheer assertion that this is a valid 
or even meaningful statement.
(51) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.71
(52) D.M.Baillie GOD WAS IN CHRIST Faber & Faber
1948 p.95
(53) W.Pannenberg op cit p.311
(54) The "two-consciousness" strategy for interpreting the 
person of Christ is utilised by B .Hebblethwaite "The Moral 
and Religious Value of the Incarnation" (Ed)M .Goulder 
p.90 and also by K.Rahner in FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN
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FAITH (E.T.) Darton, Longman & Todd 1978 p.224f. Earlier 
this century a Freudian version was suggested by UJ.Sanday 
CHRISTOLOGIES ANCIENT AND MODERN Oxford University Press 
1910.H.R. Mackintosh op cit p.470 rejected this
theory of a double consciousness in Christ as did 
P.T.Forsyth op cit p.319. For a modern response to
Rahner and Hebblethwaite see A.T.Hanson "Two- 
Consciousnesses: The Modern Version of Chalcedon" THE
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol. 37 no 4 1984 p.471f
(55) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.102
(56) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.103
(57) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.148
(58) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.149
(59) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.150
(60) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.154
(61) T.V.Moriss L.G.I. p.157
(62) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.158
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(63) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.161-162
(64) T.V.Morris "The Metaphysics of God Incarnate" op 
cit p.126
(65) T.V.Morris ibid p.126
(66) T.V.Morris ibid p.125
(67) 3.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRI5T0LDGY SCM Press 
p.137f McIntyre (arguing against the 'two-minds' theory 
of E.L.Mascall) makes a similar point to the one being 
made here, "...if it is assumed that the divine person 
is the subject of knowledge of both the divine mind and 
the human mind, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that he both knows and does not know the same fact at the 
same time." (With Mackintosh, Forsyth, Baillie and 
McIntyre all rejecting a 'two-consciousness' theory of 
Christ one can almost speak of a twentieth century 
Scottish tradition of rejecting this particular approach.)
(68) 3.Hick "The Logic of God Incarnate" op cit p.423
(69) 3.McIntyre charges Morris with advocating a 
Nestorian account of the person of Christ(unless Morris 
explicitly embraces a theory of enhypostasia ) in a review
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of Morris' AN5ELMIAN EXPLORATIONS in THE SCOTTISH
JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY No 4 March 1990 p.601
Interestingly, given the similarities between Morris' and 
Barth's theories already noted, a recent monograph by
C.T.Waldrop on KARL BARTH'S CHRISTOLDGY : Its Basic
Alexandrian Character Mouton Publishers 1 984 p.7f
takes as one of its interpretative strands the differing 
readings of Barth offered by John McIntyre and Claude 
Welch. Waldrop suggests that McIntyre reads Barth as 
'Antiochene',even Nestorian, in character whereas Welch 
reads Barth as Alexandrian in character. It is no part of 
this thesis to enter into this debate save to note that 
the ambiguity found at the heart of Morris' christology 
would also seem to apply to that of Barth leading to 
these conflicting readings of their christologies. This 
continuing ambiguity can only reinforce my suggestion that 
it is exceedingly difficult for a contemporary scholar to 
maintain a consistent Alexandrian position, despite the 
best intentions, given the modern understanding of the 
person as an individual centre of consciousness,will and 
activity.
(70) R.Swinburne "Could God Become Man" THE PHILOSOPHY 
IN CHRISTIANITY (Ed) G.Vesey Cambridge University
Press 1989
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(71) R.Swinburne ibid p.59-61
(72) R.Swinburne ibid p.59 see also p.54
(73) R.Swinburne ibid p.60-61
(74) R.Swinburne ibid p.61
(75) R,Swinburne ibid p.55f
(76) D.Brown op cit p.261
(77) D.Brown ibid p.263
(78) D.Brown ibid p .264
(79) D.Brown ibid p .264
(80) D.Brown ibid p.264
(81) D.Brown ibid p.265
(82) D.Brown ibid p.265-266
(83) D,Brown ibid p.266
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(84) D.Broun ibid p.266
(85) D.Broun ibid p.230
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(1) 3.Hick "3esus and the World Religions" M.G.I. op 
cit p.177
(2) 3.Hick ibid p.170
(3) T.F.Torrance SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION Oxford 
University Press 1969 p.1-2
(4) N.Lash "Interpretation and Imagination" M.G.I. 
p.23 Lash cites the interesting observation of Bernard 
Lonergan that the term "substance" was transferred into 
Christological discourse by a process of metaphorical 
transference.
(5) P.Ricoeur THE RULE OF METAPHOR (E.T.), (Trs) 
R.Czerny, University of Toronto Press 1977 Hereafter
referred to as T.R.M.
(6) G.Vico THE NEW SCIENCE (E.T.) ,(Trs) T.G.Bergin
& M.H.Fisch, Cornell University Press 1 948 p.118
(7) F.Neitzsche "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral
Sense" THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE (E.T.), (Trs) W.Kaufmann, 
The Viking Press 1969 p.47
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(B) H.Gadamer TRUTH AND METHOD Sheed and Ward 1981 
p.388f
(9) Aristotle (Poetics chapter 21) in ON THE ART OF 
POETRY , CLASSICAL LITERARY CRITICISM (Trs) T.S.Dorsch, 
Penguin 1965
(10) Aristotle Rhetoric (1111,1406b) (Trs) lii. R . Roberts , 
Vol XI of WORKS ,(Ed) W.D.Ross, Oxford University Press 
1 924
(11) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.46 Ricoeur's study of 
metaphor is massive and difficult to summarise. I do not 
intend to enter deeply into the 'in house* debate* 
between his theory of metaphor and those of 
I.A.Richards,Max Black, Nelson Goodman etc.,save where an 
important point of difference is to be found. All hold to 
the basic notion that metaphor is an indispensable 
cognitive tool that cannot be literally paraphrased 
without a consequent cognitive loss. In a similar fashion 
both 3anet Soskice in METAPHOR AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
Clarendon Press 1985 p.88/89, and Elizabeth Kittay 
METAPHOR- ITS COGNITIVE FORCE AND LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 
Clarendon Press 1987 p.303-311, agree that metaphor is a 
vital cognitive tool but differ from Ricoeur on the 
question of whether we can therefore speak of a separate
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metaphorical reference. For the purposes of this chapter 
this group can be taken as a ’broad church’ holding 
similar enough views to be taken together.
(12) P.Ricoeur T.R.M . p.78f
(13) I.A.Richards THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC Oxford 
University Press 1936 p.lOOf
(14) M . Black "More About Metaphor" METAPHOR AND
THOUGHT (Ed) A.Ortony, Cambridge University Press 1979
p.28
(15) 3.Soskice op cit p.46/47 Soskice is right to
point out that the idea that there is always a 
’principal' subject and 'subsidiary' subject in a 
metaphor is only true of simple 'A' is a 'B ' type 
metaphors. She cites the example of 'a writhing script' 
as an obvious metaphor which does not have two subjects. 
Whilst agreeing with this ,(one might cite 'Eternal 
Generation' as another example),the point is overstated 
as she herself concedes that there are always two or more 
networks of associations in the metaphorical 
process.(p.49f) Soskice also overstates her criticism of 
both Ricoeur and Black when she rejects the idea that the 
sentence is the primary unity of discourse.(p.21) Her
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insistence that a larger context of meaning is sometimes 
required to decide whether or not a particular phrase is 
metaphorical -she offers the example 'that is a cold coal 
to blow at'- does seem to ignore the fact that 
Ricoeur,at least, does place the event of metaphorical 
predication within the larger framework of the meaning 
offered by a narrative text.
(16) 3.Soskice ibid p.2D
(17) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p .21f
(18) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.27
(19) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.74
(20) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.78f In order to support
this idea of the polysemy of words Ricoeur draws 
attention to the difficulty of translation. Translating 
is not just the replacing of a word in another language 
by a word in your own language. The translator has to 
attempt to find an identical constellation of meaning to 
the original work so that each word in his translation is 
influenced and acted upon in the way that the original 
words influence and interact with one another. This task 
will involve the translator in a creative process which
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is almost as original as the creative moment of the first 
work.
(21) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.217-220
(22) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.219
(23) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.220
(24) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.220
(25) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.221
(26) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination and Feeling" ON METAPHOR (Ed) 5,Sacks, 
University of Chicago Press 1979 p.150
(27) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination and Feeling" ibid p.151
(28) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination and Feeling" ibid p.154
(29) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition,
Imagination and Feeling" ibid p.152
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(30) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.255
(31) cited in K .3.Vanhoozer BIBLICAL NARRATIVE IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR Cambridge University Press 
1990 p.70
(32) K .3.Vanhoozer ibid p.71
(33) W.V.O.Quine "A Postscript on Metaphor" ON METAPHOR 
(Ed) S.Sacks op cit p.159-160 Quine argues that metaphor 
flourishes in poetic art but is also vital at the growing 
edges of science and philosophy.lt also governs both our 
acquisition of language and the growth of language and 
therefore it is a mistake to see our language as 
primarily literal and only metaphorical at the edges. 
However, cognitive discourse attempts to explicate the 
mystery of metaphor by clearing away the 'tropical 
jungle' of metaphorical predication,
(34) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.295
(35) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.296
(36) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.300
(37) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.303
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( 3 8 ) P .R i c o e u r T . R . M . p.31 3
(39) D.Davidson "What Metaphors Mean" ON METAPHOR
(Ed) S. Sacks op cit p.29
(40) D.Davidson ibid p . 31
(41) D.Davidson ibid p.39
(42) D.Davidson ibid p.43
(43) As previously stated both Soskice op cit p.93f, 
and Kittay op cit p.325f, argue for metaphor’s ability 
to convey cognitive information. Both locate this 
cognitive ability within the multiplicity of
interpretations that every lively metaphor offers. As 
there are no other linguistic tools to carry out this 
task metaphors are cognitively irreplaceable. However, 
at least some explication of the metaphor is necessary if 
we are to speak of a genuine cognitive gain achieved 
through metaphorical predication.
(44) 3.Soskice op cit p.95
(45) D.Cooper METAPHOR Basil Blackwell 1986 p.229
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(46) D.Cooper ibid p.95
(47) Ian Ramsey's debt to the work of Max Black is 
readily acknowledged in MODELS AND MYSTERY Oxford
University Press 1964 p.ix. Ramsey makes particular use 
of Black’s account of analogue models which he 
redesignates ’disclosure’ models, p.10.
(48) M, Black
(49) M . Black
(50) M.Black
(51) M.Black
"More About Metaphor" op cit p.29-30
ibid
ibid
ibid
p . 31
p.29
p.40
(52) The influence of Black’s theory on Ian Ramsey’s 
theory of models has already been noted. However, it is 
worth pointing out that Ramsey explicitly links 
’disclosure’ models with metaphors. op cit (p.48) 
’Disclosure’ models and metaphors are born in moments of 
insight when the universe reveals itself to us in a 
particular way. (p.50) The function of such models and 
metaphors is to enable us to be articulate about some 
mystery which previously eluded our description. However, 
this articulation is not a straightforward picturing or
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copying.(p .53) Such models and metaphors are not 
incidental to scientific investigation but play a crucial 
role in its development.(p.50) Although metaphors and 
models arise in moments of insight and imagination there 
is a certain ontological and objective reference which 
they help to disclose.(p.58)
John McIntyre in THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY op cit 
developed Ramsey’s insights in a way which prefigures 
much of what I have attempted to do here with theory- 
constitutive metaphors. Of particular interest is the way 
McIntyre develops the descriptive, normative, and 
integrative function of models. (p.67-74) Similarly 
McIntyre's discussion of the criteria governing the use 
of models accords with much of what I have said 
concerning root-metaphors of the New Testament and in 
particular the role of Scripture in the experience of the 
Christian community and its practice of the Christian 
narratives in its ’pedagogy of discipleship.’(P .78-81) 
Although I have refrained from offering an explicit 
discussion of metaphor and analogy I would agree with 
McIntyre that the theory of models(and by extension 
theory-constitutive metaphors) is a modern presentation 
of the traditional doctrine of analogy.(p.65) Much of the 
discussion of metaphorical predication subsumes topics 
which were once treated under the problem of analogical
Page 352 The Logic and Language of the Incarnation
Footnotes to Chapter Two
language. This point becomes obvious if one agrees with 
McIntyre when he says that in every analogy there is a 
negative as well as a positive pole, an 'is and is not' 
aspect.(p.66) To show the closeness of McIntyre's 
treatment of models and analogy to the account offered 
here of irreplaceable metaphors I quote, "...at no point 
is it quite possible to extract the positive analogy and 
to state it in a non-analogical way, the end product is 
such a two-dimensional superficial account that it cannot 
compete with the analogy even as a
description..........This difficulty, namely of
transcending the model,the metaphor, or the analogy, 
prevents us from ever assuming that we have exhaustively 
described or defined the mystery of the Word made flesh. 
We never grasp it in the immediacy of non-analogical 
language."(p.67)
(53) R.Boyd "Metaphor and Theory Change ; What is 
Metaphor a Metaphor for?" METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Ed) 
A.Ortony op cit p.356f Boyd's theory has decisively 
influenced the treatment of metaphor offered by Soskice 
op cit p133f, and more recently Colin Gunton's
treatment of metaphor in THE ACTUALITY OF ATONEMENT : A 
Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian 
Tradition, T & T Clark 1988 p.45f
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(54) R.Boyd ibid p.356
(55) R.Boyd ibid p.357 It is interesting that 
Boyd’s assertion that metaphors develop and articulate 
theories in mature research programmes although we are 
typically unable to specify exactly what the relevant 
similarities and analogies are, corresponds closely to 
Ramsey's argument that models articulate insights 
without in any way presenting a naive copy or picture of 
the referent described. Ramsey op cit (p.10-12) 
Similarly, there is a striking parallel between Boyd's 
argument that the function of theory-constitutive 
metaphors is to develop terminologies which 'accommodate 
our language to the causal structures of the world so 
that they cut the world at its joints' and Ramsey's 
insistence that the model must chime in with and echo the 
universe in some way. Ramsey op cit (p.15)
(56) R.Boyd ibid p.357
(57) R.Boyd ibid p.358
(58) Cited in 3.Soskice op cit p.127
(59) R.Boyd op cit p.358
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(60) R.Boyd ibid p.358
(61) R.Boyd ibid p.358
(62) R.Boyd ibid p.362
(63) R.Boyd ibid p.366
(64) R.Boyd ibid p.361
(65) E.Ouengel "Metaphorical Truth : Reflections on the 
theological relevance of Metaphor as a contribution to 
the hermeneutics of narrative theology" THEOLOGICAL 
E5SAYS (E.T.) (Trs) O.B.Webster, T & T Clark 1989 
p.58-60 Ouengel's account of metaphor is very similar to 
that offered by Ricoeur. He rejects the classical 
correspondence theory of truth as this can only say what 
is actual. But truth must include the element of 
possibility as well as actuality for in God’s coming to 
the world in Jesus Christ we must say what is more than 
actual. Unlike Ricoeur he offers a criterion for 
distinguishing between valid and invalid theological 
metaphors. "Thus the cross of Jesus Christ is the ground 
and measure of the formation of metaphors which are 
appropriate to God. Every theological metaphor must be 
compatible with the cross of Jesus Christ.(p.65)
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(66) S.McFague METAPHORICAL THEOLOGY SCM 1982
p.108/109 McFague is another scholar who has been
deeply influenced by Ricoeur's theory of metaphor.
(67) D.Tracy "Metaphor and Religion: The Test Case of 
Christian Texts" ON METAPHOR (Ed) S. Sacks op cit p.99
(68) S.McFague op cit p.51 McFague writes that 
"Metaphorical statements are never identity 
statements; hence idolatry, "Jesusolatory" , is avoided, 
and while we look through the story of Jesus to gain an 
understanding of what it means to live under God's rule, 
we cannot make the illegitimate move of identifying Jesus 
with God" McFague here is stressing the negative rather 
than the positive aspect of metaphors,the'is not' rather 
than the 'is'. One must ask if sufficient attention has 
been paid to the cumulative effect of the New Testament 
metaphors. For they do not just ask that we look Godward 
through Jesus, but assert that God has come to us in 
Jesus. Certainly a thesis based on theory-constitutive 
metaphors would question whether McFague can extract the 
positive aspect of her theory from the parables of Jesus 
if she discards the central core that God is decisively 
present in the activity and life of Jesus. The conceptual 
articulation of this insight in the later creeds and 
dogmas of the church are attempts to explore the
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implications of the basic conviction that God was in 
Christ. Although the work of interpretation is not 
committed to the precise language and concepts used in 
the credal statements, it is committed, if it is 
controlled and guided by the suggestiveness of the root- 
metaphor of incarnation which is at the heart of 
Scripture, to explicating the cognitive claim involved 
in God's presence in Christ, cf Surin op cit below p.99- 
100
(69) E.Sanders JESUS AND JUDAISM SCM 1 985 Although 
Sanders places Jesus firmly within Jewish 'restoration' 
theology he does acknowledge that Jesus associated 
himself and his ministry extremely closely with the 
coming of that Kingdom and the subsequent rule of God to 
the extent that he foresaw a place for himself and his 
followers in the coming Kingdom p.155f & p.234f. However, 
Sanders doubts that this feeling was unique to Jesus as 
other eschatological prophets probably also associated 
themselves with the will and activity of God. Whilst this 
may be true, it is nevertheless the case that, after the 
impact of the resurrection,(which Sanders does not 
consider) the earliest Christian community was compelled 
to clarify precisely what this identification between the 
will and activity of God and the person of Jesus Christ 
involved.
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(70) E .O u e n g e l " M e t a p h o r i c a l  Truth" op c i t p .67
(71) E.Ouengel ibid p.67
(72) K.Surin "Some aspects of the 'grammar* of
'incarnation' and 'kenosis' CHRIST, ETHICS AND TRAGEDY
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DONALD MACKINNON
University Press 1989
Cambridge
(73) K.Surin ibid p.97
(74) K.Surin ibid p.99 Surin acknowledges that
opponents of incarnational doctrine will oppose this 
proposal of pragmatic presuppositions undergirding 
international discourse. Nevertheless he insists that it 
is proper for the international theologian to assume them 
in order that christological discourse can be properly 
transacted.
(75) K.Surin ibid p.99
(76) K.Surin ibid p.99
(77) K.Surin ibid p.100
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(78) In support of my thesis that the concept of 
incarnation once formed became a theory-constitutive 
metaphor that dominated and controlled the suggestions 
offered by other New Testament metaphors I cite the 
following passage from O.D.G.Dunn CHRISTOLOGY IN THE 
MAKING SCM 1980 p,249f "It is lasting testimony to the 
inspired genius of the Fourth Evangelist that he brought 
together the Logos poem and the Father-Son christology in 
such a definitive way. Without the Fourth Gospel all the 
other assertions we have been looking at would have been 
resolvable [my emphasis] into more modest assertions. Of 
the canonical literature it is pre-eminently the Fourth 
Gospel which prevents Christian thought from settling for 
a more accommodating faith, more straightforwardly 
conceptualised, of Oesus simply the eschatological 
prophet,climax of God's revelation to man,or of Oesus 
simply God(or a god) appearing on earth in human guise."
(79) I.Lakatos "Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes" CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH 
OF KNOWLEDGE (Ed) I.Lakatos & A.Musgrave Cambridge 
University Press 1974 Lakatos argues that the hard­
core of a research programme is rendered unfalsifiable by 
"the methodological decisions of its protagonists" p.133 
Note the similarity here with Surin's pragmatic 
presuppositions the truth of which have to be assumed
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before the christological project can get be initiated . 
Surin op cit p.98-99. A fuller development of Lakatos's 
conception of a research programme will be offered in the 
final chapter
(80) Lonergan on homoousios "down to the Council of 
Nicaea "homoousios " was understood in one sense and in 
one sense only: it meant "of one stuff"; and as applied
to the Divine Persons, it conveyed a metaphor drawn from 
material objects. The Fathers at Nicaea,then, did not 
find ready to hand a sharply defined, immutable concept 
which they made into a vehicle for the Christian 
message:on the contrary, they found a word which they 
employed in a metaphorical sense." B.8.F.Lonergan "The 
Dehellenisation of Dogma" A SECOND COLLECTION (Ed) 
W.F.O.Ryan & B.3.Tyrrell Darton,Longman & Todd 1974 
p.23
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(1) D.M.Baillie GOD WAS IN CHRIST Faber & Faber 1948 
Hereafter referred to as G.W.I.C
(2) See R.A.Norris,Jr. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY 
Fortress Press 1980 p.113ff for selected fragments of
Theodore’s doctrinal works.
(3) D.Brown THE DIVINE TRINITY op cit p.236
(4) S.T.Davies (Ed) ENCOUNTERING OESUS : A DEBATE ON 
CHRISTOLOGY John Knox Press 1988
(5) O.Hick "An Inspiration Christology" ENCOUNTERING 
OESUS p.22
(6) O.Hick ibid p.21
(7) O.Hick ibid p.22 Hick's reading of Baillie'e
work has not changed substantially from that offered in 
his first review of G.W.I.C in "The Christology of
D.M.Baillie" THE SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol. 11 
1 958 p.1-12. Hereafter referred to as SOT . However, it 
would be true to say that Hick's estimation of its value
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has changed significantly reflecting Hick’s own 
theological pilgrimage.
(8) S.T.Davies "Oesus Christ Saviour or Guru" 
ENCOUNTERING OESUS p.75/76 That Baillie continues to 
play an important role in contemporary discussion is 
evidenced by the recurring mentions of his approach 
throughout this work. Cf p.27f O.M. Robinson in his 
response to Hick's article argues that Baillie's picture 
of Christ is a recognisably N.T. picture, Robinson 
perhaps overpraises Baillie's book when he suggests that 
Barth's CHURCH DOGMATICS has been overtaken in 
importance by G.W.I.C . Similarly, Baillie's rejection 
of Kenoticism, anhypostasia and his views on the Trinity 
are criticised in R.O.Feenstra & C.Plantinga (Ed) 
TRINITY,INCARNATION AND ATONEMENT op cit p.4f
(9) D.Brown op cit p.236
(10) F.A.Sullivan THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THEODORE OF 
MOPSUESTIA Gregorian University Rome 1956 p.287/288 
Sullivan forcefully argues that Theodore's teaching is 
substantially the same as Nestorius.
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(11) Theodore "ON THE INCARNATION" Book VII Fragment 
2,cited in THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY (Ed) 
R.A.Norris op cit p.114
(12) Theodore ibid p.114
(13) Theodore ibid p.115
(14) Theodore ibid p.115
(15) Theodore ibid p.116
(16) Theodore ibid p.116-117
(17) cited in O.N.D Kelly EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES A 
& C Black 1985 p.307 cf Theodore Book V Fragment 1 
op cit p.113
(18) cited in O.N.D.Kelly op cit p.307
(19) O.N.D.Kelly ibid p.307
(20) Theodore Book VII Fragment 4 op cit p.117f
(21) Theodore ibid p.118
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( 2 2 ) J.N.D.Kelly op cit p .2 98/299
(23) H.Cuncliffe Oones (Ed) A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN 
DOCTRINE T & T Clark 1978 p.126
(24) H.Cunliffe Oones (Ed) ibid p.126
(25) Theodore Book VIII Fragment 7 op cit p.120 
cf.O.N.D.Kelly op cit p.306 Kelly says that we are 
bound to regard the Syriac version here with extreme 
suspicion as the linking of prosopon and hypostasis is 
unparalleled anywhere else in Theodore's writings. His 
true teaching, Kelly thinks, is that the Incarnate is 
'one prosopon'.
(26) Theodore Book VIII Fragment 8 op cit p.120
(27) Theodore Book VII Fragment 3 ibid p.118
(28) F.A.Sullivan op cit p.239
(29) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.225
(30) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.201
(31) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.218
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(32) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.254
(33) R.A.Norris MANHOOD AND CHRIST Oxford University 
Press 1963
(34) R.A.Norris ibid p.196
(35) R.A.Norris ibid p.201
(36) R.A.Norris ibid p.201
(37) R.A.Norris ibid p.216ff
(38) R.A.Norris ibid p.222
(39) R.A.Norris ibid p.222
(40) R.A.Norris ibid p.222
(41) R.A.Norris ibid p.223
(42) R.A.Norris ibid p.229
(43) of D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C for a contemporary 
development of what Norris is suggesting here
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(44) R. A. Norris MANHOOD AND CHRIST p.231
(45) R.A.Norris ibid p.232
(46) R.A.Norris ibid p.232
(47) R.A.Norris ibid p.232
(48) R.A.Norris ibid p.234
(49) O.N.D.Kelly op cit p.305/306
(50) Like Theodore, Donald Baillie draws his analogy of 
the "paradox of grace" from the realm of human religious 
experience. G.W.I.C p.114. Baillie may have been
influenced in this direction by the work of
Schleiermacher who argued that if the believer
acknowledged the possibility of the divine encountering 
the human in his own life, in terms of his own experience 
of the Holy Spirit,then there could be no impossibility 
of the same encountering taking place in the life of 
Christ although to an absolutely different degree. Cited 
in K.W.Clements FRIEDRICH SCLEIERMACHER Collins 1987 
p.203
(51)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.114
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(52)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.117
(53)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.117
(54)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.126
(55)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.130
(56)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.131
(57)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.131
(5B)R.A.Norris MANHOOD AND CHRIST p.238
(59)0.McIntyre "A Tale of Two exchanges: the Christology 
of D.M.Baillie" IN DIVERS MANNERS (Ed) D.W.D.Shaw ST 
Mary’s College 1990 p.152-153 McIntyre pertinently 
asks if Baillie has addressed the central question raised 
by Chalcedon and the theory of anhypostasia , namely, who 
is the subject of the experiences which we describe as 
having a divine and human nature. Since Baillie does not 
address this adequately McIntyre suggests that he does 
not solve the main problems raised by Chalcedon.
(60)0.Hick SOT op cit
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(61 )0. Hick ‘srT" p.10-11
(62)0.Hick SOT p.10
(63)0.Baillie "Some Comments on Professor Hick’s Article
on ’The Christology of D.M.Baillie'" SOT Mai 11 p.269
(64)0.Baillie ibid p.269
(65)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.106f
(66)D .M .Baillie G.W.I.C p.109 Baillie draws an
analogy between the necessary distortions involved in 
talking about God and those involved in the making of 
maps.As we need two different maps to accurately reflect 
the spherical shape of the earth on a flat surface 
sometimes we need to say two seemingly contradictory
things to capture the full reality of God.
(67)D .M .Baillie 'Unpublished lecture notes and draft 
version of God was in Christ . " Envelope 2BA Archive 
Material, University of St. Andrews Library. Cf G.W.I.C. 
p.109
(68)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.106
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(69)0.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.109-110
(70)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.129
(71)0.Hick SOT op cit p.8 For a response to Hick 
see 0.McIntyre's article in D.W.D Shaw (Ed) op cit 
p.1 55f
(72)0.Baillie SOT op cit p.269
(73)H.R.Mackintosh THE PERSON OF OESUS CHRIST p.432- 
434
(74)See 0. Robinson THE HUMAN FACE OF GOD SCM Press
1973 p.209f Robinson faces the degree/kind distinction
full square and argues for a similar approach to the one 
taken here,"If one had to choose, I should side with 
those who opt for a ' degree '-however enormous the 
degree."
(75)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.20
(76)cf 0,Robinson op cit p.113-114 "The formula we
presuppose is not one of a superhuman person with two 
natures,divine and human, but of one human person of whom 
we must use two languages. Oesus is wholly and completely
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a man,but a man who speaks truly of humanity and of God: 
he stands in God's place, he is God to us and for us." 
And again "The pressure to say divine things about Oesus 
in some form is inseparable from saying that he is the 
Christ." p.99 Another theologian who has made extensive 
use of the two languages approach is E .Schillebeeckx in 
OESUS:AN EXPERIMENT IN CHRISTOLOGY (E.T.) Collins 1974 
who argues that when we speak of Oesus we use two 
languages about the one event,one secular language and 
one faith language. p.656f
(77) I owe this example of the differing levels of a 
computer programme to P.Davies GOD AND THE NEW PHYSICS 
Penguin 1983p.62
(78)0.L.Mackie "Evil and Omnipotence" GOD AND EVIL (Ed) 
N.Pike, p.56. Mackie's article first appeared in Mind Vol 
LXIV No 254
(79)0.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY p.140 
McIntyre regards both Pittenger and Baillie as exponents 
of what he terms a psychological model of christology. 
Whilst recognising his intention it is important to note 
that Baillie explicitly thought that he was seeking to 
offer, not a psychological explanation of God's presence
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in Christ, but a deeper and more ultimate analysis. 
D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.20
(80)0.McIntyre op cit IN DIVERS MANNERS p.159
(81)D.Davidson "Psychology -as Philosophy" THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Ed) 0.Glover Oxford University Press 
1 976
(82)D .Davidson ibid p.102
(83)A.Thatcher TRULY A PERSON,TRULY A GOD SPCK 1990 
p.101 The concerns and issues of Thatcher's work are 
similar to this thesis. However, he prefers to attempt to 
defend Chalcedon via an 'analogical' theory of the 
person, I have attempted to present Donald Baillie's 
approach as a genuine middle way for christology. 
Thatcher makes no reference to Baillie at all#
(84)For the characterisation of Donald Baillie's theory 
as essentially Antiochene and in agreement with Theodore 
see W .N .Pittenger THE WORD INCARNATE James Nisbet and 
Company p.197. Pittenger is expressly developing a 
theory in relation to Theodore's account of the 
incarnation and his criticism of Baillie is that he has 
insufficiently attended to the ontological grounding of
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God's presence in Christ.This does not mean that 
Pittenger wishes to return to the category of substance 
for such an ontological grounding, he argues that God in 
the depths of his being is love. Therefore, the union is 
grounded ontologically in the loving relationship between 
God and the man Christ. Similarly, J.Robinson op cit 
argues that "Theodore grounds the incarnation in the 
personal purpose of God without sacrificing either the 
distinctiveness of Christ or his continuity with other 
men. He would have agreed with Augustine when he boldly 
said'Every man, from the commencement of his faith, 
becomes a Christian by the same grace by which that man 
from his formation became Christ." p.206 Robinson 
acknowledges that this quote is at the heart of Baillie's 
position.See also A.T.Hanson THE IMAGE OF THE INVISIBLE 
GOD SCM Press 1982 p.21
(85) D.Brown op cit p.235 Brown feels that
Baillie's position is just the Antiochene/Nestorian 
position in modern guise.
(B6)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.90
(B7)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. citing Augustine p.11B
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(88)D,M.Baillie Unpublished lecture notes on
christology.Archive Department, University of St.Andrews
(B9)D.M.Baillie 
christology.
Unpublished lecture notes on
(90)A.Harnack HISTORY OF DOGMA (E.T.) (Trs) J.Millar 
1898 p.129
(91)0.McGuckin "Did Augustine's Christology depend on 
Theodore of Mopsuestia" Heythrop Journal 31 1990
(92)J .McGuckin ibid p.40
(93)cited in J.McGuckin ibid p.46
(94)J.McGuckin ibid p.45/46
(95)J.McGuckin ibid p.45
(96)cited in J.McGuckin ibid p.48
(97)J.McGuckin ibid p.48
(98)cited in J.McGuckin ibid p.48
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(99)D .Brown op cit" p .235
(100)0.Brown ibid p.264f
(101)0.Brown ibid p.264f
(102)D.Brown ibid p.266
(103)0.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.20
(104)0.McIntyre ON THE LOVE OF GOD Collins 1962
p.1 B6f
(105)0.McIntyre op cit IN DIVERS MANNERS p.159
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(1) E. Ouengel GOD AS THE MYSTERY OF THE WORLD (E.T.)
T & T Clark 1903 In particular the sections which deal 
with God's unity with perishability and the humanity of 
God. Ouengel argues that if God's identification with the 
crucified Oesus is believed then an ontological question 
is put to our thinking as to how God can be united with 
death and perishability, p.21 Of. Hereafter GOD AS THE 
MYSTERY OF THE WORLD shall be cited as G.M.W.
(2) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.326
(3) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.228
(4) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.228
(5) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.228
(6) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.298
(7) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.219/220
(8) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p .220
(9) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.220
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(10) E .Ouengel G.M.W. p . 3 2 7 I am considerably 
foreshortening Ouengel's convoluted argument here and may 
therefore be guilty of doing less than full justice to
every precise nuance of his thought.
(11) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.327
(12) E.Ouengel G.M.W. p.329
(13) 0.McIntyre ON THE LOVE OF GOD Collins 1962
(14) 0.McIntyre ibid p.190/199
(15) 0.McIntyre ibid p.192
(16) 0.McIntyre ibid p.197
(17) 0.McIntyre ibid p.202/203
(10) 0.McIntyre ibid p.204
(19) 0.McIntyre ibid p.199 (My emphasis)
(20) 0.McIntyre ibid p.211
(21) 0.McIntyre ibid p.201
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(22) ].McIntyre ibid p.199
(23) 0.McIntyre ibid p.199
(24) For an indication as to how the divine life might 
permeate and pervade an individual human life see 
W.P.Alston "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit" in DIVINE 
NATURE AND HUMAN LANGUAGE Cornell University Press 1989 
p.246f Alston's concern is to show how the Holy Spirit 
might be at work in the sanctification of the individual 
in such a way that respects personal freedom. He suggests 
a 'sharing' notion whereby the individual's life is 
interpenetrated by the divine life. Such interpenetration 
is less that what is being suggested here as a possible 
model for the incarnation but that is appropriate as 
Alston is not dealing with a unique incarnation of God in 
a single life but with his sanctifying presence in every 
believer's life. However, the model suggests what could 
possibly be achieved
(25) For a very similar approach to the idea that shall be 
developed here see K. Rahner THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
Vol 1 (E.T.) Darton, Longman & Todd 1961 p.149-185 Rahner 
develops from a basic anthropological insight of human 
openness towards God a position which argues 'that only a 
divine person can possess as its own a freedom really
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distinct from itself in such a way that this freedom does 
not cease to be truly free even with regard to the divine 
person possessing it, while it continues to qualify this 
very Person as its ontological subject'(p162).
(26) For an example of an address and response christology 
see the following chapter where ].A.T.Robinson's 
unpublished doctoral thesis THOU WHO ART is examined. 
Robinson's thesis undergirds the type of approach he was 
later to suggest in THE HUMAN FACE OF GOD
(27) H.A.Wolfson THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS
Vol 1 Harvard University Press 1956 P.420f Wolfson
argues that the most accurate translation of perichoresis 
is penetration at all points. Wolfson cites the original 
christological use of the term in the writings of Gregory 
of Nazianzus, Pseudo-Cyril,Maximus the Confessor and John 
of Damascus. Wolfson concludes that the term perichoresis 
is a physical analogy suggesting thorough penetration as a 
means of explaining the communicatio idiomatum 
Perichoresis is always a mutual act but the penetration 
of the divine into the human is always prior to, and is 
the basis of, any human penetration (participation) in 
the divine.
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(2B) G.U.F.Hegel THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (E.T.) (Ed & 
Trs) Peter C. Hodgson Scholars Press 1979 p.95 It will 
be immediately obvious from the prior discussion of 
Juengel that his understanding of the self-differentiation 
within the eternal being of God is directly influenced by 
the thought of Hegel.
(29) ].McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY op cit 
p.lOOf, see also his article " A Tale of Two Exchanges: 
the Christology of D.M. Baillie" in IN DIVERS MANNERS 
(Ed) D.W.D. Shaw, St Mary's College 1990 p.153 for 
McIntyre's continued support for the composite hypostasis 
theory of Ephraim of Antioch.
(30) cf. W.P.Alston op cit p.251-252
(31) The rejection of the notion of divine impassibility 
is most famously associated with Jurgen Moltmann and his 
development of the implications of a theologia crucis in 
his seminal THE CRUCIFIED GOD (E.T.) SCM 1974 p.267f. 
Moltmann'8 thesis has been so influential that the idea of 
God suffering in his identification with human suffering 
has become almost paradigmatic for contemporary theology.
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(1) The idea of a divine incognito in the life of Christ 
is most famously associated in our century with the 
thought of Karl Barth. However, Barth almost certainly 
took the idea from Boren Kierkegaard who argued that in 
Jesus Christ God appeared * in a strict incognito, an 
incognito impenetrable to the most intimate observation'
5. Kierkegaard TRAINING IN CHRISTIANITY (E.T.) Princeton 
University Press 1946 p.27 The whole notion of a divine 
incognito was questioned by Donald Baillie who asked what 
was gained in the incarnation if nothing of the nature of 
God was revealed through it. D.Baillie GOD WAS IN CHRIST 
p .49
(2) D.W.D.Shaw "Identification and Incarnation" 
Unpublished lecture to New College Union, October, 1986 
p.4. Shaw's paper though unpublished forms the beginning 
point of this study of a christology of identification.
(3) D.W.D.Shaw ibid p.5
(4) Boethius TRACTATES Trs. H.f, Stewart,E.K.Rand &
S.J. Tester Harvard University Press 1973 p.85
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(5) R.Descartes■DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS 
Penguin 1968 Meditation 2 p.105
(6) G.111.F,Hegel THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION p.95
(7) J.MacMurray PERSONS IN RELATION Faber & Faber 1961 
p.17 For an interesting development of MacMurrays 
position in relation to christology which parallels some 
of the approaches taken here see A.Shutte "Indwelling, 
Intersubjectivity and God" SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY 
Vol. 32 1 979 p.201f
(B) J. A.T.Robinson THOU WHO ART Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation submitted Cambridge University 1946
(9) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.24f
(10) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.8/9
(11) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.67
(12) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.114
(13) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.142
(14) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.142
The Logic and Language of the Incarnation Page 381
Footnotes to Chapter Five
(15) J . A . T . R o b i n s o n THOU WHO A R T p.214
(16) 0.A.T.Robinson ibid p.215
(17) J. A.T.Robinson ibid p.215/216
(IB) A.I.McFadyen THE CALL TO PER50NH00D Cambridge
University Press 1990
(19) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.19
(20) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.21
(21) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.25
(22) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.41
(23) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.69ff
(24) W.Pannenberg ANTHROPOLOGY IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(ET) T & T Clark 1985 Hereafter referred to as A.T.P.
(25) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.62
(26) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.67
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(27) W.Pannenberg A.T.P p.150
(28) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.185
(29) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.191
(30) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.235
(32) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.241
(33) C. Taylor "The Person" in THE CATEGORY OF THE PERSON
(Ed) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, 5. Lukes Cambridge 
University Press 1985 p.296f
(34) For the classic expression of growth and development 
in the incarnation of Christ see O.A. Dorner HISTORY OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST Vol iii (E.T.)
T & T Clark 1861 p.328f " Since Christ exhibited true
humanity in an actual human life, a truly human growth 
pertains to Him. Since, on the other hand , God can only 
be perfectly manifest in Christ when the whole fulness of 
the Divine Logos has also become the proper fulness of 
this man in knowledge and volition, and therefore has 
become Divine-human, with the growth of the human side 
there is also necessarily given .in Him a growth of the 
God-humanity; and the incarnation is not to be thought as
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at once completed, but as continuous , nay augmentative.." 
This idea of Dorner's is picked up and developed by H.R. 
Macintosh in the PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST p495ff where it 
forms the basis of his kenotic theory. In a passage that 
strikingly prefigures the treatment I have offered here 
"Hence we may regard the union alternately and equally 
from two points of view, each of which is defined by the 
other. As the Father's gift, in a purpose infallibly sure 
of execution, it is Divinely real from the outset and sub 
specie aeternitatis . But also it is humanly actualised in 
time; it comes to fruition in One who "passes from a
destiny to a perfection through a career." (p.502) This 
type of approach is similar to that of Karl Rahner who
argues that Jesus is more completely at the disposal of 
the Logos than anyone else, op cit p.171/172f In his
openness towards God Jesus lives a life of absolute unique 
surrender to God which presupposes an absolute self- 
communication of God to man and this is incarnation. It
will be obvious from the text that I am in very broad 
agreement with these approaches with the constantly stated 
proviso that growth and development in Christ is not 
growth into unity but a growing realisation and expression 
of an already constituted unity.
(35) W.Panneneberg JESUS GOD AND MAN ( E . T . ). p.334f I 
am in broad agreement with Pannenberg's view that Jesus's
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personal community with the Father reveals his essential 
community although the essential community is of course an 
implication drawn by the community of faith after the 
resurrection. I am less convinced by his argument for a 
resurrection that is retroactive in its effects,
(36) W.Pannenberg ibid p.334 I am again in
agreement with Pannenberg on the indirect nature of 
Jesus' sonship if this means that the person Jesus knew
himself to be obedient to, was God his Father. However, to 
read off from Jesus' historical filial relation to God the 
Father an eternal ontological relationship of Sonship is
less than persuasive. I would prefer to follow Juengel and 
to find the basis of differentiation in the eternal being 
of God in thinking through the implications of God's 
identification with the death of Jesus on the Cross.
(37) J.A.T.Robinson op cit p.227ff
(38) J.A.T. Robinson ibid p.229/230 cf
McFadyen op cit for an essentially similar position " 
Christ is not only the second person of the Trinity, but 
divinity and humanity together, a human as well as a 
divine person. From the divine side, Christ is God's 
address to us: but from the human side, he is the perfect
human response to that address. Christ is therefore the
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place where divine address and undistorted human response 
coincide, the place where God's call and proper human 
response meet." p.46
(39) P .Schoonenberg THE CHRIST (E.T.) p.87
"Now not the human but the divine nature in Christ is 
anhypostatic , with the proviso, moreover, that this is 
valid inasmuch as we do not know the person of the Word 
outside the man Jesus." Schoonenberg goes to describe what 
he terms the enhypostasia of the Word in the human life 
of Jesus, Much of this is essentially in accord with the 
position developed in this thesis.
(40) The most famous exponent of the idea that it is from 
Jesus Christ that we understand what is divine and what 
is human is, of course, Karl Barth. He writes "We cannot 
then, from the standpoint of a previously clarified 
conception of God, or of a previously clarified 
anthropology, understand what it means when in the New 
Testament the Son of God is called Jesus of Nazareth.... 
The incarnation of which the Holy Scriptures speaks can be 
understood only from the standpoint of Holy Scripture,ie., 
of the name Jesus Christ, or of the simple, once for-all 
reality indicated by this name." CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol 1 
part 2 (E.T.) T & T Clark 1956 p.14/15
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(41) The idea that man finds freedom in obedience, in 
correspondence, to the gracious call and demand of God 
finds support in Karl Barth's treatment of man's action in 
response to the gracious call of the commanding God, In 
this response of obedience to God's call man, as a 
Christian, both acquires and exercises his freedom. K. 
Barth THE CHRISTIAN LIFE (E.T.) T & T Clark 1981 
p.42-43.
(42) P. Schoonenberg op cit p.34ff Engages in a
profound analysis of Nature and Grace and argues that no 
sharp division can be drawn been nature and God's gift of 
grace. With particular relevance to my thesis that God's 
grace comes to us in encounter with others see p.41 " Only
in the other man, in his giving relationship to me and in 
my giving relation to him, does God's grace stand before 
me as giving."
(43) W.P.Alston op cit p.248f Alston develops the
idea that an internalisation of the promptings of God 
through the interpenetration of the human and divine life 
can influence human actions yet respect human freedom
(44) W.Pannenberg OESUS GOD AND MAN p.350f
Pannenberg here effectively denies a genuine freedom of 
the will in Oesus Christ as a freedom of choice for Jesus'
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will would make his unity a work of human will instead of 
that unity being experienced as a work of God, Despite 
what I have already said about finding broad agreement 
with Pannenberg’s position I must reject this concept of 
Jesus' freedom in favour of the one I have outlined in the 
thesis. It seems that Pannenberg's stress upon the filial 
obedience of Jesus has led him to effectively give that 
obedience a constitutive ontological role as the 
foundation of the unity of the person of Christ. If 
Pannenberg wishes to say that Jesus's personal obedience 
and community with God the Father reveals a prior 
essential community then I would have to agree. But if 
this were the case he would not have to deny a free-will 
to Jesus for the type of unity presupposed in a 
christology of identification is established prior to 
Jesus' response though it reaches ever greater realisation 
in the perfected obedience of Christ. To be sure 
Pannenberg is correct to say that when a mission has 
siezed a man unconditionally he no longer has any choice 
with respect to that mission. This may be thought of as 
corresponding to the account given in the chapter of the 
sedimentation of past significant choices contributing to 
the enduring person which is the self so that in future 
certain siginificant choices are sure to be made.
(45) This is of course a paraphrase of J.L. Mackie's
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famous refutation of the free-will defence in " Evil and 
Omnipotence" GOD AND EVIL (Ed) N . Pike Prentice Hall 
1964. For a response to Mackie's argument see my "Evil 
and the Logic of Freedom: Tensions Unresolved" THE
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES Vol XI No.2 Autumn 
1 990 where it is argued that only a being with the 
attributes of God could be ensured to always act rightly.
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(1) R.Bauckham "Christology Today" in SCRIPTURA 27 
(1 988) p.24
(2) R.Bauckham ibid p.25
( 3 ) li), P . Alston op cit p.223f
(4) For a social view of the Trinity see D,Brown op cit 
p.289f see also his "Trinitarian Personhood and 
Individuality" p.4Bf in ( Ed)R.3.Feenstra & C.Plantings 
op cit In the same volume see C.Plantinga "Social 
Trinity and Tritheism" p .21f for another development of 
the relational model of the Trinity.
(5) D.Brown op cit p.294
(6) D.Brown ibid p.294f see also T.V.Morris
L .G .I . p.213f Although Morris inclines towards a
social view of the Trinity he argues that his theory does 
not require it. I am n.ot convinced that it does not but 
nevertheless a similar position is being maintained in 
this thesis in that although I incline towards a unitary
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understanding of the Trinity the theory of identification 
does not require it.
(7) D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.136
(8) I.Lakatos "Falsification and Methodology of
Scientific Research Programmes" op cit p.91-196
(9) I,Lakatos ibid p.133
(10)1.Lakatos ibid p.135
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(1 ) There are many books covering the development of 
early Christian doctrine but see especially G.N.D.Kelly 
EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES A & C Black 1985; F.Young 
THE MAKING OF THE CREEDS SCM Press 1991; A.Grillmeier 
CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION Mowbrays 1975;
(Ed)H.Cunliffe Bones A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE T 
& T Clark 1980
(2)cited in H.Bettenson DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH Oxford University Press 1977 p.48
(3) Athanasius THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD OF GOD
(Trs. & Ed) C.S.Lewis Mowbray 1982 p.76f see also
Book III ORATIONS AGAINST THE ARIANS cited in THE 
CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY p.85f
(4) Athanasius Book III ORATIONS ibid p.83/84
(5) Athanasius ibid p.85
(6) Athanasius THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD OF GOD 
op cit paragraph 8 p.33 & paragraph 17 p.45/46
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(7) Athanasius Book III ORATIONS cited in THE EARLY 
CHRISTIAN FATHERS (Ed) H.Bettenson Oxford University 
Press 1969 p.288-289
(8) 3.N.D.Kelly op cit p.2BBf
(9) Apollinarius FRAGMENTS cited in R.A. Norris op cit 
p.108-111. At a number of points Apollinarius makes it 
clear that the intellect or rational soul of God the Son 
is the directing principle of the incarnate Christ, 
This point is not affected by the discussion as to 
whether or not Apollinarius had a dualistic or tri­
partite view of human nature.
(10) Athanasius Book III ORATIONS cited in THE
CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY op cit p.96-97
(11) cited in H.Bettenson DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH op cit p.45
(12) The Hypostatic union teaches that the union 
between the divine and human natures in Christ is 
substantial and takes place in the hypostasis or person 
of God the Son, Confusion surrounded the meaning of the 
term hypostasis as it covered a number of meanings 
ranging from underlying reality or substance of a thing,
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where it is an equivalent term to ousia , or it could 
mean an the individual instantiation of an ousia . Its 
use in Trinitarian discussion tended to drive the
chr is tological use of the term towards the second of
these two senses. In the context of christological 
debate the Antiochene/Nestorian understanding of 
hypostasis tended towards the first of these two
senses. Therefore a hypostatic union seemed to them to
necessitate some sort of change to the divine substance
or nature. This threatened the impassibility of the Word 
and the Antiochene response was to argue that each
nature possessed its own hypostasis , ie. were concrete 
instances of their respective natures. They could not be 
united hypostatically for this would mean a change into 
a hybrid type of creature. The Antiochene solution was 
to respect the integrity of each nature and consequently 
each hypostasis and to argue that the union was
prosopic . Prosopon also has the sense of individual 
or person but its root meaning is that of face, mask or 
external appearance. To the Alexandrians a prosopic 
unity seemed to speak of a union which was one of 
external appearance only and therefore posited an 
unwanted duality in the person of Christ. Also the
Antiochene structure seemed to suggest to them that in 
the incarnation we did not have the direct and
unqualified involvement of God the Son, For a fuller
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account of the derivation of these terms see G.UI,Lampe 
A PATRISTIC GREEK LEXICON Clarendon Press 1961
(13)3.N.D.Kelly op cit p.312
(14)3.N.D.Kelly ibid p.311
(15)H .Bettenson ’The Anathemas of Cyril of Alexandria’ 
cited in DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH op cit 
p . 46
(16)3.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY p.94
(17)The interpretation of Chalcedon which argues that 
the human nature of 3esus had no hypostasis came to be 
known as the theory of anhypostasia . A development of 
this position was offered by Leontius of Byzantium who 
argued that the human nature found its hypostasis in 
the hypostasis of the Word as was thus enhypostatic 
For a modern defence of the concept of enhypostasia see 
K.Barth CHURCH DOGMATICS VOl. 4 part 2 T & T Clark 
1958 p.49f. Barth argues that hypostasis does not 
refer to the personality of Christ but rather to the 
independent existence of Christ. Accordingly the theory 
does not mean that the humanity of Christ was
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'impersonal* but that it had no separate and independent 
existence apart from the Word of God, This is certainly 
a helpful addendum but it does not solve the central 
issue about how one resolves the fact that if Christ is 
truly human then there would appear to be two complete 
individuals in the one person of Christ,
(18) ].McIntyre ibid p.B8/89f
(19) W.Pannenberg op cit p.295/296 Gives a brief
outline of the mediaeval discussion. See also H.Kung
THE INCARNATION OF GOD (E.T.) T & T CLark 1987 p.530f
(20)T.Gilby (Ed) St. THOMAS AQUINAS THEOLOGICAL TEXTS 
Oxford University Press 1 955 p.289-290 & p300-301
(21) Aquinas SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Book Four
University of Notre Dame Press 1975 Chapters 38-44
p.185-202, of. Gilby op cit p.300
(22) A.E,McGrath "Homo Assumptus? A Study in the
Christology of the Via Moderns with particular 
reference to William of Ockham" p.291 EPHEMERIDES
THEOLOGICAL LOVANIENSES Vol. 60 1984
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(23) A.E.McGrath ibid p.292
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